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DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD?  LESSONS FOR RISK DISCLOSURE &
ESG REPORTING REFORM FROM THE REGULATION
S-K CONCEPT RELEASE
VIRGINIA HARPER HO*
ABSTRACT
In 2018 and 2019, the SEC released the first new rules to emerge from
a decades-long project to “modernize and simplify” the disclosure obliga-
tions that apply to publicly traded companies under Regulation S-K.  Most
are pragmatic fixes that should make disclosure more user-friendly for in-
vestors and cheaper for companies.  Largely missing, however, are any
changes to the basic rules governing how companies provide information
to investors about risk, including emerging “environmental, social, and
governance” (ESG) risks.  In part, this is because of persistent concerns
that such reforms will result in costly over-disclosure that will overload in-
vestors and obscure useful information.  Using data from nearly 300 pub-
lic comments submitted during the SEC’s own review of its reporting
framework, this study challenges some of these key objections to ESG dis-
closure reform.  As the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the public
comment data across over 140 questions raised by the SEC, it also offers a
valuable resource for current policy debates and sheds light on fundamen-
tal issues that will shape the future of risk disclosure reform.
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Excessive disclosure . . . can overload investors with immaterial information
that can render more material information difficult to find and evaluate.
~ Exxon Mobil (2016)1
[H]igh levels of immaterial disclosure can obscure important information or
reduce incentives for certain market participants to trade or create markets for
securities.
~ Regulation S-K Concept Release (2016).2
INTRODUCTION
IN 2018 and 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) re-leased the first new rules to emerge from a decades-long project to
“modernize and simplify” the disclosure obligations that apply to publicly
traded companies under Regulation S-K.3  Most are technical changes that
simplify corporate reporting and reduce duplication and redundancy,
pragmatic fixes that should make disclosure more user-friendly for inves-
tors and cheaper for companies.  Largely missing, however, are any
changes to the basic rules governing how companies provide information
to the market about risk, including emerging “environmental, social, and
governance” (ESG) risks.4  Using data obtained from the SEC’s own re-
view of its reporting framework under Regulation S-K, this Article chal-
lenges some of the key objections to ESG disclosure reform and sheds
light on a range of fundamental issues that will shape the course of any
future changes to how companies disclose risk.
1. Comment of David S. Rosenthal, Vice Pres., Exxon Mobil (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-355.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9SXC-E87M].  Unless otherwise indicated, all further references to comments in
this Article are addressed to Brent J. Fields, Secretary of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, in response to the Business and Financial Disclosure
Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,919 (Apr.
22, 2016) [hereinafter Concept Release].
2. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,919.
3. Disclosure Update and Simplification, 83 Fed. Reg. 50,148 (Oct. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter 2018 Final Rules] (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 210, 229–30, 240, 249
& 274) (amending numerous rules under Regulation S-X, which governs financial
statements, as well as certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the ‘33 Act),
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘34 Act), Regulation S-K, and other provi-
sions); FAST Act Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-K, 84 Fed. Reg.
12,674 (Apr. 2, 2019) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 229–30, 239–40, 249, 270 &
274–75) [hereinafter 2019 Final Rules]; Modernization of Regulation S-K Items
101, 103, and 105, Rel. No. 33-10668 (proposed Aug. 8, 2019) [hereinafter 2019
Proposed Rules].  The SEC had previously introduced final rules on other aspects
of the disclosure regime beyond Regulation S-K, but the 2018 and 2019 amend-
ments are the first to affect the content of Regulation S-K.
4. The term “ESG” is sometimes used to refer to “sustainability” or non-finan-
cial information, even though it is broader than the former and narrower than the
latter.  On the relationship among these terms, see Richard Barker & Robert G.
Eccles, Should FASB and IASB Be Responsible for Setting Standards for Nonfinancial In-
formation? 6–8 (Green Paper, Oct. 12, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3272250 [https://perma.cc/N5VN-NF4L].
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The absence of more ambitious modifications to risk disclosure thus
far is due less to the SEC’s prudence and incrementalism and more to the
fact that disclosure reform has become increasingly contentious.  A prime
objection is the potential for over-disclosure—the fear that any expansion
of reporting requirements will overload investors with insignificant infor-
mation that will obscure what is truly material.5  Corporations and busi-
ness groups also raise concerns that new disclosure rules will expand the
space for disclosure-related litigation, impose higher compliance costs on
reporting companies, and discourage listings on U.S. securities
exchanges.6
Investors, on the other hand, increasingly assert that the problem of
companies’ public filings is more one of under-reporting and information
asymmetries than disclosure overload.7  Many argue that corporations are
failing to identify emerging environmental or social risks as material to
investors and so important risk-related information is not being ade-
quately disclosed under existing rules.8
5. This concern was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1978) (“[I]f the stan-
dard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its man-
agement be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements, but
also management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply
to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information a result that is
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.”), quoted in Basic v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
6. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,919 (noting all of these as factors
weighing against expansive disclosure rules).  See generally CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS.
COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ESSENTIAL INFORMATION: MODERN-
IZING OUR CORPORATE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM (2017), https://www.centerforcapital
markets.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/U.S.-Chamber-Essential-Information
_Materiality-Report-W_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2Z-6M5E] (arguing
that ESG information does not fall within the Supreme Court’s definition of mate-
riality and that advocates of ESG disclosure “seek to reconceptualize materiality to
advance their own objectives”).
7. In 2018, institutional investors representing over $5 trillion in assets under
management joined a petition urging the SEC consider new rulemaking on ESG
disclosure by public companies. See Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Request for
Rulemaking Petition on Environmental, Social and Governance Disclosure (Oct.
1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/ETY9-YTRN]; see also id. at 14–16 (citing four prior petitions on gender pay
ratio, human capital management, human rights, political spending disclosure,
and tax disclosure); Council of Institutional Investors, Congressional Submitted
Testimony, Hearing on Building a Sustainable and Competitive Economy: An Examina-
tion of Proposals to Improve Environmental, Social and Governance Disclosures Before the
H. Subcomm. on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, 116th Cong.
2 (July 9, 2019) [hereinafter CII Testimony], https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and
_advocacy/correspondence/2019/July%209%202019%20(finalI)%20Subcommit-
tee%20hearing%20letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X29-JF7P] (arguing that ESG
disclosures in public filings are inadequate with respect to ESG risk).
8. CII Testimony, supra note 7; see also Williams & Fisch, supra note 7, at 2,
10–12; KIRAN VASANTHAM ET AL., 2019 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY 15–16
(2019), https://www.morrowsodali.com/uploads/insights/attachments/ae189c64
14e1ef6b0eed5b7372ecb385.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6XX-QTHH] (last visited
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Demand from investors and regulators for more information on
emerging ESG risks has been on the rise in recent years, fueled by growing
recognition of their financial materiality.9  Governments and multilateral
institutions,10 including the United Nations,11 the OECD,12 the G20,13 the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),14 the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB),15 the Worldwide Federa-
tion of Exchanges,16 and the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO),17 are all promoting ESG disclosure reform as a way
July 10, 2019) (finding that 80% of institutional investors support the integration
of ESG factors into existing mandatory disclosures).
9. See generally Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated
Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210
(2015) (analyzing this evidence since the 1970s); see also TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-
RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD), FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 5–11 tbls.1 & 2
(2017) https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-
TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9MH-5Z5T] (identifying the fi-
nancial impacts of climate-related risk).
10. See generally WIM BARTELS, ET AL., KPMG INT’L ET AL., CARROTS & STICKS:
GLOBAL TRENDS IN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING REGULATION AND POLICY (2016)
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/carrots-and-sticks-may-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VMS-Z2TN] (identifying approximately 400 mea-
sures in over sixty countries); see also REPORTING EXCHANGE, https://www.report-
ingexchange.com [https://perma.cc/XNV9-6JPE] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019)
(subscription based) (identifying seventy governments that have now adopted sus-
tainability reporting measures, 80% of which are mandatory).
11. See About the PRI, PRI, http://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri/ [https://
perma.cc/49N2-UPLR] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (describing the United Nations’
voluntary framework for institutional investors who commit to engaging with cor-
porations around non-financial performance).
12. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE AND THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL,
AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS (2017), https://www.oecd.org/finance/Investment-
Governance-Integration-ESG-Factors.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ2U-YY3H].
13. See About the Task Force, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE RELATED FINANCIAL DIS-
CLOSURES, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/PD4A-ESC3] (last
visited Feb. 21, 2019) (explaining the mandate of the TCFD from the G20’s Finan-
cial Stability Board).
14. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, STATEMENT
ON DISCLOSURE OF ESG MATTERS BY ISSUERS 1 (2019), https://www.iosco.org/li-
brary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S96-S6BW] (acknowl-
edging the potential impact of ESG matters on issuer operations and investment
risk and return).
15. See, e.g., Speech: IASB Chair on What Sustainability Reporting Can and Cannot
Achieve, IFRS (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/2019/04/
speech-iasb-chair-on-sustainability-reporting/ [https://perma.cc/Y7TX-X9LR]
(noting the IASB’s support for ESG reporting harmonization and the limits of
disclosure as a form of regulation).
16. The World Federation of Exchanges Publishes Five Sustainability Principles for
Member Exchanges, WORLD FED’N EXCHS. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.world-ex-
changes.org/news/articles/world-federation-exchanges-publishes-five-sus-
tainability-principles-member-exchanges [https://perma.cc/V7C4-C9KN].
17. See Sustainable Finance, INT’L ORG. STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/
committee/7203746.html [https://perma.cc/Q9RA-FQUU] (last visited Sept. 21,
5
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to help capital markets more accurately price environmental and social
risks and to encourage companies to become more accountable for the
external impacts of their operations.18  Regulators are also increasingly
concerned about the systemic effects of climate-related risk on financial
markets and aware of the need to make sure markets can more efficiently
direct capital toward sustainable uses.19 While there have been some ef-
forts in Congress to take up these issues,20 the SEC has thus far resisted
investor calls for ESG disclosure reform, and current reporting require-
ments for U.S. public companies deal with these questions in a largely ad
hoc manner.21
Fortunately, a rich source of data already exists that sheds light on
whether the federal disclosure framework suffers from critical gaps or in-
stead exacerbates over-disclosure.  In 2016, as part of its comprehensive
review of the federal disclosure regime, the SEC issued an ambitious con-
cept release seeking public comment on the effectiveness of certain re-
porting requirements under Regulation S-K that apply to public
companies (the Concept Release).22  In the Concept Release, the SEC
2019) (establishing a technical committee to develop standards for sustainable fi-
nance and integrating ESG and sustainability considerations into financial
analysis).
18. These two objectives have different rationales and justifications; for the
first, those rationales are directly economic, while the second rests more directly
on public policy and stakeholder-oriented rationales.  Virginia Harper Ho & Ste-
phen Park, Non-Financial Reporting: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Disclosure, 41
U. PENN. INT’L L.J. 249, 270–76 (2019).
19. See EUROPEAN UNION HIGH-LEVEL WORKING GRP. ON SUSTAINABLE FIN., FI-
NANCING A SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN ECONOMY 20–22 (2017) [hereinafter EU REPORT
ON SUSTAINABLE FINANCE], https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/170713-sus-
tainable-finance-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JCS6-4WMF]; see also About the
Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/sustainablede-
velopment/sustainable-development-goals/ [https://perma.cc/3XG9-XBYL] (last
visited, Feb. 21, 2019).
20. A bill to address climate risk disclosure was introduced in the Senate in
2018.  Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018, S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018).  In July
2019, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services’ Subcommit-
tee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets held hearings
on “Proposals to Improve Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure,” in-
cluding several bills on the topic that were pending in Congress at the time of the
hearings. See generally Hearing: Building a Sustainable and Competitive Economy: An
Examination of Proposals to Improve Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosures,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. REPOSITORY (July 10, 2019 2:00 PM),
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=109770
[https://perma.cc/4SDY-MDC7] (referencing the “ESG Disclosure Simplification
Act of 2019,” the “Shareholder Protection Act of 2019,” the “Corporate Human
Rights Risk Assessment, Prevention, and Mitigation Act of 2019,” and the “Climate
Risk Disclosure Act of 2019,” among others).
21. See generally infra Section III.B; see also Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial
Disclosure & the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 425–30 (2018) (sur-
veying these rules and the state of ESG disclosure).
22. Due to space limitations, the full list of questions in the Concept Release
is not reproduced here. To review the public comments on the Concept Release,
see Comments on Concept Release: Business and Financial Disclosure Required by
6
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raised questions on many aspects of risk disclosure.  It also for the first
time sought input on whether ESG issues are material to investors and
whether the current reporting framework already elicits adequate ESG in-
formation.23  The SEC received over 25,000 comments, including over 375
unique responses.24  Most focused entirely on the eight questions covering
ESG issues without responding to the hundreds of other areas on which
the SEC sought guidance.  Eighty percent urged the SEC to improve how
companies disclose ESG information in their public filings.25
This Article presents the results of the first in-depth empirical analysis
of the public comments to the Concept Release, and the only one thus far
to focus on risk-related disclosure.26  It utilizes a hand-collected dataset
drawn from the public comments submitted in response to the Concept
Release as of December 31, 2017, as well as further evidence of corporate
and investor perspectives on risk-related disclosure since then.27  It begins
by presenting a descriptive analysis of over 140 of the questions raised in
the Concept Release,28 creating a rich foundation for the second part of
the analysis, which uses these data to test competing hypotheses about the
extent to which investors and public companies are concerned about over-
disclosure under Regulation S-K with respect to risk disclosure generally
and ESG information specifically.
This study seeks to identify where investor and reporting company
views differ significantly from each other on the need for disclosure re-
form, and to assess the extent to which areas of disagreement are most
Regulation S-K, Rel. Nos. 33-10064, 34-77599 [hereinafter Regulation S-K Com-
ments], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616.htm [https://perma
.cc/37FT-27DU] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
23. Concept Release, supra note 1, at section IV.F (“Disclosure of Information
Related to Public Policy and Sustainability Matters”).
24. See Regulation S-K Comments, supra note 22.
25. SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., THE STATE OF DISCLOSURE
2016: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE IN SEC FIL-
INGS 4 (2016) [hereinafter SASB], https://www.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/state-of-
disclosure-2016/ [https://perma.cc/C2PJ-8VGS]; see also TYLER GELLASCH, TO-
WARDS A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY: A REVIEW OF COMMENTS TO THE SEC’S DISCLOSURE
EFFECTIVENESS CONCEPT RELEASE 21 (2016), https://www.ussif.org/Files/Pub-
lic_Policy/Comment_Letters/Sustainable_Economy_Report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/28WQ-NA5A] (noting that if form letter responses are included, support for
ESG reform exceeds 99%).
26. There are three primary prior analyses of the public comments: Comment
of J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law,
Comment to the Regulation S-K Concept Release (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-374.pdf [https://perma.cc/EU5C-FB9M] (ana-
lyzing previously submitted comments); SASB, supra note 25; and GELLASCH, supra
note 25.
27. See infra Part II (explaining the methodology used in this study).  The
analysis presented here is also supported by evidence of corporate and investor
perspectives on risk-related disclosure since the Concept Release. See, e.g., CTR.
FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 6.
28. See infra Appendix, at Table 1 (detailing the coverage of this study relative
to all Concept Release questions).
7
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relevant to future SEC rulemaking proposals.  These questions remain crit-
ical as Congress and the SEC continue to assess the need for further dis-
closure reform,29 particularly because the SEC’s rulemaking to date
addresses ESG disclosure and other core aspects of risk disclosure raised
in the Concept Release only to a limited extent.30
This study moves beyond the few prior reports on the Regulation S-K
Concept Release in several important ways.  First, these reports either fo-
cus narrowly on the eight Concept Release questions on ESG disclosure or
present high-level summaries of respondents’ views.31  Earlier reports have
therefore failed to capture the extent to which ESG disclosure issues are
integrally related to basic elements of the current disclosure framework
covered in the Concept Release, namely:
• the scope of the Commission’s statutory authority;32
• the nature of disclosure requirements;33
• disclosure of risk factors, risk management, and forward-looking
information;34
• the continued relevance of Industry Guides;35 the use of scaled or
phased disclosures;36 and
• the use of company websites, hyperlinking, and other aspects of
disclosure delivery.37
This study takes advantage of the large number of unique responses
to the Concept Release to produce a more nuanced, empirically grounded
analysis.  It is the first comprehensive analysis of the Regulation S-K public
comment data with respect to ESG and risk disclosure.
The findings here confirm that concerns about investors’ disclosure
overload are overblown and indeed, outdated.38  While many investors
support some streamlining of risk-related disclosure, most investor com-
ments focus on the under-disclosure of material information, not the re-
verse.  The empirical results discussed in Part III below confirm that
respondents’ support for, or opposition to, ESG disclosure reform has less
to do with ESG and more to do with their underlying views on materiality,
the value of prescriptive disclosure, and how satisfied they are with the
current state of reporting.  At the same time, this study also finds a surpris-
29. 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 9 (confirming the Commission’s intent
to consider further changes to the disclosure regime on the basis of earlier re-
quests for comment, including the Regulation S-K Concept Release).
30. On the scope of the prior rules, see generally 2018 Final Rules, supra note
3; see also 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 9–10 (summarizing the 2019 amend-
ments); 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3.
31. See supra note 26 (citing these reports).
32. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at section III.A.1 & section IV.F.
33. See id. at section III.B.
34. See id. at section IV.C.
35. See id. at section IV.E.
36. See id. at section IV.H.
37. See id. at part V.
38. See infra Sections III.B.7 & C and sources cited therein.
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ing level of agreement among respondents on a number of the SEC’s pro-
posals to simplify risk-related disclosures, particularly with regard to
market risk disclosures and Management’s Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A).
Part I of this Article introduces the SEC’s ongoing review and reform
of disclosure under Regulation S-K.  Part II describes the data, research
questions, and methodology of this study.  Part III presents a detailed anal-
ysis of the comment responses, followed by the primary research findings
and conclusions.  Due to the length of the Concept Release, readers inter-
ested in the primary conclusions of this study may wish to focus on the
empirical analyses in Section III.C, while those interested in particular as-
pects of the Concept Release or Regulation S-K should focus on Sections
III.A–B.
I. UNDER-REPORTING, DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD & THE CHALLENGES OF
RISK-RELATED DISCLOSURE REFORM
The Concept Release and the 2018 and 2019 disclosure reforms are
part of a comprehensive review of the federal disclosure regime that Con-
gress first mandated in 2012 under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act.39  In 2015, Congress extended that mandate under the Fixing
America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act.40  The primary purpose of
this effort was to “modernize and simplify” the disclosure system for the
benefit of both investors and reporting companies.41  More particularly,
Congress directed the SEC to “scale or eliminate” reporting rules in a
manner that reduces the “costs and burdens” on emerging growth compa-
nies, smaller reporting companies (SRCs), and other issuers, and to elimi-
nate unnecessary or redundant provisions, while still providing material
information to investors.42  Avoiding the twin problems of over- and
under-reporting is therefore a basic goal of the SEC’s ongoing review of
the federal disclosure regime.43
This Part briefly introduces the SEC’s disclosure reform project.  It
then explains the core positions that define the debate on over- and
39. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 108, 126 Stat.
306 (2012).
40. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat.
1312 (2015) [hereinafter, FAST Act].
41. Id. §§ 72002–72003.
42. Id. § 72002; see also Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,921 (citing this
authority).
43. Congress was particularly concerned about the potential burden of re-
porting obligations for smaller issuers and emerging growth companies (EGCs),
but the SEC broadened its focus to consider the effectiveness of the disclosure
framework for all companies. SEC, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIRE-
MENTS IN REGULATION S-K 1–4 (Dec. 2013) [hereinafter REGULATION S-K STUDY],
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JWC-EG37].
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under-reporting and how these issues relate to broader questions sur-
rounding how corporations disclose risk.
A. The SEC’s Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative
The SEC issued the Concept Release in April 2016 as part of its “Dis-
closure Effectiveness Initiative,”44 following a 2013 report to Congress on
the disclosure framework and an initial public comment period that
strongly informed the questions and proposals in the Concept Release.45
The Concept Release contains 340 multi-part questions relating to the bus-
iness and financial disclosure rules contained in Regulation S-K.  Although
it addresses the goals and manner of disclosure, as well as specific disclo-
sure requirements, the Concept Release does not cover all aspects of Reg-
ulation S-K, nor does it address the financial disclosures required under
Regulation S-X, which were part of a separate review.46  Also excluded are
some matters, such as executive compensation and corporate governance,
on which the SEC sought input separately and which have been more fre-
quently updated.47  Until the recent issuance of the 2018 and 2019
amendments, the business and financial disclosures covered by the Con-
cept Release had been largely unchanged since their adoption.48
The SEC received 26,887 responses to the Concept Release, among
the highest response rates on any major SEC proposal in the past ten
years.49  As will become evident in Part III, the reason the Concept Release
attracted such a strong public response was because it simultaneously
raised questions about the compliance burdens of disclosure and the pos-
sibility of new ESG reporting rules.
Between 2018 and 2020, the SEC issued final and proposed rules that
address a small subset of the issues raised in the Concept Release without
responding to the core questions on ESG disclosure that attracted this his-
44. See generally Spotlight on Disclosure Effectiveness, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/disclosure-effectiveness.shtml [https://perma.cc/3DJB-U7LF] (last mod-
ified Dec. 13, 2016).
45. See generally REGULATION S-K STUDY, supra note 43.
46. See Spotlight on Disclosure Effectiveness Review, supra note 44.
47. See Request for Comment on Subpart 400 of Regulation S-K Disclosure
Requirements Relating to Management, Certain Security Holders, and Corporate
Governance Matters, Release No. 33-10198, 114 SEC Docket 5254, at 3 (Aug. 25,
2016),  https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2016/33-10198.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N3WX-T23Y] (soliciting comments on subpart 400).
48. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,921.
49. GELLASCH, supra note 25, at 15 (reporting that “the Concept Release gar-
nered more public comments than all but five of the 161 major proposals issued by
the SEC since 2008”). This figure includes 9,893 submissions (Form A) from a
campaign by Public Citizen that urged new disclosure rules on corporate political
spending, overseas tax payments, and adoption of sustainability plans.  An addi-
tional 16,302 form submissions (Form B) focused on country-specific reporting of
subsidiaries, tax obligations, and employee-related disclosures.  Forms A and B are
available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-34.htm [https://perma.cc/
D7J5-5SXJ] (last visited June 10, 2019).
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toric level of public attention.50  For the most part, the new rules amend
Regulation S-K to eliminate requirements that in the view of the Commis-
sion had “become redundant, duplicative, overlapping, outdated, or su-
perseded,” given other required disclosures and the evolution of U.S.
GAAP.51  Table 1 of the Appendix identifies the aspects of the 2018 and
2019 Final Rules and the 2019 and 2020 Proposed Rules that relate to
issues covered by the Concept Release.  Where relevant to this study, these
changes are described in Part III below.  The Agency has indicated that it
intends to consider again the input it has received from the Concept Re-
lease in future rulemaking initiatives,52 though at the time of this writing,
the future of ESG reform remains uncertain.
B. Under- or Over-Reporting?  Risk & the Debate over ESG Disclosure Reform
The vast majority of the public comments to the Concept Release fo-
cused to some extent and often exclusively on ESG disclosure issues.53
The level of attention ESG disclosure attracted is particularly striking in
view of the broad scope of the Concept Release: these questions represent
only 8 of its more than 300 questions.  The scale of the response on these
issues is also significant in light of the fact that the SEC had already issued
guidance in 2010 explaining that disclosure of material ESG information
is required under several provisions of Regulation S-K.54  These include,
for example, mandatory environmental disclosures, MD&A, and risk factor
disclosures, all of which are discussed in Part III below.55  One reason for
this strong response is that the debate over whether public companies are
burdened by over-disclosure, prone to systematically under-disclose, or
50. The sole exception is the proposed addition of human capital to the list of
factors companies may disclose as material under Item 101(c).  2019 Proposed
Rules, supra note 3; see also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing this proposal).  None of
the rules adopted to date address ESG issues, nor do the 2020 proposed amend-
ments. See generally 2018 Final Rules, supra note 3; 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3;
Management’s Discussion and Analysis, Selected Financial Data, and Supplemen-
tary Financial Information, Rel. No. 33-10750 (proposed Jan. 30, 2020) [hereinaf-
ter 2020 Proposed Rules].  Because the first congressionally mandated SEC staff
report on the Concept Release was released in November 2016 soon after the pres-
idential election (and when public comments were still being received), its propos-
als were extremely modest, nonpartisan, and uncontroversial. See REPORT ON
MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF REGULATION S-K (2016) [hereinafter
REGULATION S-K REPORT], https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-fast-act-report-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQJ2-9JQ4].
51. 2018 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 50,148; 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at
12,674.
52. 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at note 9.
53. See infra Section III.B.7 (analyzing comments on these questions).
54. SEC, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE], https://
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B6G-AD62].
55. See id. at 6295–97 (explaining their application to material climate-related
disclosure).
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both was already well underway as of mid-2016 when the Concept Release
was released for public comment.56
Of course, mandatory disclosure is widely accepted as essential to in-
vestor protection, market efficiency, and capital formation.57  Disclosure
mandates are necessary because of the recognized managerial biases that
result in the underproduction of information, particularly negative infor-
mation,58 and because of the public benefits and cost savings that arise
from the standardization of disclosure’s content, format, and quality.59
Disclosure mandates also serve an important corporate governance func-
tion in reducing agency costs, as managers who are subject to greater
transparency are less likely to engage in shirking or self-dealing.60  Trans-
parency and reputational interests can themselves compel changes in cor-
porate behavior,61 even if formal enforcement of disclosure rules is
weak.62  For these reasons disclosure is a common “soft” regulatory tool
56. For a survey of this debate in the legal literature, see Harper Ho, supra
note 21, at 431–40.
57. The Concept Release itself observes that “[l]owering information asym-
metries between managers of companies and investors may enhance capital forma-
tion and the allocative efficiency of the capital markets. . . .  [Disclosure] may lead
to more accurate share prices, discourage fraud, heighten monitoring of the man-
agers of companies, and increase liquidity.”  Concept Release, supra note 1, at
23,919; see also INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 3 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS-
COPD561.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUN9-S6FX (observing that the purpose of
mandatory disclosure is to protect investors from fraud, to promote “fair, efficient
and transparent markets,” and to reduce systemic risk).
58. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 759–62 (2006) (discussing disincentives against trans-
parency in the secondary markets); see also Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig, Reinier
Kraakman & Edward Rock, Corporate Law and Securities Markets, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 246–47 (Reinier
Kraakman et al., eds., 3d ed. 2017) (summarizing the empirical evidence of under-
reporting).
59. See Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and the
JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 224–26 (2013) (highlighting the fairness
interests in a level playing field as a key rational for mandatory disclosure); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733–34 (1984) (describing as “social waste” the transac-
tion costs in the under and overproduction of securities research that arise in the
absence of mandatory disclosure).
60. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336–38 (1979) (explaining these
effects as part of investor protection); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1335–56 (1999) (presenting these arguments); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra
note 58, at 718 (same).
61. On the role of disclosure as a regulatory and private governance tool, see
Harper Ho & Park, supra note 18, at 273–88 (discussing these goals and the inter-
actions between public and private disclosure regimes).  A seminal article on this
point is Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342–45 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Lia-
bility in the Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 968 (2019) (explaining
12
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used by both governments and private standard setters.63  All of these
goals are undermined in in the absence of disclosure regulation, since
firms and their managers have strong incentives to under-report—particu-
larly when it comes to risk.64
However, the sheer length of public filings has expanded dramatically
over time, perhaps in response to disclosure rules that may have become
outdated or irrelevant.65  In TSC Industries v. Northway,66 and later in Basic
v. Levinson,67 the Supreme Court expressed concern that excess immate-
rial information might produce disclosure overload, working against the
goals of mandatory disclosure and hurting investors by obscuring material
information.68
In addition, most of the “specialized disclosures” the SEC adopted at
Congress’s direction under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act have been highly un-
popular among affected companies.  These include reporting on the use
of conflict minerals, payments to foreign governments by extractive sector
companies, mine safety, and business activities in Iran.69  Most specialized
disclosures have faced legal challenge and some were struck down in
the weakness of disclosure rules and fraud-on-the-market litigation in compelling
and enforcing risk disclosure).
63. See Harper Ho & Park, supra note 18, at 273–88 (presenting a typology of
public and private approaches).
64. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146
U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997) (describing cognitive biases that lead to the under-identi-
fication and under-disclosure of risk and negative risk events); see also Harper Ho,
supra note 21, at 440–43 (explaining why establishing appropriate risk disclosure
rules is particularly difficult).
65. Ernst & Young observed in a 2012 report that the size of disclosures had
quadrupled in the preceding years. ERNST & YOUNG, TO THE POINT: NOW IS THE
TIME TO ADDRESS DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD (2012), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic
.com/gateway/sec/speech/
$FILE_TothePoint_BB2367_DisclosureOverload_21June2012.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VHM4-FQ5J].  This study was cited by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) in support of its own disclosure effectiveness review, which was
ongoing at the same time as the SEC’s review of Regulation S-K. What You Need to
Know About Disclosure Framework, FASB (2014) https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/
Page/SectionPage&cid=1176164203721 [https://perma.cc/7GK4-JE36].
66. 426 U.S. 438 (1978).
67. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
68. Id. at 231 (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448–49).
69. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1502–1504, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m (2018)); 17 C.F.R. § 229.104 (2019) (mine safety); see also Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 219,
126 Stat. 1214, 1235–36 (2012); Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12,
2012); Mine Safety Disclosure, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,762 (Dec. 28, 2011).  The SEC’s
final rule on Payments to Governments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-78167 (2016), was repealed February 14, 2017 by Pub. L. No.
115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (2017), and a proposed replacement is currently pending.  Dis-
closure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 85 Fed. Reg. 2522 (Dec. 18,
2019).
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whole or in part on constitutional or administrative law grounds.70  Since
2016, the Trump Administration’s deregulatory policies have also led to
several efforts to further pare back on disclosure rules and to prevent the
adoption of new reporting requirements.71  For companies and some SEC
commissioners, the prospect of new ESG disclosure mandates also raises
many of the same concerns that specialized disclosures did about the po-
tential costs of any expansion of reporting obligations, and the potential
for firms to face increased exposure to disclosure-related litigation.72
Some of these concerns are heightened because of the nature of ESG
information, for example:
(i) The term “ESG” is subject to a wide range of interpretations, so
its scope is potentially open-ended in the absence of narrowing
definitions established by regulation or legislation.
(ii) ESG information is often related to the business and legal risks
associated with corporate operations and therefore will often be
forward-looking and difficult to quantify or predict with
certainty.
(iii) Like cybersecurity risk, ESG risks are often described as “emerg-
ing,” and therefore the materiality of particular ESG informa-
tion may be more likely to change over time and to vary across
issuers.
(iv) Evidence from market participants suggests that which ESG is-
sues are material to companies and their investors varies by in-
dustry sector.73
These features also raise challenges for regulators considering whether
and how to craft appropriate disclosure rules.
70. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Pub. L. No.
115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (2017) (repealing the resource extraction payments rule); see also
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d. 518, 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (invalidating
part of the conflict minerals disclosure rules).
71. See, e.g., Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Or-
der No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (limiting the adoption of new
federal regulations unless other regulations are proposed for repeal).  The Finan-
cial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong., tit. III, §§ 311–341 (2017), if
passed, would have imposed procedural limits on new guidance or rule-making by
the SEC and other financial regulators.
72. See, e.g., Hester M. Peirce, My Beef with Stakeholders: Remarks at the 17th An-
nual SEC Conference, Center for Corporate Reporting and Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2018/09/24/my-beef-with-stakeholders-remarks-at-the-17th-annual-sec-con-
ference-center-for-corporate-reporting-and-governance/ [https://perma.cc/
TGH7-EPYZ] (opposing ESG disclosure as opening a Pandora’s Box).
73. See generally Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on
Materiality, 91 ACCT. REV. 1697 (2016) (assessing the materiality of indicators devel-
oped by SASB); see also TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES,
FSB, IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RE-
LATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/12/FINAL-TCFD-Annex-Amended-121517.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2BAB-JYCR] (providing sector-specific indicators).
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Finally, the fact that most publicly traded companies already produce
ESG information in some form raises the question of whether more
targeted ESG disclosure rules, whatever their form, are necessary.  Over
85% of companies in the S&P 500 produce voluntary sustainability reports,
so some of this ESG information is already publicly available to investors
and the capital markets.74  Although their quality and comparability are
uneven across firms,75 some companies also voluntarily include sus-
tainability or other ESG concepts in their Form 10-Ks, annual reports, or
proxy statements.76  In addition, companies must already disclose ESG in-
formation in their public filings if expressly required to do so under ex-
isting disclosure rules and if necessary to make disclosed information not
misleading.77  Several current SEC commissioners and business organiza-
tions have therefore expressed the view that ESG disclosure is best left to
private ordering—companies can elect to voluntarily disclose ESG infor-
mation, and investors can engage directly with the companies they invest
in, file shareholder proposals seeking disclosure, or litigate if they believe
corporate disclosures are materially inadequate.78
However, by 2016, international organizations, foreign regulators,
and institutional investors had already begun to raise concerns about the
74. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST., FLASH REPORT: 86% OF S&P INDEX
COMPANIES PUBLISH CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY/RESPONSIBILITY REPORTS IN 2018
(2019), https://www.ga-institute.com/press-releases/article/flash-report-86-of-sp-
500-indexR-companies-publish-sustainability-responsibility-reports-in-20.html
[https://perma.cc/ZW4V-4K8E].  Smaller companies are far less likely to produce
sustainability reports. ERNST & YOUNG, IS YOUR NONFINANCIAL PERFORMANCE RE-
VEALING THE TRUE VALUE OF YOUR BUSINESS TO INVESTORS? 9 (2017) http://www.ey
.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_Nonfinancial_performance_may_influence_
investors/$FILE/ey-nonfinancial-performance-may-influence-investors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GVE4-6TEX] (finding that the level and quality of sus-
tainability reporting among smaller public companies is significantly lower than
for larger public companies).  There is some evidence, however, that this informa-
tion is not efficiently incorporated into market prices. See, e.g., Harrison Hong, et
al., Climate Risks and Market Efficiency (NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., Working Paper
No. 22,890, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22890.pdf [https://perma.cc/
27TX-XRHX] (analyzing cross-sectional data from thirty countries and finding
that stock markets do not efficiently price climate risk).
75. On these limits, see SASB, supra note 25; Williams & Fisch, supra note 7, at
9–12; see also infra Section III.B.7 (identifying similar concerns in the Concept
Release comments).
76. INT’L INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL (IIRC) INSTITUTE & SUSTAINABLE
INVESTMENTS INSTITUTE (SI2), STATE OF INTEGRATED AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
29–33 (2018) [hereinafter IIRC] (reporting that 40% of the S&P 500 include ESG
concepts in their public filings); Era Aganosti et al., E&S Disclosure Trends in SEC
Filings 2018–2019, WHITE & CASE LLP (June 26, 2019), https://www.whitecase
.com/publications/alert/es-disclosure-trends-sec-filings-2018-2019 [https://perma
.cc/6D9S-5H67] (reporting that over 90% of the top fifty Fortune 100 firms in-
creased the environmental and social disclosures in Form 10-Ks and proxy state-
ments from 2018–2019).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2001); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2013).
78. See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 72; CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 6.
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costs and risks to investors of corporate under-reporting of ESG informa-
tion.79  Surveys of institutional investors in the U.S. and abroad continue
to find rising demand for ESG information, matched with growing dissatis-
faction with its limited accessibility, comparability, and consistency.80  Vol-
untary sustainability reports are also subject to different materiality and
reliability standards than those that apply to public filings, and ESG infor-
mation in such reports is costly to identify, obtain, and incorporate in in-
vestment analysis.81  These factors have led most investors to rely primarily
on the more limited ESG information companies provide in their public
filings, which is more accessible and is reported in a consistent, analyzable
format.82
Nonetheless, there is also evidence that material ESG information is
under-reported in public filings, in part because of companies’ failure to
identify ESG information as material and in part because of a lack of inte-
gration between the corporate risk management, internal controls, and
reporting functions that apply to public filings, and those through which
voluntary reports are produced.83  For example, in its 2018 guidance on
the integration of ESG-related risks into enterprise risk management, the
79. See generally supra notes 11–17 and sources cited therein.  On the eco-
nomic rationales of institutional investor demand for ESG information, see gener-
ally Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring
Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (drawing on empirical studies in fi-
nance,  accounting, and business ethics).
80. These surveys find, on average, that 70% to 80% of institutional investors
consider ESG information as important or essential to investment analysis. See, e.g.,
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLC, SUSTAINABILITY GOES MAINSTREAM: INSIGHTS INTO
INVESTOR VIEWS 6–9 (2014), http://www.truevaluemetrics.org/DBpdfs/Sus-
tainability/PwC/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W3CZ-9FTW]; PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLC, SUSTAINABILITY DISCLO-
SURES: IS YOUR COMPANY MEETING INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS? 7 (2015), https://
greenmoney.com/sustainability-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/N2NM-PCLP]
(finding that “82% of investors were dissatisfied with how risks and opportunities
are identified and quantified in financial terms” and “79% were dissatisfied with
the comparability of sustainability reporting between companies in the same indus-
try”); ERNST & YOUNG, TOMORROW’S INVESTMENT RULES 2.0 12–13 & fig.2.2 (2015),
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-ccass-institutional-investor-sur-
vey-2015/$FILE/ey-ccass-institutional-investor-survey-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8UHZ-4ASS] (reporting that over 80% of surveyed investors considered minimiz-
ing ESG risk as essential or important); ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 74, at 6, 18
(finding that nearly reporting that nearly 70% of surveyed institutions identified
corporate nonfinancial performance as “pivotal” in investment decisions).
81. See IIRC, supra note 76, at 26–33 (discussing these limitations); see also
Comment of Barry C. Melancon, President & Chief Executive Officer, Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants (AICPA) (July 20, 2016) [hereinafter, AICPA Com-
ment Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-194.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q9RF-FLZT].
82. See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors Congressional Submitted Testi-
mony, supra note 7.
83. See IIRC, supra note 76, at 26 (discussing firms’ materiality judgments on
sustainability); AICPA Comment Letter, supra note 81. See generally SASB, supra
note 25  (reporting on analysis of nearly 600 Form 10-Ks).
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Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO)84 identified the causes of the lack of alignment between volun-
tary ESG disclosures and mandatory risk disclosures to include lack of
“cross-functional collaboration between risk management and sus-
tainability practitioners” and a lack of alignment between the sustainability
specialists responsible for ESG risk disclosure and those responsible for
management and disclosure of strategic, operational, or financial risks.85
Institutional investor support for ESG rulemaking petitions and more re-
cent surveys of institutional investors underscore these concerns.86
In short, the Concept Release was issued against the backdrop of
widespread controversy over how much disclosure is enough and how
much is too much, particularly as it relates to ESG information.  To be
sure, the SEC has already modified the form and content of disclosure
rules to reduce immaterial disclosure and to ensure that material informa-
tion reaches investors as cheaply and effectively as possible.87  Congress
has also, through legislation, intervened at times to reduce the potential
burden and litigation risk of periodic reporting, for example, by establish-
ing statutory safe harbors.88  As discussed in Part III, most of the Concept
Release is intended to gauge public perception on whether these tools
should be more widely used and whether the existing rules strike the right
balance.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Because of its broad scope and the strong response it generated, the
Concept Release and the data it elicited are an important resource for
Congress, the SEC, and policy advocates as they consider future disclosure
84. COSO is a joint initiative of the American Accounting Association, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Financial Executives Interna-
tional, the Association of Accountants and Financial Professionals in Business, and
the Institute of Internal Auditors for the development of enterprise risk manage-
ment and internal control frameworks. See About Us, COSO, https://www.coso
.org/Pages/aboutus.aspx [https://perma.cc/84LP-ZFZ7] (last visited Feb. 10,
2020).
85. COSO & WORLD BUS. COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEV. (WBSCD), ENTERPRISE
RISK MANAGEMENT: APPLYING ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL SO-
CIAL AND GOVERNANCE-RELATED RISKS 5 (2018), https://www.coso.org/Docu-
ments/COSO-WBCSD-ESGERM-Guidance-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3RQ-
9K6Y] (citing results of a 2017 survey of WBCSD member companies).
86. See, e.g., Williams & Fisch, supra note 7; see also VASANTHAM ET AL., supra
note 8 (presenting the results of a 2019 survey).
87. Many of these tools are considered in the Concept Release, supra note 1,
and in Part III, infra, including: (i) the use of Industry Guides and other sector-
specific guidance; (ii) automatic sunsets or review periods for new rules; (iii)
scaled or phased disclosure or exemptions that would apply to smaller or newer
issuers; and (iv) the use of materiality qualifiers.
88. A prime example is the safe harbors for forward-looking information es-
tablished in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-2 & 1578 u-5 (2018).
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reforms.  This Part describes the core research questions, hypotheses,
data, and methodology of this study.  Part III presents the results.
A. Research Questions & Hypotheses
The purpose of this study is two-fold.  First, it provides an in-depth
descriptive account of whether, in the view of Concept Release respon-
dents, the current reporting regime should be expanded, reduced, or
amended to facilitate better risk-related disclosure, potentially to include
material ESG information.  Table 1 in the Appendix identifies the topics
covered by the Concept Release and those that are included in this analy-
sis.89  Second, this study attempts to answer several key questions about
where respondents align on the issue of over-disclosure and to identify
factors that affect respondents’ support for or opposition to ESG disclo-
sure reform.  The research questions relevant to each of these two goals
are presented below.
1. Risk-Related Business & Financial Disclosure in Regulation S-K: A
Descriptive Analysis
Sections III.A and III.B below present the descriptive analysis of re-
spondents’ views on risk-related disclosure under Regulation S-K.  It be-
gins with an analysis of comments on general topics addressed at the start
of the Concept Release that are broadly relevant to disclosure reform: (i)
the nature of disclosure requirements, that is, whether principles-based
disclosure, prescriptive rules, or a mixed approach is optimal; (ii) the au-
dience for disclosure; and (iii) whether new disclosure rules should be
adopted on a temporary basis.  With respect to these issues, reporting
companies are expected to prefer the greatest flexibility and space for
managerial judgment and to oppose any expansion of disclosure obliga-
tions.  They are therefore expected to prefer principles-based disclosure
over line-item rules and to urge that any reforms be adopted, if at all, only
on a temporary basis.  Investors and investor advocacy organizations, in
contrast, are expected to be more supportive of prescriptive rules adopted
on a permanent basis.  Both groups may be willing to support reforms that
simplify disclosure, depending on the nature of the reform.
The next set of topics analyzed here cover specific provisions of Regu-
lation S-K that relate to risk disclosure: (i) Item 101 (Description of the
Business); (ii) Item 303 (Management’s Discussion & Analysis); (iii) Item
105 (formerly, Item 503(c)) (Risk Factors); and (iv) Item 505 (Market
Risk & Risk Management).90  As indicated on Table 1 of the Appendix,
89. Table 1 also identifies those provisions that have been amended by the
2018 and 2019 Rules.  Excluded from this study are disclosures outside of Regula-
tion S-K, such as those under the proxy rules, and those not raised in the Concept
Release.
90. Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2012), which requires disclosure of mate-
rial legal proceedings, is not included in the Concept Release and so is referenced
only to a limited extent in Section III.B.2, infra (analyzing comments on Item 101).
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infra, several topics in the Concept Release that relate to financial risk but
that overlap to some extent with the content of financial reports are not
included in this study; where the questions in these sections are not rele-
vant to risk disclosure, they are also excluded.91  Sections of the Concept
Release concerning the format, presentation, and delivery of disclosure
are not addressed separately but instead are discussed as they relate to risk
disclosure.
In general, reporting companies and others who favor giving greater
discretion to management are expected to support proposals to reduce
line-item disclosures, provide a safe harbor from litigation over disclosed
information, or add materiality qualifiers to existing provisions.92  Inves-
tors would be expected to support the opposite in order to obtain the
most expansive, specific, and comparable disclosures possible.
The final section of Section III.B below analyzes comments on section
IV.F of the Concept Release, which addresses whether Regulation S-K
should be amended to introduce new ESG reporting requirements.  Re-
spondents’ perspectives on these issues are generally expected to parallel
their views on risk disclosure rules in Regulation S-K.  Reporting compa-
nies are generally expected to resist new ESG disclosures, to dispute ESG
materiality, and to favor the status quo, while investors are expected to
believe that material ESG information is under-disclosed and that current
rules, SEC guidance, and voluntary sustainability disclosures are
inadequate.
2. The Over-Disclosure Debate
The second part of this study focuses on the question of over-disclo-
sure itself, and its primary goals are also two-fold.  The first is to identify
whether there are statistically significant differences in the views of inves-
tors, the business community (referred to here as “issuers”), and others on
risk-related disclosure, ESG reporting, and information overload.93  The
specific research questions related to this objective are:
(1) Are there significant differences among issuer and investor views
on whether over-disclosure is a critical problem?  Are issuers or
investors equally worried about over-disclosure?
(2) Are there significant differences among issuer and investor views
on whether under-disclosure of ESG information is a critical
problem?
91. These include for example, section IV.D of the Concept Release (con-
cerning Items 201, 202, 701, and 703), and section IV.G of the Concept Release
(regarding exhibits).
92. Mandatory disclosures may be qualified by the addition of language such
as “if material” so that only information deemed material to investors by the corpo-
ration must be disclosed.
93. Table 2 of the Appendix, infra, explains the categorization of
respondents.
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(3) Are there significant differences among issuer and investor views
on whether over- or under-disclosure problems affect the risk-re-
lated provisions of Regulation S-K (Items 101, 303, 503 (now
105), & 305)?
(4) Do respondents’ views vary significantly with regard to the appro-
priate approach to disclosure (i.e., the use of prescriptive, princi-
ples-based, or mixed approaches to disclosure)?
These questions generate the following hypotheses, based on the
literature reviewed in Part I.  Further context in support of these hypothe-
ses is presented throughout the analysis of the findings in Section III.B
below.
H1: Investors are less concerned about over-disclosure than issuers.
H2: Investors are more concerned than issuers about under-disclo-
sure of ESG information.
H3: Investors are more concerned about under-disclosure of material
information on risk.
H4: Investors are more likely than issuers to support prescriptive dis-
closure rules.
The second goal is to clarify the source of the expected (and observed)
variation in respondents’ views on the need for ESG disclosure using a
regression analysis. Specifically:
(5) Are respondents’ views on the value of ESG disclosure correlated
with or affected by their views on the value of prescriptive disclo-
sure or their degree of satisfaction with the current reporting
framework?
Hypothesis 5 relates to this question:
H5: Respondents’ support for (opposition to) ESG disclosure reform
is positively (negatively) related to (w) their alignment with in-
vestors and other consumers of disclosure or with issuers, as pro-
ducers of disclosure; (x) their support for prescriptive disclosure;
(y) their views on ESG materiality; and (z) their views on the
adequacy of the current reporting framework.
B. The Public Comment Data
To test these hypotheses, this study utilizes a dataset based on the full
set of 375 unique comments posted to the SEC’s website as of December
31, 2017.94  Of these, comments were identified for inclusion in the
dataset if they focused on risk-related disclosure, which was defined as
those comments that addressed any question or concept in either section
III.C or section IV.F of the Concept Release.  Section III.C is the part of
the Concept Release that addresses the core risk-related disclosure rules in
Regulation S-K and section IV.F of the Concept Release focuses on “public
94. Three additional comments not included in this study were filed as of
December 2018.
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policy and sustainability matters.”95  Ambiguity was resolved in favor of in-
clusion, resulting in 282 comments in the dataset.  Together these re-
present 75% of the total pool of 375 unique comments.  Excluded from
this study are the more than 25,000 form responses submitted by two in-
vestor campaigns.96  Had these been included, they would have dramati-
cally amplified support for new disclosure requirements with respect to
ESG issues, specifically disclosure of political contributions, foreign tax
payments, sustainability strategy, and the identification of foreign
subsidiaries.
1. Compilation & Data Coding
The next step in compiling the dataset was to code each comment for
any response to any of the 140 questions, as well as sub-questions, within
the Concept Release that relate in some way to risk-related disclosure, as
shown on Table 1 of the Appendix.  These represent 40% of the 340 num-
bered questions in the Concept Release.  In addition, each subpart of a
multi-part question in the Concept Release was coded separately, resulting
in multiple unique variables for many of the numbered questions.  Be-
cause some questions elicited only narrative responses, not every question
of relevance to the study is included in the quantitative analysis.  Examples
from the narrative responses are included in Part III where relevant.
Every comment was hand-coded three times to ensure accuracy and
consistency—first by two research assistants, then by the author.  At the
initial stage of review, research assistants identified each specific question
from the risk-related sections of the Concept Release that the comment
addressed in any way.  The respondent’s position on the issue was noted if
it was clear (e.g., support or oppose), and responses were noted as “un-
specified” if the comment addressed the issue but did not state a clearly
identifiable position.  The goal of this approach was to identify most
broadly those who had an interest in or view on a particular issue.
In some cases, comments identified specific responses by question
number; in such cases, the response was coded as responding only to the
identified question.  Otherwise, the comment was coded as responsive to
each question to which it could pertain.  The purpose of this approach was
to give the broadest expression to all clear positions expressed in each
comment.  Non-responses were disregarded in the analysis, since respon-
dents mention only the issues of concern to them.  After all basic re-
sponses to particular questions were coded, the author reviewed each
comment letter twice: first to confirm its support or opposition to specific
questions was coded appropriately and to identify common alternative re-
sponses, and a second time to confirm the accuracy of the initial coding.97
95. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,969–73.
96. On the investor campaigns, see supra note 49.
97. A clear limitation of relying on a single researcher to code the data is that
it raises the possibility of error and subjectivity.  However, because of the sheer
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2. Unique Features of the Public Comment Data
Several general features of SEC public comment data deserve men-
tion, as they affect the conclusions that should be drawn from the results.
The first is that public comments are not representative of the underlying
populations the respondents may represent.  Individuals submitting re-
sponses are likely to hold stronger opinions than those who do not, and
most comments are submitted by advocacy organizations, companies, and
other institutions.  Second, most commentators do not, and in the case of
this lengthy Concept Release possibly could not, respond to all of the
questions the SEC raises.  There are therefore many questions in this study
that garnered few or no responses,98 and others for which a quantitative
analysis of the responses is impossible due to the small number of com-
ments on that question.99  Indeed, these factors often prevent any kind of
empirical analysis of public comments of the kind done here.  At the same
time, the decision to respond to a specific question is a strong indicator of
its importance to the respondent.  For these reasons, the analysis here only
considers the views of respondents relative to others who expressed a posi-
tion on the same issue.
The nature of public comment data also introduces other unavoida-
ble sources of subjectivity into any analysis.  Because the underlying data is
textual, much of the richness of the responses is best reflected in the lan-
guage of the comments, but the selection of some of these voices necessa-
rily amplifies them over others.  In addition, the process of coding both
generic and highly specific responses as “pro” or “con” inevitably sacrifices
nuance and complexity for the sake of quantification.
A final question is whether to weight certain comments more heavily
than others.  Here, as is typical of public comments, 60% of the respon-
dents are organizations, not individuals, and some of these organizations
represent tens or hundreds of individuals or even other organizations with
their own institutional members.100  Organizational responses arguably
should carry more weight than individual responses, since they reflect the
collective views of many individuals or even organizations.101  However,
because not all comments indicate the number of individuals they re-
number of questions and responses involved, utilizing parallel coding by multiple
researchers was considered impractical and more prone to inconsistency.  The idi-
osyncratic nature of each comment also made automated tools less useful.
98. See, e.g., infra note 167 and accompanying text (regarding the limited re-
sponses to Concept Release questions concerning the cost-benefit impacts of pro-
posed MD&A disclosures).
99. For example, responses on the question of whether current MD&A rules
result in immaterial disclosures were too limited to permit analysis of differences
among respondent groups. See, e.g., infra Table 12 (reporting responses to Ques-
tion 89 of the Concept Release).
100. On the demographics of respondents, see infra Part III.
101. The identity of the speaker often also affects the weight the SEC affords
a particular comment because of the reputation or experience of the
commentator.
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present, it is not possible to adjust or weight all responses and so any effort
to do so in select cases would inevitably be arbitrary.  In addition, many
responses here include statements endorsing the comments of another
respondent; although these endorsements have been identified in the
dataset, this analysis does not weight responses receiving endorsements
more heavily since it is difficult to know whether an endorsement applies
to all elements of a given comment or not.102  Therefore, in this study,
each comment is weighted equally.
C. Methodology
This Article uses basic descriptive statistics and Fisher’s exact test of
independence to test Hypotheses 1 through 4 and to identify statistically
significant variation among investor, issuer, and other respondents’ views
on each Concept Release question.103  Insignificant test results would in-
stead suggest that there is substantial agreement across the three respon-
dent groups (investors, public companies or trade associations (i.e.,
issuers), and other respondents) with respect to that variable (i.e., ques-
tion).  These results are reported in Part III for specific questions in the
Concept Release.  Table 3 of the Appendix and Section III.C of the analy-
sis report the results of the Fisher exact tests for the variables that relate to
Hypotheses 1 through 4, respectively.
As shown in Table 3 of the Appendix, multiple variables based on
specific questions in the Concept Release are relevant to each of Hypothe-
ses 1 through 4.  Because the Concept Release contained general ques-
tions associated with the independent variables for Hypotheses 2 and 4, a
tetrachoric correlation analysis was used to test whether the specific vari-
ables (i.e., questions) identified in this study104 as indicating support for
ESG disclosure reform (Hypothesis 2) and the use of prescriptive rules
(Hypothesis 4) are in fact correlated with those variables in the dataset.105
102. Eighteen of the 282 total comments (6%) endorsed those of others, to-
taling 57 endorsements.  However, few comments received multiple endorsements;
the SASB received the highest number (4), followed by the National Association of
Manufacturers (3).
103. As shown in Table 2 of the Appendix, infra, respondents were catego-
rized for ease of analysis into three groups: “investors,” “issuers,” and “other.” See
also infra Section III.A (reporting descripive statistics on these groups).  Fisher’s
exact test does not indicate the source of any observed nonrandom association
between the group responses.
104. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.
105. Specifically, the tetrachoric correlation analysis in this study confirms
which individual variables are correlated with (i) support for ESG reform; (ii) op-
position to ESG reform; (iii) support for the use of prescriptive disclosure rules;
(iv) opposition to the use of prescriptive disclosure rules; and (v) respondent views
on ESG materiality. See infra Appendix, at Table 3.  These results are not reported
here but are on file with the author.  Tetrachoric correlation analysis can be used
with dichotomous variables, such as the “pro” and “con” responses to Concept
Release questions, and the results indicate the positive or negative directionality of
the correlation. See generally John S. Ubersax, Introduction to the Tetrachoric and
Polychoric Correlation Coefficients, http://john-uebersax.com/stat/tetra.htm [https:/
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The results confirm that responses to the individual questions shown on
Table 3 are an appropriate basis on which to draw conclusions regarding
Hypotheses 2 and 4.
For the SEC to correctly interpret the public comments, it is also use-
ful to undestand why respondents support or oppose a given measure
rather than simply observing that they do.  This study uses three separate
methods to measure the effects of the factors that are expected to affect
respondents’ views (Hypothesis 5).  First, textual review of the comments
themselves provides an initial indication of these effects; some of this lan-
guage is incorporated in the notes throughout.  Second, logistic regres-
sion is used to isolate the independent effects that certain respondent
characteristics, namely the identity of the respondent and their views on
general disclosure principles, have on their support or opposition to ESG
disclosure reform.106  To test the robustness of the findings and symmetric
responses, multiple models are used: in the first set of models (together,
Model I), the dependent variable is support for ESG reform, and in the
second set of models (together, Model II), the dependent variable is oppo-
sition to ESG reform.  Further detail on these models is provided in Sec-
tion III.B below.  Third, the tetrachoric correlation analysis used to test
the variables associated with Hypotheses 1 through 4 is also used as a fur-
ther robustness check on the results of the regression analysis.
III. RESEARCH FINDINGS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part presents the research findings in two parts.  Following a
description of the Concept Release respondents in Section III.A, Section
III.B provides a detailed descriptive analysis of investor and issuer views on
each of the risk-related disclosure topics within the Concept Release.107
Again, due to the broad scope of the Concept Release, Section III.B is
somewhat lengthy, so readers interested in the broader conclusions of this
study should proceed to Section III.C.  Section III.C presents the research
findings from the empirical tests of the five hypotheses outlined above.
Further descriptive data as well as supporting detail for those empirical
tests are found in the Appendix.  These findings challenge common mis-
perceptions about information overload and reveal surprising areas of
agreement between investors and issuers regarding potential directions
for future risk disclosure reform.
/perma.cc/Z6SN-R396] (last revised Sept. 8, 2015). This analysis was only possible
for Hypotheses 2 and 4 because the Concept Release included specific questions
that reflected the independent variables for these hypotheses—support for ESG
reform, and support for prescriptive disclosure, respectively.
106. The tetrachoric correlation discussed above supports preliminary find-
ings but cannot control for possible spurious relationships among variables; thus,
this third method is used.  Because these data reflect respondents’ views at a single
point in time, the regression analysis cannot be used to establish a causal relation-
ship; however, it can identify correlations among the dependent and independent
variables.
107. See infra Appendix, at Table 1 (detailing the scope of this study).
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A. Concept Release Respondents
As shown in Table 2 of the Appendix, comments on the Concept Re-
lease were submitted by a wide range of respondents, including academics,
current and former government officials, advocacy groups, corporations,
trade associations, and retail and institutional investors (asset owners and
asset managers), as well as various professionals and other experts.  To
facilitate analysis, respondents were categorized as “investors,” “issuers,”
and “other,” as shown in Figure 1.108  Of the 72 advocacy organizations
and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose comments are
included in this study, 21% are business-oriented, 57% are investor-ori-
ented, and 22% are academic, governmental or other organizations that
do not self-identify exclusively with companies or investors.  The category
of “investors” includes individual and institutional asset owners and asset
managers, and investor-oriented NGOs; together, these 219 comments re-
present 78% of the 282 comments in this study.109  Based on the subset of
investors whose comments reported the figure, investor respondents re-
present over $89.38 trillion in assets under management (AUM).110  As
Table 2 indicates, only 16% of investor comments were from public pen-
sion funds, labor union funds, or religious institutions, which are the in-
vestors who have historically engaged in shareholder activism around ESG
issues.111  The category of “issuers” includes companies, industry or trade
108. The limited number of comment letters in each of these three groups
cautions against further subdividing respondent categories, for example, by sector.
The term “issuer” is used here for ease of reference rather than “registrant” even
though the disclosure rules at issue in the Concept Release are not limited to the
offering context.  On this distinction, see 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 12,688
n.159.
109. This study also includes 81 comments that are modified versions of the
Public Citizen form letter (Form A), which states that corporations should disclose
their political spending, foreign tax payments on a per-country basis, and “sus-
tainability plans.”  Letter Type A, SEC, www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-
34.htm [https://perma.cc/8YGF-6KAA] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).  These re-
present 28.7% of all comments in this study and 46.5% of all investor comments.
Inclusion of the modified Public Citizen comments increases support for the mate-
riality of these particular issues and for prescriptive reforms generally but does not
otherwise affect the results presented here.  Eleven foreign institutional investors,
including Hermes and Norges Bank, submitted comments, as well as 2 individuals
located abroad; these total 5.9% of the investor comments.  The few foreign-based
organizations not representing asset owners or managers, such as the London-
based Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) and the Geneva-based World
Business Council for Sustainable Development, are not included in this
percentage.
110. These numbers have not been independently verified or adjusted, and
reflect only AUM reported in a comment as of that date.
111. This figure is around 40% if individuals are excluded.  Of the “Big 4”
institutional investors—BlackRock, State Street, Fidelity, and Vanguard, only State
Street submitted a comment on the Concept Release. See Comment of Rakhi
Kumar, Head of Corp. Gov., State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) & Christopher
McKnett, Head of ESG Inv., SSGA (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-160.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9GN-RJF3].
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associations, business-oriented NGOs, and their advisors, including law
firms and accounting firms; together these 28 comments represent 10% of
all comments in this study.  “Other” includes 35 academics, government
representatives, stock exchanges,112 and standard setters, such as the Sus-
tainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI); together “other” respondents account for 12% of the
comments in this study.
Figure 1 also indicates the percentage of each of these three groups
that are institutional or individual respondents.  Individuals account for
39% of all respondents and 46.12% of all investor respondents in this
study.  Over 60% of responses were submitted by organizations, including
institutional investors, industry groups, and advocacy organizations.
Which investors make up the bulk of the Concept Release comments
is an important threshold question in considering what the Concept Re-
lease tell us about over-disclosure.  Specifically, if investor public com-
ments represent ESG-oriented or “socially responsible” strategies, then
they may not reflect mainstream trends in the market.  Investors that iden-
tify themselves as responsible investors, socially responsible investors
(SRI), SRI fund managers, and NGOs that advocate on ESG issues (to-
gether, SRI respondents) may be more likely to favor expanded ESG dis-
closures and may be less concerned about the materiality of this
information because of their broader ethical or policy goals.  However, of
the 219 investors included in this study, only 29% identified themselves in
these terms.  Similarly, only 24% of all NGOs in this study, all of which are
investor-oriented, identified themselves as an SRI advocacy group.113
112. Two stock exchanges, NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange Group,
submitted comments. See Comment of Edward S. Knight, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, Gen. Counsel & Chief Regulatory Officer, NASDAQ, Inc. (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-368.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KV7S-HGUS]; Jonathan Jachym, Head of N. Am. Regulatory Strategy & Gov’t. Re-
lations, London Stock Exch. Grp., FTSE Russell (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-294.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ5S-K6SP].
113. Investor-oriented NGOs account for 60% of the NGOs in this study,
while business advocacy and neutral groups each account for approximately 20%
of all NGOs in this study. See infra Appendix, at Table 2.  Examples in this study
include Investors Against Genocide, the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Invest-
ment (now Investor Advocates for Social Justice), and the U.S. Sustainable Invest-
ment Forum.
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Figure 1: Institutional & Individual Respondents.
35.82
2.84
0.71
41.84
9.57
9.22
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Investors
Others
Issuers
Individuals Institutions
B. Risk-Related Business & Financial Disclosures in Regulation S-K:
Descriptive Analysis
The following analysis of responses to specific questions raised by the
Concept Release generally follows the structure of Regulation S-K, with
some modification for emphasis; as a result, most topics are presented in
the order that they appear in the Concept Release.  Positive or negative
responses are reported relative to the total number of responses to that
question; comments that provided no response on an issue are disre-
garded.114  Approximately 40% of the comments addressed risk disclo-
sures to some extent, and nearly all comments in this study (98%)
included some reference to the ESG topics covered in section IV.F of the
Concept Release, as shown in Table 4 of the Appendix.
1. The Nature & Audience of Disclosure Requirements; Permanency of New
Rules.  Questions 1–23.115
The first twenty-three questions of the Concept Release tackle four
basic questions related to how well the current disclosure regime works
and the potential for over-disclosure: (1) How should the SEC balance a
prescriptive or principles-based approach to disclosure?  (2) How diverse
is the intended audience for disclosure, and how should disclosure be cali-
brated to that audience?  (3) How should the SEC balance the potential
costs and benefits of disclosure?  and (4) Should the SEC adopt new rules
only on a temporary basis?  The following discussion considers these issues
in this order.
114. In order to account for the imbalance in the number of investor and
issuer submissions and in the percentage of institutional responses across groups,
the analysis presented here reports the percentage of supporters or opponents
relative to the total number of comments submitted by that group of respondents,
unless otherwise noted.
115. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,924–31.
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a. Principles-Based & Prescriptive Disclosure; Materiality
Considerations.  Questions 6–13.116
This section of the Concept Release asks whether the SEC should ex-
pand the use of principles-based disclosure, increase its use of quantitative
and qualitative materiality thresholds, or adopt an alternative “objectives-
oriented” approach.117  In its 2013 Regulation S-K Study, the SEC con-
cluded that “any recommended revisions [to Regulation S-K] should em-
phasize a principles-based approach as an overarching component of the
disclosure framework . . . while preserving the benefits of a rules-based
system . . . .”118  This balance is reflected in the current reporting
framework.
Principles-based disclosure rules offer flexibility, since they give re-
porting companies greater discretion to decide how the disclosure princi-
ple applies to their particular circumstances and whether any disclosure is
necessary.  The most important example of principles-based disclosure is
the use of materiality qualifiers, which only mandate a disclosure if the
reporting company determines that the information is material to investors.
However, this same flexibility reduces disclosure comparability and may
lead to under-reporting.119
Line-item mandatory disclosures and other prescriptive rules aid com-
parability and can reduce the risk of under-reporting because they are
“bright-line” rules and are not subject to management discretion.120  How-
116. Id. at 23,927–28
117. Id. at 23,926–28.
118. REGULATION S-K STUDY, supra note 43, at 98.
119. See Comment of Members of Congress 1 (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-175.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB66-53Y8] (voicing
concerns about the lack of comparability of disclosures for rules within the Regula-
tion S-K framework that defer to issuer materiality judgments); see also Comment of
Kurt N. Schact & James C. Allen, CFA Institute 5 (Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Com-
ment of CFA Institute], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-375.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WMN9-GC56] (“CFA Institute has been a strong proponent of
prescriptive standards with regard to financial reporting because registrants have
shown a tendency to interpret principles in a manner that is most beneficial to
them rather than most beneficial to investors.  In general, principles-based re-
quirements will [cause issuers to] withhold disclosure based on an internal deter-
mination that the information is immaterial; . . .  group information in a manner
that obfuscates negative performance or conditions; [a]nd third, different issuers
will apply the ‘principles’ differently, thus making the information incomparable
across different issuers.”); Comment of F. Michael Zovistoski, President, N.Y. State
Soc’y Certified Pub. Accountants 4 (July 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-150.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L7T-5W7F] (“[W]ith a strictly
principles-based approach, what is required to be disclosed would be left to the
discretion of management.”); Comment of Douglas Hoffner, Interim Chief Execu-
tive Officer, Cal. Pub. Emp.’s Retirement Sys., at app. 1–2 (July 21, 2016) [herein-
after, Comment of CalPERS], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-
267.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMZ4-295C] (advocating a mixed approach and not-
ing that “the fact that registrants determine what is material to reasonable investors
is problematic in getting meaningful and comparable disclosure”).
120. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,925–27.
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ever, because many prescriptive rules apply to all reporting companies
across the board, they may result in over-reporting of immaterial informa-
tion if they are used in circumstances where the materiality of a given issue
varies widely among firms.
As explained in the Concept Release, under an alternative “objectives-
oriented” approach, “standard setters would develop new rules by clearly
articulating the accounting objective of the standard and providing suffi-
cient detail and structure so that the standard can be applied on a consis-
tent basis[;]” these standards would be “based on a consistently-applied
conceptual framework, minimize exceptions and avoid the use of bright-
line tests.” 121
Importantly, issuer and investor respondents generally agreed that
any disclosure reforms should be grounded on the TSC Industries defini-
tion of materiality.122  Less than 10% of investor comments deviated from
this materiality standard and these comments largely supported ex-
panding disclosure to include information that may not be material in the
short term but directly impacts financial performance and may be leading
indicators of material future risk.123
Nearly all respondents in this study expressed a view on these initial
questions, but issuer positions diverged widely from those of investors and
other respondents.  As Table 5 of the Appendix shows, only a few issuer
comments (10%) supported any kind of prescriptive disclosure, in con-
trast to 88% of investors.  Instead, 75% of issuers affirmatively opposed the
use of prescriptive disclosures, in contrast to less than 6%of investors.124
Sixteen percent of all respondents, and an equivalent percentage of each
121. Id. at 23,927.
122. Under the Supreme Court’s standard of materiality, as established in
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, (1976), information is “material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote” or “that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the ‘total mix’ of information” available to the investor in reaching a voting or
investment decision.  Id. at 448–49 (emphasis added); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (extending the TSC Industries standard to section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
123. See, e.g., Comment of Josh Zinner, Chief  Executive Officer, and Sarah
Margolis, Associate Program Director, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibil-
ity (ICCR) (July 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-103
.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYT7-3F2P].  Twenty investor comments (7% of investor
comments) are adapted from the ICCR form and tend to include this language.
See, e.g., Comment of Andrew Behar, Chief Executive Officer, As You Sow (July 21,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-198.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2QNN-2Q5C].
124. Comments from the business community and law firms in response to
the 2013 Regulation S-K Study had also expressed strong support for principles-
based disclosure.  Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,939–40 & 23,926 n.117 (cit-
ing comments by the CFA Institute, Shearman & Sterling, the U.K. Financial Re-
porting Council, the Business Roundtable, and the Center for Capital Markets
Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
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respondent group, urged the SEC to maintain a mixed approach that in-
cludes both principles-based and prescriptive elements.  Seven comments
(not shown in Table 5) also supported objectives-oriented disclosure as a
form of principles-based disclosure, although some questioned how it
might work in practice.125  The differences in responses among the three
groups on the use of prescriptive disclosure are significant at a less than
1% level; differences among groups with respect to mixed or objectives-
based approaches are not significant, indicating equally high levels of sup-
port for mixed disclosure approaches among respondent groups.
b. Audience for Disclosure.  Questions 14–20.126
Here, the Concept Release addresses the extent to which disclosure
rules should be directed only at sophisticated investors or should continue
to be directed at a broader range of shareholders.  It also seeks input on
how different investors utilize disclosure, and whether the needs of market
participants other than investors should be taken into account in consider-
ing disclosure reform.127
The question of who is in fact the “reasonable investor” the disclosure
system is designed to serve is directly connected to questions of over-dis-
closure.128  Respondents who seek to reduce the disclosure burden on
companies tend to argue that only sophisticated investors are the proper
target of disclosure, whereas those concerned about “Main Street” or retail
investors may see a need for more detailed disclosure and for more acces-
sible presentation of information.129
Approximately 20% of respondents addressed this question, and
nearly 70% of them agreed that the term “reasonable investor” should
continue to be understood to encompass all investors, whether sophisti-
cated or not.  As shown in Table 6 of the Appendix, around 20% of inves-
tors and a similar percentage of issuers argued that disclosures should be
125. See, e.g., Comment of CalPERS, supra note 119, at app. 1–2; Comment of
Nancy J. Schroeder, Chair, Fin. Reporting Comm., Inst. of Mgmt. Accountants
(July 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-341.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/4DF3-WBU8]; Comment of Ernst & Young, LLP (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-223.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2499-E5PM]; Comment of John Matthews, Dir. of Fin., Governance & SEC Report-
ing, PNC Fin. Servs. Grp. (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-227.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TGD-SC9Q]; Comment of Michael L. Gul-
lette, Vice President, Accounting & Fin. Mgmt., Am. Bankers Ass’n (July 15, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-105.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JH3E-H28Y].
126. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,929–30.
127. Id. at 23–52.
128. The TSC Industries materiality standard is defined in terms of the “rea-
sonable investor.” See supra note 122.
129. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,951 (discussing comments to the
Regulation S-K study to this effect).
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designed for sophisticated investors,130 while several investor responses ar-
gued the opposite—that “Main Street” or retail investors are the proper
audience of disclosures.131
d. Disclosure Costs & Benefits.  Questions 21–23.132
These three questions are among multiple places in the Concept Re-
lease where the SEC seeks input on how it should evaluate the costs and
benefits of disclosure, and “reduce costs for registrants while still provid-
ing investors with the information that is important or useful to making
informed investment and voting decisions.”133  Respondents generally in-
corporated responses to these questions into their discussion of other por-
tions of the Concept Release rather than responding directly to section
III.B.3, so cost-benefit issues are integrated below into the analysis of other
key topics.  Although many sections of the Concept Release sought quanti-
fied estimates of the costs related to particular disclosures, few responses
addressed cost issues and none in this study did so with specific esti-
mates.134  In general, however, issuers who discussed these topics tended
to emphasize the costs of mandatory disclosure, while investors either did
not address cost concerns or emphasized the cost savings to investors that
would result from standardizing reporting requirements.135
e. Support for Sunset Provisions.  Questions 1–5.136
Sunsetting is a means of addressing over-disclosure concerns in the
event the SEC introduces new disclosure rules.  It allows for new rules to
be adopted on a temporary basis in order to permit an assessment of effec-
tiveness before the rule is abandoned or becomes permanent.  Less than
5% of respondents addressed the SEC’s questions on whether new rules
130. See, e.g., Comment of Shearman & Sterling, LLP (Aug. 31, 2016), https:/
/www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-367.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH7V-
UCXL]; Comment of Ams. for Fin. Reform (Aug. 10, 2016) [hereinafter, Com-
ment of Ams. for Fin. Reform], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-
358.pdf [https://perma.cc/96LF-38CN]; Comment of Jeanette L. Ourada, Vice
President & Comptroller, Chevron Corp. (July 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-06-16/s70616-315.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WUC-ZT2U].
131. See, e.g., Comment of CFA Institute, supra note 119; Comment of Ams.
for Fin. Reform, supra note 130.
132. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,931.
133. Id.
134. Examples of questions seeking quantified cost estimates include Ques-
tion 7 of the Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,927 (“What would be the costs
and benefits of [a principles-based] approach for investors and registrants?”); see
also, Question 106 of the Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,945 (“What would
be the costs and benefits of requiring registrants in certain industries to disclose
standardized performance metrics?”).
135. See, e.g., infra Section III.B.7 (discussing potential cost savings of ESG
standardization).
136. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,924.
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should be subject to automatic sunsets.137  As Table 7 of the Appendix
shows, most investors who responded (66.67%) did so to oppose sunset-
ting, while most issuers and other respondents generally did so to support
it.138
The SEC had also suggested an alternative—that it review and report
within a short period after the adoption of new rules on the rule’s effec-
tiveness.139  Although too few responses addressed this question to allow
any comparison among views on that option, some expressed support for
such a review.140
2. General Description of the Business; Environmental & Employment-Related
Disclosures.  Item 101.  Questions 24–41, 49–59.141
Item 101’s general description of the business includes several topics
that may affect the company’s risk profile.  For example, the description of
the business’s development required under Item 101(a) could include dis-
cussion of material business, legal, or regulatory risks.142  Item 101(c) re-
quires certain limited disclosures on intellectual property, environmental,
and employment-related matters.143  Although government contracting
and intangible assets disclosure may also reveal key areas of risk to inves-
tors, the analysis of Item 101 here focuses on questions that address cur-
rent and potential environmental or social (i.e., employment-related)
risks, as noted on Table 1 in the Appendix.
137. See infra Appendix, at Table 7.
138. The CFA Institute, however, noted that sunsetting risk disclosures
“would ignore the emerging risks a company faces” and would therefore “not serve
investors’ interests.”  Comment of CFA Institute, supra note 119, at 4; see also
Heather Slavkin Corzo, Dir. Office of Inv., AFL-CIO 6 (July 21, 2016), https://www
.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-305.pdf [https://perma.cc/49MU-GVLT]
(opposing sunsetting as contributing to systemic risk).
139. It is noteworthy that the SEC’s 2018 Final Rules were adopted subject to
this kind of post-adoption review requirement: the SEC will review the amend-
ments within five years of their effective date to assess their impact on “disclosure
and capital formation.”  2018 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 50,151.
140. See Comment of Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP 4 n.6 (July 22, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-313.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AH9N-UERA] (“[S]eeking repeal of requirements . . . after their enactment im-
poses an additional layer of costs on both registrants and the Commission.  Never-
theless, we suggest that some sort of formal review (with or without Commission
action) would . . . ensure that disclosure requirements remain sufficiently respon-
sive to changing circumstances . . . .”).
141. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,931–33, 23,935–36.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (2019).
143. Id. § 229.101(c).
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a. General Development of the Business, Item 101(a)(1); Narrative
Description.  Item 101(c).  Questions 24–30, 31–41.144
Item 101(a) requires a “description of the general development of
the business” and disclosure of certain significant, non-ordinary course
events such as bankruptcy proceedings, mergers, or other material
changes in the operations of the business.145  Similarly, Item 101(c) re-
quires a narrative description of the business.  To the extent material, the
description of each reporting segment must include disclosure of the ma-
terial effects of compliance with environmental laws, the number of em-
ployees, and ten other specific items related to operations.
This section of the Concept Release asked whether Item 101(a) and
Item 101(c) are still useful, how they might be improved, and whether
they elicit redundant or outdated information.  For Item 101(c), the SEC
also asked whether this information should instead be incorporated in
other discussions of risk, such as the MD&A, and whether the rule should
continue to require that companies identify the segments of their business
for whom these disclosed matters are significant.
Although these questions did not specifically mention ESG matters or
non-financial risk, as Table 8 shows, a few comments (less than 15, or 5%)
mentioned ESG factors as relevant to Item 101(a) or Item 101(c), for ex-
ample, referencing the importance of ESG as an integral part of business
strategy.146  Only 3 were issuers.147  Several comments recommended de-
leting Item 101 disclosures in favor of requirements to disclose only if
there are material changes in the business.148  Changes to Rule 101(a)
proposed by the SEC in 2019 would instead eliminate the current five-year
timeframe for disclosing information necessary to an understanding of the
business, substitute disclosure based on materiality principles for the pre-
144. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,931–33.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c) (2019).
146. See, e.g., Comment of Michelle de Cordova, NEI Inv., Vancouver, Canada
(July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-229.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/L3N6-NP9K]; Comment of Principles for Responsible Inv. 3 (July 19,
2016) [hereinafter, Comment of PRI], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/
s70616-149.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R5U-2RT8].
147. See Comment of Matthew D. Brusch, CAE & Michael C. McGough, CAE,
Interim Co-Chief Executive Officers, Nat’l Inv. Relations Inst. (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-350.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VPN2-A6EN].  The NIRI is a trade association of over 1,600 company representa-
tives. See also Comment of Brendan Williams, Executive Vice President, Am. Fuel &
Petrochem. Mfrs. (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/
s70616-282.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB7P-RMWR]; Comment of Corporate Gov-
ernance Coalition for Investor Value (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-188.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KJ9-97SF].  The coalition is a
business advocacy organization and its members “represent American businesses.”
Id.
148. See, e.g., Comment of Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 140.
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scriptive list of topics to be disclosed, and permit later filings to simply
cross-reference and update the initial filing.149
b. Environmental Disclosure.  Item 101(c)(1)(xii).  Questions
49–51.150
Item 101(c)(1)(xii) requires certain environmental disclosures and is
therefore also relevant to an assessment of companies’ sustainability
risks.151  Specifically, it requires a registrant to provide material estimated
capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for its current
and succeeding fiscal years and for further periods the registrant deems
material.152
Questions 49 to 51 in the Concept Release asked first whether Item
101(c) environmental disclosures should be expanded or reduced,
whether disclosure regarding compliance with emissions regulations is
useful to investors, and whether similar disclosures should be required
about the material effects of other regulations. As Table 9 of the Appendix
shows, these questions attracted a limited number of responses (around
6% of all respondents), but the contrast between the perspectives of busi-
ness interests (i.e., issuers) and others is clear.  These differences are statis-
tically significant at the 5% or 10% levels.  The 2019 Proposed Rules would
extend this disclosure to include the material effects of compliance with
material government regulations, not only environmental laws; they would
not alter the current disclosures regarding environmental capital
expenditures.153
Although Item 103, which requires a description of material pending
legal proceedings, was not part of the Concept Release, many issuers dis-
cussed the quantitative materiality thresholds that apply to Item 103 disclo-
sure and that require companies to disclose proceedings under the
environmental laws to which a governmental authority is a party if the an-
ticipated penalties or fines are in excess of $100,000.154  All issuer com-
ments referencing Item 103 opposed any expansion of environmental
disclosure and any use of quantified materiality thresholds generally.155
149. 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 44,360–63.
150. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,935
151. These requirements were adopted in 1973 pursuant to congressional
mandate under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 U.S.C.
§§ 4321–4347.  In the Concept Release, the Commission refers to the environmen-
tal compliance requirements incorporated in Item 101 as mandatory disclosures
that, like the specialized disclosures adopted by the SEC in recent years, are “not
necessarily financial in nature.”  Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,922 & n.61.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2019); Concept Release, supra note 1, at
23,922 (citing 1976 Environmental Release).
153. 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 44,363–69 (discussing proposed
Item 101(c)(2)(i)).
154. See Instruction 5.C to Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2019).
155. These include comments by Edison Electric Institute and the American
Gas Association Accounting Advisory Council (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec
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In contrast, most investors favored the current quantitative materiality
thresholds and expanding environmental disclosure in some form.156
They also tended to emphasize that the environmental disclosures cur-
rently required are in fact material.157  Differences among respondent
groups on the merits of quantitative thresholds generally or in Item 103
specifically were highly statistically significant. The 2019 Proposed Rules
would retain the Item 103 quantitative threshold for certain environmen-
tal litigation, but would raise it to adjust for inflation.158
c. Number of Employees.  Item 101(c)(1)(xiii).  Questions 54–59.159
Item 101(c)(1)(xiii) is the primary provision of Regulation S-K re-
lated to employment (i.e., “social”) matters.160  It currently requires lim-
ited disclosures related to the number of employees, which the SEC has
interpreted to include “the number of persons retained as independent
contractors” for registrants who generally hire independent contractors
rather than employees.161  As the SEC noted in the Concept Release, in-
formation on the number and type of employees may be “indicative of
trends or shifts in a registrant’s operations,” as well as relevant to assess-
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-241.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SB7-WN3P]; Com-
ment of Jeanette L. Ourada, Vice President & Comptroller, Chevron Corp., supra
note 130; Comment of the National Investor Relations Institute (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-350.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WK8U-SD5D]; Exxon Mobil, supra note 1; and Comment of General Motors 2
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-373.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RLD8-KC5A].  These comments expressed concern that mone-
tary thresholds lock in quantitative floors that inevitably become so low over time
that they sweep in immaterial information.
156. These included comments by Domini Soc. Invs. (July 21, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-221.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PZ4-
G5BE]; Comment of Eric Hespenheide, Interim Chief Executive, Glo. Reporting
Initiative (GRI) (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-
220.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGK7-5C4Y]; Impax Asset Mgmt. Ltd. (July 19, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-169.pdf [https://perma.cc/
37BE-8PNQ]; Comment of Sanford Lewis, Inv. Envtl. Health Network (July 15,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-133.pdf [https://perma
.cc/G6HJ-8726].  Other supporters include Deloitte & Touche LLP (July 15,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-131.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8A77-8532].
157. See, e.g., Comment of E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General of Oklahoma et
al. (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-289.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RYL9-2TBX].
158. 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 44,372–74 (proposing to raise the
Item 103 threshold to $300,000).
159. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,936.
160. “Social” ESG factors are generally understood to refer to labor, employ-
ment, and other matters related to human capital.
161. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,936 & n.224 (citing Regulation S–K
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations Question 203.01, https://www.sec
.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm [https://perma.cc/H8JX-
EBND]).
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ments of its size and scale.162  In response to several rulemaking petitions
on human capital disclosure,163 the 2019 Proposed Rules would substitute
a principles-based approach and require disclosure of human capital re-
sources and any related human capital measures used by management, to
the extent material, in the disclosure topics under Item 101(c).164
The questions on employment-related disclosure under Item 101(c)
attracted a large number of responses, mostly from investors.  As Table 10
of the Appendix shows, most investors argued that all of the additional
employment information suggested in the Concept Release is important;
nearly all who responded also supported new disclosure on outsourcing or
subcontracting practices in some form.  Many investor responses also em-
phasized the materiality of employment-related (i.e., “social”) information
and related risks to their voting and investment decisions.  In contrast,
only 8 issuers responded to these questions, primarily to oppose any dis-
closure expansion and to support the current form of the rule.165  The
differences among the three respondent groups on all these questions are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
3. Management’s Discussion & Analysis. Item 303. Questions 88–106.166
The MD&A is intended to: “[i] Provide a narrative explanation of a
registrant’s financial statements that enables investors to see the registrant
through the eyes of management; . . . [ii] enhance the overall financial
disclosure and provide the context within which financial information
should be analyzed; and . . . [iii] provide information about the quality of,
and potential variability of, a registrant’s earnings and cash flow, so inves-
tors can ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indicative of fu-
ture performance.”167  Item 303(a) of the MD&A requires management’s
assessment of “known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the
[company] reasonably expects will have a material impact” on the com-
pany’s operational results, and the reasons behind those effects.168  As the
SEC recognized in its 2010 Climate Guidance, the MD&A is one of the
162. Id.
163. See generally Williams & Fisch, supra note 8.  See also Human Capital Man-
agement Coalition Petition (July 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/
2017/petn4-711.pdf [https://perma.cc/47BC-YM7N].
164. 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 44,369–72.
165. See, e.g., Comment of Michael L. Gullette, Vice President, Accounting &
Fin. Mgmt., Am. Bankers Ass’n, supra note 125.
166. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,942–45.
167. Id. at 23,941 & n.286 (citing the Commission Guidance Regarding Man-
agement’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Opera-
tions, Release No. 33-8350, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter, 2003
MD&A Interpretive Release], https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm
[https://perma.cc/3PX7-8YJB]).
168. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2019); see Concept Release, supra note 1,
at 23,942 & n.298 (discussing Item 303 with reference to the 2003 MD&A Interpre-
tive Release, supra note 150).
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primary potential sources of qualitative risk-related information, including
ESG information, in the current disclosure framework.169  However, be-
cause it is in narrative form, enhanced MD&A disclosure is unlikely to
improve the comparability of ESG information.
The Concept Release includes nearly twenty topics related to the
scope of the MD&A.  Together, they address the quality and focus of analy-
sis, the disclosure of forward-looking information, and reporting of key
performance indicators (KPIs).  All of these topics are particularly relevant
in evaluating whether the MD&A is effective in eliciting disclosure on ma-
terial ESG risk.
A relatively high percentage of respondents in this study commented
on MD&A issues, although the number of respondents is small for many
specific questions.170  Responses on specific proposed changes to the
MD&A reveal interesting similarities and differences between investors
and issuers, although the limited responses to certain of these questions
means that these results cannot be interpreted conclusively.  In particular,
most respondents agreed about the difficulties of any requirement to
quantify risk.  As Table 12 of the Appendix indicates, all responses on the
question of whether the SEC should consolidate its MD&A-related gui-
dance also support such a change.171  However, issuers diverge from other
respondents on most questions proposing additional risk-related
disclosures.
As shown on Table 11 of the Appendix, approximately 10% of all
comment submissions in this study explicitly referenced ESG-related mat-
ters in connection with the MD&A, indicating its relevance to material risk
assessment.  Interestingly, the percentage of issuers and business organiza-
tions to do so was even higher—nearing 20%.
a. Quality & Focus of Analysis.  Questions 88–98.172
A number of the SEC’s questions focused specifically on whether the
MD&A currently elicits material information or results in over-disclosure,
and whether changes should be made to prevent over-disclosure by nar-
rowing the MD&A’s potential scope.  As Table 12 of the Appendix shows,
only several respondents commented on these questions, but they did so
to concur that Item 303 “result[s] in immaterial disclosures that may ob-
169. 2010 Climate Guidance, supra note 54.  ESG risks such as climate-related
risk may be related to “external or macro-economic matters” or changes in the
regulatory environment that the SEC has recognized are relevant to the MD&A.
See, e.g., Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,944 & n.327 (identifying these gen-
eral concerns).
170. Appendix, infra, at Tables 11–15.
171. Both the SEC and its Division of Corporate Finance provide guidance on
the MD&A, including SEC releases, the Division’s Financial Reporting Manual and
SEC staff Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations. See Concept Release, supra
note 1, at 23,943.
172. Id. at 23,942–44.
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scure significant information.”173 The data do not permit clear inferences
from silence, but it may be that most respondents believe that the MD&A
generally elicits material information and is not overly broad.174
The question of whether the SEC should introduce a qualitative or
quantitative materiality threshold for MD&A disclosure attracted more re-
sponses, and both investors and issuers opposed.175  Some comments also
stressed that the MD&A is a useful vehicle for helping companies disclose
longer-term risks, particularly with respect to climate-change and other en-
vironmental risks.176 No comments provided cost-benefit estimates for
the MD&A; the single specific response on cost-benefit issues from
CalPERS emphasized that shareholders “should have a greater voice in
determining the value of disclosures” since they ultimately bear the costs
of disclosure and depend upon it.177
Several of the questions in this section ask whether new format re-
quirements might make the information in the MD&A more accessible to
different audiences.  The SEC has previously recommended that compa-
nies include an overview in the MD&A to highlight the information that is
most important.178  It has also encouraged companies to adopt a “layered
approach” to MD&A disclosure, such as the use of overviews or introduc-
tions, to emphasize key information.  As Table 12 shows, most respondents
would support a new requirement that companies provide an executive-
level overview in the MD&A, with a minority suggesting it be encouraged
but not required.  As a result, no significant differences among groups
were identified on this question.  A limited number of investors indicated
they would find layered disclosure helpful, while the few issuer responses
all indicated they see no benefit to the use of layered disclosure gener-
ally.179  This difference was significant at the 10% level.  Again, however,
most of these questions attracted a limited number of responses.
173. Id. at 23,943.
174. Due to the limited data, no significant differences among groups on this
question were identified. See infra Appendix, at Table 11.
175. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,942 (Question 89).  Due to the lim-
ited number of responses, no significant difference among groups was identified.
176. Comment of CalPERS, supra note 119.
177. Id. at 17.
178. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,942 & n.314 (citing 2003 MD&A
Interpretive Release, supra note 150 (“The overview should provide insight into
[management’s view of] material opportunities, challenges and risks . . . on which
the registrant’s executives are most focused for both the short and long term, as
well as the actions they are taking to address [them].”).
179. Table 12 shows that of the 11 comments on layered disclosure, the 3
investors were divided, all 3 issuers opposed, and all 3 of the remaining comments
supported its use.  The SEC also sought guidance on whether auditor review
should be required for the MD&A (Question 96).  Seventy-two percent of the 15
responses on this question, including all of the auditor comments in this study,
either deferred to the SEC on this question or opposed such a requirement.  In
light of these responses, the SEC staff’s recommendations in 2016 indicated they
would not encourage adopting such requirements. See REGULATION S-K REPORT,
supra note 50.
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b. Forward-Looking Information. Questions 99–102.180
A key feature of the MD&A is that it elicits risk-related disclosure that
is by its nature forward-looking.181  Because of the uncertainty regarding
future events, such forward-looking information is subject to a litigation
safe harbor established under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) and several regulatory safe harbors.182 The SEC has also en-
couraged optional disclosures of forward-looking information where fu-
ture trends or events are unknown but anticipated, or where the impact of
a known event, trend, or uncertainty is “less predictable.”183  Because ESG
information that is material to investors typically relates to risk, ESG disclo-
sure in the MD&A or in any new ESG disclosure rules raises many of these
same compliance and liability concerns for public companies.
This section of the Concept Release addresses two critical questions
about risk-related disclosure in the MD&A: (i) whether the SEC should
revise or eliminate its current materiality standard for MD&A disclosure in
favor of the narrower materiality standard established in Basic v. Levinson
that applies to liability claims under Rule 10b-5; and (ii) whether the SEC
should require, not simply encourage, companies to quantify “the material
effects of known material trends or uncertainties.”184
In Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court established a test for deter-
mining the materiality of forward-looking information that requires a bal-
ancing of the “probability that the event will occur and [its] anticipated
magnitude . . . in light of the totality of the company activity.”185  As noted
in the Concept Release, there is currently a circuit split among the courts
that have considered whether Item 303 creates a general duty to disclose
known risks such that an omission would give rise to liability under Rule
10b-5, but the courts are in agreement in their application of the Basic v.
Levinson “probability and magnitude” test.186
180. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,944.
181. Id. at 23,943.  As noted in the Concept Release, a number of provisions
in Item 303 require disclosure of forward-looking information. Id. at note 316
(citing Item 303(a)(1) (known trends and uncertainties); Item 303(a)(2)(ii)
(known material trends in capital resources and any expected material changes);
Item 303(a)(3)(ii) (any known trends or uncertainties that may reasonably impact
operational results); and Instruction 3 to Item 303(a)).
182. Supra note 88; see also Rule 175 of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.175(c)(3) (2019); Rule 3b-6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(b)(3) (2019).
183. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,943 & n.318 (citing Concept
Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Op-
erations, Release No. 33-6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715-02 (Apr. 24, 1987) (codified in
17 C.F.R. § 229 (2019))).
184. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,944.
185. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
186. See Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,944 & n.322, (citing Stratte-Mc-
Clure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100–04 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Item
303 does give rise to a duty to disclose under Rule 10b–5)); In re NVIDIA Corp.
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However, the SEC does not currently require companies to assess the
probability or magnitude of “known trends or uncertainties” in order to
determine whether disclosure must be made in the MD&A.187  Instead, it
has adopted a two-step test.188  Under this test, a risk is material and must
be disclosed in the MD&A if management determines (i) that a “known
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty” is “reasonably likely”
to occur; or (ii) if this cannot be done, they must disclose the risk unless
they “evaluate objectively the consequences” of the event’s occurrence and
determine that it is not “reasonably likely” to have a material effect on the
company’s financial condition or operational results.189  The SEC’s two-
step test potentially results in more expansive disclosure than would be the
case under the Basic v. Levinson test.
As Table 13 of the Appendix shows, only 17 comments (6%) re-
sponded on this issue, but the majority of these supported maintaining the
two-step test.  Three respondents, split among the respondent groups, op-
posed the two-step test, and 2 issuers argued in favor of the probability/
magnitude test.  There was no significant difference among respondent
groups with respect to this issue.
Only 11 comments in the data set responded on the second question
regarding quantification of risk effects.  As Table 14 of the Appendix
shows, most (70%) opposed.190  Because of the strong agreement on this
question, no significant differences were identified among the three
groups on this issue.
c. Key Indicators of Financial Condition & Operating Performance.
Questions 103–106.191
In this section, the SEC asked whether Item 303 should be revised to
include a principles-based or prescriptive requirement that all registrants
disclose performance metrics and related analysis.  Under current SEC
guidance, disclosure of qualitative or quantitative measures that are neces-
sary to enable investors to evaluate a company’s performance should al-
Sec. Lit., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054–56 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Item 303 does not
create a duty to disclose for Rule 10b–5 purposes); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275,
287–88 (3d Cir. 2000) (leaving open the question of Rule 10b–5 liability for Item
303 violations).
187. See Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations, Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 (May 24, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 211, 231, 241, 271) (noting that
the probability-magnitude test applied to securities fraud claims in Basic v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988), is not the two-step materiality test that the SEC
has established for MD&A disclosure).
188. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22,943 (citation omitted).
189. Id.
190. One investment analyst recommended that quantification continue to
be encouraged but not required.  Comment of Stephen P. Percoco, Lark Research,
Inc. (July 24, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-317.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JVN3-VW93].
191. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,945.
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ready be identified in the MD&A,192 and the Concept Release also noted
that many companies do include industry-specific KPIs in their public
filings.193
As shown in Table 15 of the Appendix, these questions attracted a
high number of responses relative to other Concept Release issues, other
than section IV.F’s questions on ESG disclosure.  Many of the comments
emphasized that the MD&A should already elicit ESG-related performance
measures relevant to the company or its industry.
Interestingly, all three groups align in their strong support for princi-
ples-based KPI disclosure, with high support among investors.  However,
all issuer comments on this question opposed new prescriptive KPI man-
dates, while investors and other respondents were divided on this ques-
tion.194  The differences among these groups on the question of
prescriptive KPI mandates are statistically significant at the 5% level, but
insignificant with respect to principles-based KPIs, given the agreement
among groups on their value.  No comments in the study addressed the
specific costs and benefits of mandating KPI disclosure for companies in
certain industries.
d. Results of Operations.  Item 303(a)(3).  Questions 107–112.195
This section of the Concept Release does not address the core for-
ward-looking disclosures of Item 303(a)(3) on “known trends or uncer-
tainties,” but instead focuses on the time periods relevant to Item 303 and
the application of the rules to registrants who have not yet generated reve-
nue or begun operations.196  Most of these questions have already been
addressed in the 2019 Final Rules under the FAST Act.197
192. “Where there is no commonly accepted method of calculating a particu-
lar non-financial metric, the Commission has said that the registrant should pro-
vide an explanation of the calculation of the metric to promote comparability
across registrants within the industry.” Id. at 23,944 (referencing the 2003 MD&A
Interpretative Release, supra note 150, as well as SEC practice and industry-specific
KPIs); see also Commission Guidance on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Rel. No. 33-10751 (Jan. 30, 2020)
(clarifying that accompanying disclosures regarding the definition, assumptions,
and utility of the metric to management and investors should generally be pro-
vided with particular KPIs or other metrics).
193. Id. at 23,944.
194. The same investor respondent also urged the SEC to continue to en-
courage KPI reporting without any new mandate. Supra note 17.
195. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,946–47.
196. Questions 107 and 109–111 deal with the utility of existing period-to-
period comparisons. Id. at 23,946.
197. See 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 9–10 (amending Item 303 to permit
exclusion of discussion of the earliest of three years in the MD&A if already dis-
cussed in a prior filing).  The 2019 Final Rules introduced no other changes to the
MD&A.
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e. Other MD&A Disclosures.  Item 303(a)(1)–(2), (4)–(5), (8).
Questions 113–144.198
The remaining questions on Item 303 concern a number of required
disclosures in the MD&A that pertain to financial risk and, in some cases,
provide context for matters that under GAAP already appear in the finan-
cial statements or related notes.  These include: management’s analysis of
the company’s sources of liquidity and capital,199 its reliance on short-
term borrowings,200 disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements,201 and
a tabular presentation of certain long-term liabilities.202  The Concept Re-
lease questions focus on the location and format of some of these ele-
ments and whether they should be retained in their current form.  Also
included here were several questions on whether the MD&A should be
revised to require a discussion of management’s judgment regarding criti-
cal accounting estimates disclosed in the financial statements, or the fac-
tors that influence management’s assessment of materiality in the
MD&A.203  All of these questions attracted limited responses from com-
mentators in this study.204
4. Risk Factors.  Item 105 (Formerly Item 503(c)).  Questions 145–156.205
Item 105 (relocated from Item 503(c) in 2019) now requires a disclo-
sure of the “most significant risk factors” affecting the company or its se-
curities.206  The SEC has noted that risk factor disclosure is plagued
simultaneously by under-reporting of company-specific risk factors and
over-disclosure of generic or boilerplate disclosures that are similar to
other companies in the same industry.”207  For this reason, the SEC’s cur-
rent guidance on risk factor disclosure advises that disclosure should dis-
cuss the “most significant” factors that make the company’s securities
198. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,947–54.
199. Id. at 23,947 (Questions 113–120).
200. Id. at 23,948 (Questions 121–123).
201. Id. at 23,951 (Questions 125–130).
202. Id. at 23,952 (Questions 131–136).  Several of these provisions may be
amended or eliminated if the 2020 Proposed Rules, supra note 50, are adopted.
203. The 2020 Proposed Rules would require this disclosure. Supra note 50,
at 72–82.  (Questions 137–144).
204. Again, this study includes all comments responding to any question in
section IV.C (Risk and Risk Management) or section IV.F (Sustainability) of the
Concept Release.  Item 303 (MD&A) is addressed in section IV.B of the Concept
Release, so not all comments on the MD&A may be included in this study.
205. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,956.
206. The 2019 Final Rules relocated Item 503(c) disclosures to new Item 105.
Supra note 3, at 53, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 (2019).  Note that information
related to material market risk exposure, however, is disclosed under Item 305,
discussed infra at Section III.B.5.  The 2019 Proposed Rules would revise Item 105
to change the disclosure standard from the “most significant” risk factors to the
“material” factors.  2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 44,382–83.
207. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,955–56 & n.492.
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speculative or risky, and should be organized and concise.208  The SEC’s
2010 guidance on climate-related risks confirms that this rule applies to
material climate risks as well.209
The only substantive changes the SEC has made to this disclosure
since 2016 are to eliminate the risk factor examples previously included in
the rule in order to help companies focus their disclosure on firm-specific
risk.210  The 2019 Proposed Rules would require a summary for risk factor
disclosures beyond fifteen pages, substitute the term “material” factors for
the “most significant,” require the use of headings, and separately identify
generic risks at the end of the disclosure.211
Concept Release questions on Item 105 (former Item 503(c)) sought
public input on amendments to improve the quality and firm-specific con-
tent of risk factor disclosure and whether to require additional disclosure
on how management identifies and responds to material risks.  They also
asked specifically whether the length of risk factor disclosures currently
obscures investor’s understanding of significant risks.212  Most, if not all,
of the questions extend readily to material ESG risk factors.
Risk factor disclosures attracted a high number of comments.  Issuers
are generally opposed to additional or more prescriptive disclosures, while
investors tend to support more expansive risk factor disclosure.  As Table
16 of the Appendix shows, differences between investor and business com-
munity views are greatest with respect to questions of disclosure overload,
proposals to expand disclosure of companies’ risk mitigation efforts, and
proposals to expand disclosure of risk probability and impact.  On the lat-
ter two issues, these differences were statistically significant at the 1% level.
No comments in the study addressed the specific costs and benefits of risk
factor disclosure or of any of the proposed changes.213
On the core question of disclosure overload,214 the majority of re-
spondents reported that risk factor length is a concern, but investors and
issuers divided sharply.  Over 60% of investor comments on this question
disagreed that risk factor disclosure length obscures material information,
while most other respondents agreed.  These differences were statistically
significant at the 10% level.
208. 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 (2019); see also Concept Release, supra note 1, at
23,955 & nn.482–84 (citations omitted).
209. 2010 Climate Guidance, supra note 54.  On the materiality of climate-
related risk factors, see generally TCFD, supra note 9.
210. This issue was raised in Question 151 of the Concept Release. See id. at
23,956; see also 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 53, 156–57 (eliminating risk factor
examples in Item 503(c) and relocating Item 503(c) to new Item 105 in subpart
100 of Regulation S-K).  As Table 16 shows, the few responses here on this issue
were mixed across respondent groups.
211. See 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3, at 44,382–83.
212. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,956 (Question 148).
213. Id. (Question 156).
214. Id. (Question 148).
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Comments from a number of law firms stated that over-disclosure of
risk factors and generic or boilerplate disclosures are due to fear of liabil-
ity,215 and certain investors and other respondents agreed that these same
concerns also lead companies to under-disclose firm-specific risks.216  De-
spite a limited number of comments on the topic, a potential solution that
appears to be supported by most respondents (86%), including all issuers
and two-thirds of investors, is the introduction of a list of generic risks that
need not be disclosed, as has been proposed in the 2019 Proposed Rules,
and the creation of a safe harbor with respect to those risks.217
Investors and issuers also disagreed strongly on the issue of under-
disclosure—whether Item 503(c) is “effective for capturing emerging risks
. . . such as those associated with cybersecurity, climate change, and arctic
drilling.”218  Eighty percent of the investor respondents disagreed, and a
number of investors, including insurer Aflac, encouraged the SEC to spe-
cifically reference ESG factors in its future rulemaking or guidance on
Item 503(c).219  Fewer issuers responded on this issue, but nearly all dis-
agreed with investors and stated that, in their view, Item 503(c) already
elicits adequate disclosure of emerging risks.  The difference in views of
215. See, e.g., id.; see also Comment of Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 140
(“[N]otwithstanding the PSLRA, we think registrants generally limit their volun-
tary forward-looking disclosure to earnings press releases, quarterly calls or other
investor presentations that are ‘furnished’ with the Commission under Form 8-K
rather than in ‘filed’ periodic or current reports in response to the heightened
litigation risk associated with [filed] documents . . . .”); Concept Release, supra
note 1, at 23,955–56 (discussing prior public comments to this effect); Comment
of Matthew D. Brusch, supra note 147, at 3 n.5 (“[M]any companies feel compelled
to sacrifice usefulness and accessibility in favor of protection from legal risk
through over-disclosure and standardized disclosure such as ‘boilerplate’ risk fac-
tors.  Such over-disclosure not only burdens corporate resources—at the expense
of all shareholders—but often buries shareholders in an avalanche of information
that ultimately limits the practical utility of Exchange Act filings.” (quoting Com-
ment of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz 2–3 (May 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-06-16/s70616-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/B64B-UBAX])).
216. See Comment of Penny Somer-Greif, Chair, & Gregory T. Lawrence, Vice
Chair, Comm. on Securities Law, Md. State Bar Ass’n (May 8, 2017), https://www
.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-257.pdf [https://perma.cc/V72T-TX9A]; see
also Comment of Lisa French, Chief Tech. Officer, Int’l Integrated Reporting
Council 1 (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-197
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EJM-S9YJ]; Comment of Americans for Financial Re-
form, supra note 130, at 2 (“concerns about ‘excessive disclosure’ or ‘disclosure
overload’ are profoundly misplaced”—the problem is that “risk factor disclosures
have become increasingly generic and non-specific in ways that do not provide
actionable information to investors”).
217. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,956 (Question 150).
218. Id. (Question 154).
219. Comment of Frederick Crawford, Executive Vice President & Chief Fin.
Officer, Audit & Risk Comm., Aflac, Inc. (July 7, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-166.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6VT-BT9U]; see also Com-
ment of Lisa N. Woll, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. SIF & U.S. SIF Found. (July 16,
2016) [hereinafter Comment of Woll (U.S. SIF)], https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-107.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZK4-3MYF].
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investors and business advocates on this question was statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level.
Investors were strongly supportive of new rules to require a discussion
of risk mitigation, that is, how companies are addressing the identified
risks,220 with 70% in favor.  An even higher percentage of issuers (76%),
however, opposed such a change. As with the MD&A in Item 303,
mandatory disclosure of the probability of occurrence and the effect on
performance for each risk factor was favored by 75% of investor comments
on the question, while all responding investors and most other respon-
dents opposed.221  Again, both of these differences were statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level.  Investors and other non-issuers were divided on the
question of whether companies should be required to rank risk factors in
order of magnitude (Question 147),222 while nearly all issuer responses
opposed.
The results also identify areas of relative agreement among investors
and business advocates.  For example, most responses reflected shared
concern about the need to reduce generic or boilerplate disclosures,223
and about the challenges of requiring companies to identify certain risks
as more “risky” than others.  For example, in contrast to Question 147,
investors almost unanimously agreed with other respondents in opposing
a proposal that would require companies to “identify and disclose in order
their ten most significant risk factors.”224  Some investors also joined other
respondents in opposing requirements to provide a risk factor summary in
addition to a disclosure of self-identified “significant risks.”  These results
suggest that both investor and corporate perspectives emphasize the im-
portance of firm-specific risk disclosure, and that investors do not necessa-
rily advocate any and all expansions of mandatory reporting.225
220. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,956 (Question 145).
221. Id. (Question 146).
222. Id. (Question 147).
223. Id. (Question 150).
224. Compare to responses on Question 147, where some investors would
support ranking risk by probability or magnitude. See, e.g., Comment of Fenwick
West LLP 18 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-349
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX3A-XP52] (expressing concern that such disclosures
might offer investors a false sense of security and lead to higher litigation risk for
companies for a “mis-predicted outcome”).  Concern with boilerplate risk factor
disclosures is a focus of the 2019 Proposed Rules, supra note 3.
225. See, e.g., Comment of Jean A. Rogers, Chief Executive Officer, Sus-
tainability Accounting Standards Bd. 8 (July 1, 2016) [hereinafter Comment of
SASB], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-25.pdf [https://perma
.cc/WW6N-DAFQ]  (stating that “more than 40 percent of all 10-K disclosure on
sustainability topics consists of boilerplate language.  This preponderance of vague
language does not help investors to evaluate performance.”).
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5. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk.  Item 305.
Questions 157–179.226
Item 305 requires quantitative and qualitative disclosure of “market
risk-sensitive instruments,” such as derivatives, that affect the company’s
financial condition.  Item 305 uses both qualitative and quantitative disclo-
sure approaches because of the need to balance comparability for inves-
tors and flexibility for issuers.227  Item 305(b) also requires disclosure of
forward-looking information on the company’s primary market risks and a
description of how those risks are managed.228  Because Item 305 is in-
tended to elicit forward-looking information on risk,229 it also provides a
safe harbor.230
In this section of the Concept Release, the SEC sought to assess the
effectiveness of the current rule’s balance of quantitative and qualitative
disclosure, its relevance to companies outside the financial sector, the ex-
tent of any overlap with similar disclosures required by GAAP or Regula-
tion S-X, and whether any changes are needed to improve the
comparability of market risk disclosure.  These questions attracted fewer
responses than other parts of the Concept Release.  Table 17 of the Ap-
pendix presents the results of the questions that were most important to
respondents in this study.
a. Market Risk Disclosure Effectiveness & Under-Disclosure.  Questions
157–168.
Similar to responses on the adequacy of Item 105’s risk factor disclo-
sures,231 few issuers commented on these questions; those that did stated
their belief that Item 305 is not effective at eliciting market risk disclo-
sure.232  As shown on Table 17, differences among respondent groups are
not significant on this question.
The SEC also asked whether it should limit the quantitative disclosure
requirement to financial institutions or companies engaged in financial
services (Question 161).  Of the few respondents who considered the ques-
tion, most (80%) agreed that these disclosures were less relevant to other
226. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,958–59.
227. Id. at 23,959 (“In adopting Item 305, the [SEC] acknowledged the ten-
sion between approaches to market risk disclosure that favor comparability and
approaches that favor flexibility.”).
228. As the Concept Release explains, “Item 305(a) requires registrants to
provide quantitative disclosure about market risk sensitive instruments using one
or more of three disclosure alternatives,” while Item 305(b) “requires qualitative
information about market risk,” as well as a description of how material risk expo-
sures are managed and any change in such processes. Id. at 23,956.
229. Id. at 23,957.
230. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305(d) (2019).
231. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,956 (Question 154).
232. Id. at 23,958 (Question 158).
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sectors.233  Due to greater investor opposition and the limited number of
responses, differences among groups are significant at the 10% level.
b. Disclosure of Approach to Risk Management & Risk Management
Process.  Item 305(b).  Questions 169–182.234
Because this section of the Concept Release proposes potential ex-
pansions of risk management disclosure, the comments here offer some
indication of respondents’ views on under-reporting.  These questions are
particularly interesting because, in contrast to Item 503 risk factor disclo-
sures, Item 305(b) already requires reporting companies to disclose both
material market risks and how those risks are managed.235
As Table 17 shows, these topics attracted a moderate number of re-
sponses across Item 305(b), although investor responses were quite lim-
ited.  Issuers generally responded to oppose any new risk management
disclosures, while “other” respondents held more mixed views.
Although some issuers urged the SEC to eliminate the current rules
requiring a description of companies’ risk management processes for ma-
terial market risk exposures, 75% of all comments on this core aspect of
Item 305(b) favored the current requirements.236  These differences are
significant at the 5% level.  Few comments expressed a view on whether
the SEC should also require companies to assess their risk management
processes,237 or to disclose waivers or changes to fundamental parameters
of risk management approaches or policies.238  Issuers universally op-
posed both proposals, while other responses were mixed.  Differences
among groups were significant at the 10% level for Question 170 and in-
significant for Question 172, given respondents’ shared opposition on this
issue. Comments from all respondent groups, however, were nearly all in
agreement that a reform to consolidate all risk-related disclosure in a sin-
gle section of a filing would be beneficial.239
233. Note, however, that two of the three investor comments disagreed. See
infra Appendix, at Table 16.
234. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,960.
235. 17 C.F.R § 229.305(b) (2019).  The SEC has previously rejected a “man-
agement approach” to disclosure of market risk that would require disclosure of
the information methods management uses to “evaluate, monitor, and manage
market risk” because such an approach could reduce the comparability of disclo-
sure across registrants.  Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,958.  Instead, Item
305(a) requires registrants to use one or more of three (3) alternatives to disclose
market risk. Id. at 23,958 & n.524.  Although its purpose was to enable greater
standardization and comparability of disclosures, this approach may fail to capture
the diverse risk management “methods and assumptions” that companies use
(Question 168). Id. at 23,959.
236. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,960 (Question 169).
237. Id. (Question 170).
238. Id. (Question 172).
239. Id. at 23,961 (Questions 180–182).
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More comments responded to several questions on the need for dis-
closure risk factor mitigation, a question that is also relevant to Item 503
risk factor disclosure and potential ESG disclosure.240  Disclosure overload
concerns have led the SEC to discourage discussion of risk mitigation ef-
forts under Item 305(b), fearing that inclusion of mitigating language
might mislead investors by diluting their perception of the magnitude of
the risk.241  The few investor respondents were less strongly opposed to
market risk mitigation disclosures than issuers.  These differences were sig-
nificant at the 1% level, although the limited number of comments makes
interpreting the results difficult.  Overall, support for risk mitigation re-
forms was decidedly mixed, and no other significant differences among
respondents were observed.
6. Use of Industry Guides.  Questions 205–215.242
The five Industry Guides currently issued by the Division of Corpora-
tion Finance offer a partial solution to both over-reporting and under-
reporting concerns and are the subject of section IV.E of the Concept Re-
lease.  The SEC has historically used Industry Guides to address sector-
specific issues and facilitate greater comparability among disclosures for
the benefit of investors.  Because the Industry Guides are not rules, but
represent staff policy that is directed to specific programs and sectors,243
addressing sector-specific disclosure issues in the Industry Guides may also
be preferable for companies concerned about the compliance burdens of
new disclosures.  Since the materiality of many ESG risks is often sector-
specific, as discussed below, the Industry Guides could also be a vehicle for
providing tailored guidance on ESG materiality and disclosure practice to
companies in specific sectors and to improve the quality and comparability
of ESG disclosure.
In the Concept Release, the SEC sought input on whether the Indus-
try Guides facilitate disclosure that is useful to investors, whether they are
useful to companies in the relevant sectors, whether any updates are
needed, and whether any of the industry-specific disclosures should be
codified within Regulation S-K.
These questions attracted a fairly strong response, accounting for
over 10% of all comments in this study.  As Table 18 of the Appendix
shows, all respondents agreed that the Industry Guides are useful and
should be retained.244  Fourteen comments (half of all those addressing
Industry Guide questions) urged the SEC to address sector-specific ESG
disclosure matters within the Industry Guides; the only issuer response
raising ESG issues did so to oppose the use of Industry Guides for ESG
240. Id. at 23,960 (Questions 176–178).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 23,969.
243. Id. at 23,967 & n.626.
244. Id. at 23,969 (Question 205).
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disclosure.245 Very few comments addressed the need for codification of
the Industry Guides,246 and most of these, including the majority of inves-
tor responses, opposed.  No significant differences among groups were ob-
served, and comments on these questions provided few specific
recommendations.
7. Disclosure of Information Related to Public Policy & Sustainability Matters.
Questions 216–233.247
The Concept Release questions on “public policy and sustainability
matters” attracted the most attention from respondents and are the sub-
ject of the two form letters that were submitted by over 25,000 signatories.
As Table 19 shows, over 98% of the comments in this study address ESG
disclosure.  Despite the high response rate and the comments’ overall
strong support for ESG disclosure reform, none of the SEC amendments
to Regulation S-K to date address these issues.
One reason may be the sharp divergence between investors and issu-
ers on whether the problem ESG reform must solve is a question of under-
reporting or disclosure overload.  Eighty-three percent of all respondents
in this study support expanding ESG disclosure in some form, with 13%
opposed.  As Figure 2 shows, 96% of investor comments and 78% of
“other” respondents on this issue supported expanded ESG disclosure,
compared with only 15% of issuers.  Surveys of institutional investors and
corporate boards since 2016 indicate that recognition of ESG materiality
has grown stronger among both groups since then, suggesting that sup-
port for ESG disclosure would be stronger if the SEC were to pose the
same questions today.248  Interestingly, of the 17 law firm comments in-
cluded in this study, only 7 (41%) supported ESG disclosure reform.249
Table 19 presents a summary of respondent views and shows that for most
questions, differences among investors and issuers are highly statistically
significant.
245. Comment of Corporate Governance Coalition for Investor Value, supra
note 146.
246. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,969 (Questions 208, 213).
247. Id. at 23,969–73.
248. See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors, supra note 7, at 2 (observing
these trends); VASANTHAM ET AL., supra note 8 (same).
249. See, e.g., Comment of Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP (Aug. 9, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-354.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EXJ-B8HD]
(urging the SEC to focus on how to address sustainability disclosure). But see Com-
ment of Shearman & Sterling, LLP, supra note 130 (arguing that ESG disclosure is
generally immaterial and therefore mandating ESG disclosure rulemaking “moves
the SEC away from its core mission”).
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Figure 2. Support for Expanded ESG Disclosure.
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a. ESG Materiality.  Questions 216 & 220.250
These two questions focus on ESG materiality, which is at the core of
the over-disclosure debate.  If ESG information is material, companies
must also consider which ESG matters fall within the scope of current dis-
closure rules and whether their omission will render any required disclo-
sures misleading.  If, on the other hand, ESG information is categorically
immaterial, then any rules expanding ESG disclosure will inevitably in-
crease issuer costs without improving the informational content of disclo-
sure for investors.
As it has noted in the Concept Release, the SEC determined in 1975
that “disclosure relating to environmental and other matters of social con-
cern should not be required of all registrants unless appropriate to further
a specific congressional mandate or unless, under the particular facts and
circumstances, such matters are material.”251  In the Concept Release, the
SEC for the first time sought comment on precisely this issue—the extent
to which “public policy and sustainability matters” are now considered to
be material in terms of their “importance . . . to informed investment and
voting decisions,”252 and to identify such issues specifically.253  In a similar
vein, the SEC asked whether there are any ESG issues “for which line-item
disclosure requirements would be consistent with the Commission’s
250. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,972.
251. Id. at 23,970 & n.663 (citing the 1975 Environmental and Social Disclo-
sure Release, Rel. No.33-5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656-02 (Nov. 6, 1975), which con-
cluded that these matters were “social goals unrelated to the objectives of the
federal securities laws” that would be beyond the SEC’s regulatory authority but for
separate congressional authorization).
252. Id. at 23,970 (quoting the TSC Industries standard).
253. Id. at 23,972 (Question 216).
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rulemaking authority and [its] mission to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital formation.”254  It also
asked respondents to suggest flexible frameworks to “address such issues
as they evolve over time,” recognizing that materiality may be dynamic.255
A surprising finding here is that although issuers were divided on the
materiality of ESG issues, a majority agreed that certain ESG factors are
material.256  Investors and other respondents more uniformly affirm ESG
materiality, and the resulting differences between these two groups and
investors are significant at the less than 1% level.  A high percentage of
comments also addressed the SEC’s authority to adopt ESG disclosure
rules, although those identifying ESG information as material were more
likely to find it within the SEC’s authority.  Tracking responses on materi-
ality quite closely, investors uniformly affirm the SEC’s authority in this
area,257 while most issuers dispute it.258  These differences are also signifi-
cant at the 1% level.
The language used in the comments is also a strong indicator of re-
spondents’ views on materiality.  For example, companies and trade as-
sociations tended to avoid the term “ESG” or even “sustainability” and to
refer in their responses to “public policy” and “special interest” concerns.
For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stressed that any matters to
which the SEC might be referring in these questions are categorically im-
material from the perspective of a “reasonable investor,” such that any in-
vestor who might advocate in favor of their disclosure should not be
viewed as “reasonable.”259  However, some investor advocates strongly ob-
254. Id. at 23,973 (Question 220).
255. Id. (Questions 216, 220).
256. Responses here were coded as recognizing ESG materiality if they stated
so generally or identified any specific ESG factor(s) as material.
257. See, e.g., Comment of Woll (U.S. SIF), supra note 219, at 3, 12; Comment
of SASB, supra note 225; Comment of Ceres on Behalf of 45 Asset Owners & Asset
Mgrs. (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-174.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6RK-8AT9]; Comment of PRI, supra note 146; Comment of
Josh Zinner, Chief Executive Officer, and Sarah Margolis, Assoc. Program Dir.,
Interfaith Center on Corp. Responsibility (ICCR) (July 14, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-103.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J4E-9SGQ].
258. See, e.g., Comment of Penny Somer-Greif, supra note 216, at 15 (arguing
that rulemaking on ESG issues would be a “perversion of the federal securities
laws”); Comment of Karen Kerrigan, President & Chief Executive Officer, Small
Bus. & Entrepreneurship Council 2 (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-217.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KQQ-QVCR] (stating that
mandating ESG disclosure would be “inappropriate, and probably unlawful”).
259. Comment of Tom Quaadman, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce CCMC 2, 17–19 (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-173.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHY9-ML3N] (describing ESG disclosure
as “special interest disclosure, which threatens to politicize the disclosure regime
to the detriment of the reasonable investor”); see also Comment of Bruce Watzman,
Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Nat’l Mining Ass’n (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-260.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B4LN-V4QN] (charging support for ESG disclosure reform as a “politicization” of
the SEC to achieve social or political goals); Comment of Shearman and Sterling
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jected to the SEC’s use of the term “public policy” in the Concept Release
itself, arguing that the use of this term “marginalizes” ESG information as
immaterial.260 If the comments of business advocates and companies here
are representative, then their strong opposition to the possibility of ESG
materiality may support investor claims that ESG under-disclosure is in fact
occurring.261
The comments also reveal interesting similarities and differences
among issuers and investors for those who otherwise agreed on the materi-
ality of at least some ESG issues.  Thirty-three percent of all comments on
section IV.F agreed that ESG materiality is sector-specific.  In addition,
nearly 20% of the 219 investors who responded to questions in this part of
the Concept Release identified ESG factors as material to systemic, market,
or portfolio-wide risk, while no issuer responses did so.262  Comments
identified a wide range of material ESG issues; those raised most fre-
quently included climate risk and environmental matters, political contri-
butions, human rights, and international tax strategies.  The potentially
broad scope of circumstances that may render specific ESG information
material is a concern of some companies and counsel with respect to po-
tential ESG disclosure.263  Several investors, however, emphasized that
under the SEC’s materiality standard, information is material based on its
importance to the “total mix” of information rather than because of its
significance in isolation.264
LLP, supra note 130 (arguing that ESG information is generally immaterial from a
financial perspective).
260. See Comment of Lisa French, Chief Tech. Officer, Int’l Integrated Re-
porting Council 11 (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/
s70616-197.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH88-SVK9].
261. See, e.g., Comment of Michelle de Cordova, Director of Corp. Engage-
ment & Pub. Policy, NEI Invs. (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
06-16/s70616-229.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4DA-6PYS] (“In our experience of ex-
amining disclosure [for] ESG evaluations, it is more often the case that issuers
omit important information when they are unsure if it is material . . . .”).
262. See, e.g., Comment of Petter Johnsen, CIO Equity Strategies & Basak
Yeltekin, Senior Analyst Ownership Strategies, Norges Bank Inv. Mgmt. 3 (July 15,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-129.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9W5Y-WJ3R] (urging the need to use prescriptive disclosures for information
“such as climate emissions data” that are relevant to maintaining “fair, orderly, and
efficient markets”); see also Comment of Mardi McBrien, Managing Dir. Climate
Disclosure Standards Bd., at app. I (CDSB), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
06-16/s70616-211.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMB3-N4HP] (arguing that climate risk
presents systemic risk implications); Comment of Timothy Smith & Heidi Soumeri,
Walden Asset Mgmt., Boston Tr. Inv. & Inv. Mgmt. Co. 2 (July 19, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-151.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TCG-
U2CP] (same).  On the relationship between ESG information asymmetries and
systemic risk, see Harper Ho, supra note 21, at 445–46.
263. See, e.g., Comment of Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 249.
264. Comment of Lisa N. Woll (U.S. SIF), supra note 219, at 12.
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b. Concerns About ESG Disclosure Overload.  Question 217.265
In section IV.F of the Concept Release, the SEC also raised a specific
question about potential disclosure overload if new ESG disclosure man-
dates were to be introduced.  Specifically, it asked whether “line-item re-
quirements for disclosure about sustainability or public policy issues
[would] cause registrants to disclose information that is not material to
investors” or would “obscure information that is important to an under-
standing of a registrant’s business and financial condition.”
This question generated a high number of responses, with 96% of
issuers arguing that ESG disclosure would overwhelm investors with imma-
terial information, while 63% of investors disagreed.  In short, companies
and business groups were more likely to express concerns about investors’
information overload than investors themselves.
Many investors noted that advances in technology permitting ma-
chine reading and automated analytics enable efficient analysis of more
extensive disclosures, provided that the information is presented in a com-
parable format, and that over-disclosure concerns are therefore out-
dated.266  These comments emphasize the importance of consistency and
comparability, which is difficult to achieve solely through principles-based
disclosure.
c. Adequacy of Voluntary Sustainability Reporting, Website-Based ESG
Disclosure, & the SEC’s 2010 Climate Guidance.  Questions
218, 223.267
Here, the SEC sought input on the benefits of private ordering as a
driver of voluntary disclosure and referenced several potential sources of
ESG information that are currently available to investors and might allevi-
ate the need for SEC rulemaking.  The SEC asked first whether the sus-
tainability or corporate social responsibility reports some companies
already produce are adequate to “satisfy investor needs” with respect to
ESG disclosure.  The SEC also asked for comment on the “advantages and
disadvantages” of investors relying on sustainability reports or on other
information companies provide on corporate websites, particularly with
respect to its comparability and consistency.268  It then asked for comment
265. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,972.
266. See, e.g., Comment of Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 130, at
2 (“A concern that an increase in disclosure may ‘bury shareholders’ in ‘an ava-
lanche of trivial information’ is only relevant in a world of paper-based disclosures
that has long since disappeared. . . .  The proper emphasis is not on the question-
able and unproven hypothesis of so-called ‘disclosure overload,’ but on the format,
utility, and availability of disclosure.”); see also Comment of CFA Institute, supra
note 119 (“[I]nvestors have not indicated . . . that they are overwhelmed by the
volume and complexity of existing disclosure.”).
267. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,973.
268. Current rules permit registrants to comply with certain disclosure re-
quirements by providing information on their website in lieu of a filing; for exam-
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on the importance to investors of “integrated reporting,269 as opposed to
separate financial and sustainability reporting, and for comments on the
effectiveness of its 2010 Climate Guidance in eliciting adequate disclosure
of climate-related risks.270
As Table 19 shows, all of these questions attracted a high volume of
responses, and the results indicate that investors are more concerned
about under-reporting than other respondents.  These results are further
confirmed in Part IV below.  Differences among respondents on these
questions are also highly statistically significant, as shown on Table 19.
Although 46% of all comments by companies and business organiza-
tions argued that voluntary sustainability reporting outside the federal dis-
closure regime adequately meets investor needs,271 less than 1% of
investors thought so.272  In fact, 96% of investors asserted, often strongly,
that ESG information contained in these reports is inadequate for invest-
ment purposes and costly to analyze.  They stress that in the absence of a
standardized ESG reporting framework, investors must glean material in-
formation from among immaterial information in voluntary sustainability
reports that is directed at other stakeholders and often available only from
individual company websites that investors must scour at their own cost.273
For these reasons, the SEC’s own Investor Advisory Commission was
among those urging the SEC to consider the need to develop a framework
for ESG risk disclosure.274
The majority of investors cited two primary reasons why voluntary sus-
tainability reporting is inadequate.275  The first is that the broader stake-
ple, corporate codes of ethics may be posted to the registrant’s website under Item
406(c). Id. at 24,000.
269. Id. at 23,973 & n.702 (citing INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATED REPORTING
COUNCIL (IIRC), THE INTERNATIONAL IR FRAMEWORK (2013), http://integratedre-
porting.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/13-12-08-THE-INTERNATIONAL-IR-
FRAMEWORK-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN99-YYNG]).
270. 2010 Climate Guidance, supra note 54.
271. See, e.g., Comment of Michael P. Walls, Vice President, Regulatory &
Tech. Affairs, Am. Chem. Council (July 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-225.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL6W-M4TC]; Comment of
Thomas S. Timko, Vice President, Controller & Chief Accounting Officer, Gen.
Motors Co. 4 (July 6, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-373
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY3H-5UFU].
272. See, e.g., Comment of Members of Congress 1 (July 20, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-175.pdf [https://perma.cc/DLT8-VLYB]
(representing the views of six members of Congress that the SEC’s 2010 Climate
Guidance is inadequate “to ensure meaningful disclosure practices and polic[ies]”
on climate risk).
273. On investor costs, see infra Section III.B.7.e.
274. Comment of SEC Inv. Advisory Comm. 7–8 (June 15, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/826E-BQNH]
(noting that ESG issues may be financially material, supporting a mixed approach
to disclosure, and urging the SEC to develop an “analytical framework” for ESG
reporting).
275. These two disadvantages are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive
but were widely cited by investors.
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holder-orientation of most voluntary reports means they are not subject to
the same investor-oriented materiality standards that apply to public fil-
ings.276  The second is that the plethora of reporting frameworks and stan-
dards reduce the comparability of any resulting data.277  Comments from
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants also noted that the
majority of public companies do not connect the personnel and processes
associated with sustainability reporting to those responsible for financial
reporting.278
Over 80% of all respondents on this question also disagree that ESG
information provided on company websites is adequate for investment
purposes, both for the reasons set forth above and because such informa-
tion is difficult to locate and analyze at present.279  As Table 19 shows, less
than 10% of all respondents identified integrated reporting as important.
Issuers’ views also differed widely from those of other respondents
with regard to the adequacy of existing disclosure rules and the SEC’s
2010 materiality guidance on climate change disclosure in particular.280
All issuers argued that the current mix of guidance and existing rules is
adequate, while 96% of investors and 86% of all other respondents dis-
agreed.281  These differences were statistically significant at the 1% level.
276. AICPA Comment Letter, supra note 81, at 4.
277. See, e.g., Comment of Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP 6 (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-258.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LQ4K-SC37] (emphasizing the lack of comparability of voluntary reports); Com-
ment of Lisa Jankoy, Chair, Pension Inv. Ass’n of Canada 2 (PIAC) (July 17, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-206.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U3SJ-KR5B] (“[Investors require data that is clear, comprehensive, and compara-
ble across industries”); Comment of Robert Fohr, Ass’n for Mission Responsibility
Through Invest., Presbyterian Church U.S.A. 4 (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-290.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5HM-EPV2]
(same).
278. AICPA Comment Letter, supra note 81; see also COSO & WBSCD, supra
note 85, at 6 (noting these challenges).
279. See, e.g., Comment of Emil D. Efthimides, Glob. Regulatory Monitor, Eq-
uities, and Lenora Suki, Head of Sustainable Fin. Prod. Strategy, Bloomberg LP 9
(July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-264.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/MRX3-2W8T] (detailing the limitations).
280. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,973 (Question 223).
281. See Comment of Members of Congress, supra note 119 (representing the
views of six members of Congress that the SEC’s 2010 Climate Guidance is inade-
quate “to ensure meaningful disclosure practices and policy” on climate risk); see
also Comment of Ceres, supra note 257, at 2 (“[D]isclosures provided by companies
in SEC filings regarding material effects that sustainability issues may have ‘upon
the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive positions’ of registrants are still
confined largely to large cap companies—and not even all of those—and many of
the disclosures that are there have remained vague.”).  Those urging the SEC to
develop “mandatory and meaningful disclosures of the material effects of climate
change on issuers” include three former Secretaries of the Treasury. See Comment
of Henry M. Paulson, Robert E. Rubin, and George P. Shultz, Co-Chair & Member
of the Risky Bus. Project (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-202.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH9R-4A95].
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Investors’ comments suggest, ironically, that the problems of disclo-
sure overload are most acute with respect to voluntary sustainability re-
porting.  On the whole, the responses on Questions 218 and 223 from
corporations and business advocates about the kind of information that
meets investor needs are directly at odds with the views of investors
themselves.
d. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Potential ESG Disclosure Reform.  Question
221.282
As in other sections of the Concept Release, the SEC also invited com-
ment on the “additional costs of complying with sustainability or public
policy line-item disclosure requirements, including the administrative and
compliance costs of preparing and disseminating disclosures, beyond the
costs associated with current levels of disclosure.”283  This question is also
central to concerns about over-disclosure and attracted a high number of
responses.284
As Table 20 of the Appendix shows, all issuers responding, and one-
third of investor respondents expect costs to rise if ESG disclosure reforms
are introduced.285  These issuer responses represent 65% of all issuer
comments on section IV.F of the Concept Release.  However, 25% of in-
vestor comments stated that costs will not increase, largely because compa-
nies already have reporting systems in place to produce voluntary
sustainability reports, and so new reporting requirements would only re-
quire companies to disclose in their public filings material information
they have already obtained.286  Of investor respondents who indicated
that costs may rise, nearly half expect any increase to be reasonable and
for these same reasons.287  Thirty-one respondents (11.2%), none of them
issuers, indicated they would expect investor costs to decrease in the event
the SEC moved to standardize ESG disclosure.  These comments empha-
sized the high costs to investors of obtaining disclosure through direct en-
gagement with companies, filing shareholder proposals, and searching for
282. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,973.
283. Id.
284. For one response offering specific guidance on the costs and benefits of
sustainability disclosure reform, see Comment of CDSB, supra note 262, at app.
(referring the SEC to cost-benefits studies in the European Union on non-financial
reporting).
285. See, e.g., Comment of John Hayes, Chair, Corp. Governance Comm., Bus.
Roundtable (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-208
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G3B-CKAA].
286. See, e.g., Comment of eRevalue (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-06-16/s70616-363.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ9Z-8ATS].
287. See, e.g., Comment of J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of
Denver Sturm Coll. of Law 9 & n.47 (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-06-16/s70616-374.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH49-WKNS] (detailing the
ESG information companies already produce for other regulators, in addition to
sustainability reports).
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material ESG information on corporate websites and in other public
sources.288
e. Recommended Reporting Frameworks.  Question 219.289
The SEC received a high number of comments suggesting sus-
tainability reporting frameworks that it should consider if it decides to de-
velop ESG line-item disclosures.  As Figure 3 shows, the most widely used
voluntary reporting frameworks—the SASB and GRI standards—received
the strongest endorsements.  When the Concept Release was issued in
2016, the final TCFD reports and framework for climate-related financial
disclosure were still under development, which may explain why fewer
comments referenced what is now a widely endorsed and highly influential
climate disclosure framework.290
288. Selected comments detailing these costs include: Comment of Jonathan
E. Feigelson, Teacher’s Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. (July 21, 2016), https://www
.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-265.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QA7-U7EG];
Comment of Ceres, supra note 257, at 2 (“[Relying on voluntary disclosure] im-
poses a significant burden on investors who conduct engagements to persuade
companies to disclose material ESG issues.”); Comment of Joseph F. Keefe, Presi-
dent & CEO, and Julie F. Gorte, Senior Vice President Sustainable Inv., Pax World
Mgmt. LLC 1 (July 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-
152.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z8U-6AZ2] (“Investors should not have to rely on liti-
gation to compel enforcement of current regulations.”); Comment of Jonas Kron,
Senior Vice President, Trillium Asset Mgmt., LLC (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-276.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H2M-SRL5]; Com-
ment of CalPERS, supra note 119; Comment of Robert M. Wilson, Jr., MFS Inv.
Mgmt., Bos., Mass. 1–2 (July 20, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/
s70616-193.pdf [https://perma.cc/846X-MK6G] (noting that shareholder engage-
ment to obtain information “can be both costly and inefficient and often results in
insufficient information being provided to permit a quantification of . . . risk.  Im-
proved and quantified disclosures will streamline investor engagement, making
the process more efficient for companies”); Comment of Lisa N. Woll (U.S. SIF),
supra note 219, at 17 (“[B]rowsing through websites to find ESG data, company-by-
company, in order to compare registrants and make investment decisions is a time-
wasting, onerous and arduous process.”).
289. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,973.
290. On the current level of implementation of the TCFD’s recommenda-
tions, see TCFD, 2019 STATUS REPORT (June 2019), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/pub-
lications/tcfd-2019-status-report/ [https://perma.cc/FB3Z-RV8X].  The TCFD
recommendations, SASB materiality guidelines, and the CDB standards are all
based on the materiality standards established under the securities laws.
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Figure 3.  Recommended ESG Disclosure Frameworks.
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f. Scaled Requirements for Smaller Reporting Companies (SRCs) &
Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs).  Questions 264–285.291
Of particular relevance to the question of disclosure overload, the
SEC’s Disclosure Effectiveness mandate obligates it to consider how to fur-
ther reduce the regulatory burden on smaller companies, including
smaller reporting companies (SRCs) and emerging growth companies
(EGCs).292  Other jurisdictions with mandatory ESG disclosure have lim-
ited mandatory disclosure to large firms293 because those firms have the
greatest impact on shareholders and other stakeholders and a greater eco-
nomic capacity to bear the costs of complying with these disclosure man-
dates.  However, as the SEC notes elsewhere in the Concept Release, “the
benefits of disclosure may be greater for smaller registrants because infor-
mation symmetries between investors and managers of smaller companies
are typically higher than for larger, more seasoned companies with a large
following.”294
In section IV.F of the Concept Release, the SEC explicitly sought com-
ment on the benefits of scaling any future line-item ESG disclosures, or of
291. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,973.
292. See FAST Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 72002(1), 129 Stat. 1312 (2015); see also
Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,920–21 (discussing current requirements and
the Disclosure Effectiveness mandate).
293. See, e.g., Council Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 22 October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Dis-
closure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information By Certain Large Undertakings
and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 4 (limiting non-financial disclosure requirements to
corporate groups with more than 500 employees).
294. Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23,897.
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exempting SRCs or other categories of registrants from such require-
ments.295  Due to weak support for ESG disclosure reform from the busi-
ness community, most responses here came from investors.  Differences
among respondent groups are significant at the 10% level. As Table 21 of
the Appendix shows, roughly 75% of all respondents on this question op-
posed scaling or exemptions.  Common reasons offered by investors were
that smaller publicly traded firms currently produce less ESG information
than large firms and have less-developed policies and procedures for man-
aging ESG risks.  Some investors recommended instead that any new line-
item ESG rules be phased in gradually for SRCs.296
8. Other Topics: Exhibits; Subsidiaries; Scaled Requirements; Disclosure
Presentation & Delivery.  Questions 224–340.
As discussed earlier, the final sections of the Concept Release address
aspects of the format, presentation, and delivery of disclosure that could
facilitate more efficient access to material information and alleviate over-
disclosure concerns.297  As indicated on Table 1 of the Appendix, some of
these topics, such as disclosure of material contracts and the rules gov-
erning exhibits, are beyond the scope of this study; other issues from these
sections, such as scaling expectations for smaller issuers, relate more di-
rectly to the over-disclosure debate and so have already been incorporated
elsewhere in the preceding analysis.  As indicated on the Appendix, some
of these issues have been addressed in part by the 2018 and 2019 amend-
ments to Regulation S-K and related disclosure rules.298
295. Comments on scaling or exemptions, for example, in response to section
IV.H of the Concept Release (Scaled Requirements) are incorporated into the re-
sponses on Section III.B.7, supra.
296. See, e.g., Comment of Nancy J. Schroeder, Chair, Fin. Reporting Comm.,
Inst. Mgmt. Accountants (July 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-341.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQR2-YMYS]; see also Comment of Stud
Dalheim, Vice President Shareholder Advocacy, Calvert Invs. (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-245.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C6LY-23YA] (supporting phased requirements for SRCs).
297. These include internal cross-referencing (section A, Questions 286 to
295), incorporation by reference (section B, Questions 296 to 302), hyperlinks
(section C, Questions 303 to 306), company websites (section D, Questions 307 to
318), specific formatting requirements (section E, Questions 319 to 328), layered
disclosure (section F, Question 329), and structured disclosure (section G, Ques-
tions 330 to 340).
298. See generally 2018 Final Rules, supra note 3; 2019 Final Rules, supra note 3.
See also infra Appendix, at Table 1 (identifying select reforms with reference to
Concept Release topics).  Most notable among these is the SEC’s decision in its
2019 Final Rules not to require the use of “legal entity identifiers” (LEIs) that
some investors had urged could better enable them to identify geographic factors
and risks associated with a company’s foreign operations. See Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 23,985.  The SEC cited concerns about the cost to registrants of
obtaining and maintaining LEIs, and its conclusion that they conferred a limited
benefit to investors and regulators.  2019 Final Rules, supra note 3, at 89, 110.  The
SEC’s decision may also have been informed by the fact that its 2018 rulemaking
on Regulation S-K had amended Items 303(a) and 503(c) to add references to
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C. Risk & ESG: Over-Disclosure Overblown?
Since the SEC began its review of the federal disclosure regime in
2012, competing concerns about the costs to companies as producers of
disclosure, and demand for better information from investors and other
consumers of disclosure have not abated.  Thus far, this Part has presented
a descriptive account of what comments to the Concept Release can tell us
about the current framework and about potential areas for further reform.
This Section brings these findings together to clarify where respon-
dents’ views differ and where they align with respect to the core questions
about over-disclosure, under-disclosure, and potential reform paths that
are captured in Hypothesis 1 through 4.  Following that discussion are the
results of a logistic regression analysis testing the factors that may influ-
ence respondents’ views on ESG disclosure reform (Hypothesis 5).  It con-
firms that respondents’ support or opposition to ESG disclosure is in fact
correlated with their views on ESG materiality, the value of prescriptive
disclosure, and other more fundamental aspects of the reporting frame-
work.  All of these findings have direct implications for future disclosure
reform efforts Congress or the SEC may pursue.
1. Part I: Information Overload & Information Asymmetries: Who Cares &
Why It Matters
Research Questions 1 through 4 ask whether investors and investor
advocates, on the one hand, and issuers, trade associations, and their advi-
sors, on the other, have signficantly different views on: (1) whether over-
disclosure is a critical problem; (2) whether under-disclosure of ESG infor-
mation is a critical problem; (3) whether risk-related disclosure reform
should promote over- or under-disclosure problems; and (4) whether pre-
scriptive, principles-based, or mixed disclosure approaches are optimal.
The following findings are based on an analysis of the specific variables
that align with each of these hypotheses.  The results of the Fisher exact
tests of independence among respondent group responses for each of the
variables that are the relevant indicators for these hypotheses are provided
in Table 3 of the Appendix.299  Significant results indicate nonrandom
differences among the three groups, while the responses summarized in
Table 3 indicate where issuer or investor support for each indicator was
higher.
“geographic factors” in the discussions of business risk factors and trends.  2018
Final Rules, supra note 3, at 50,168–69 (deleting references to segment financial
performance in Item 101(b) and risks from foreign operations in Items 101(a)(3),
101(d)(1) and 101(d)(3) in light of these changes).
299. A tetrachoric correlation analysis was also used to confirm the binary
correlations between the variables associated with Hypothesis 2 and support for
ESG (pro_ESG). See supra Section II.C (describing this methodology).  A similar
analysis was done to confirm the correlations associated with Hypothesis 4, support
for prescriptive disclosure (prescriptive).  These results are on file with the author.
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These results generally confirm Hypothesis 1.  As Table 3 of the Ap-
pendix shows, out of 11 indicators for this hypothesis, 10 show that inves-
tors are less concerned about over-disclosure than issuers.  These
differences are significant at a 10% level or less for 5 of the indicators.  It is
noteworthy that nearly all comments in the dataset raising concerns about
the potential for “immaterial” disclosure to overload investors and obscure
material information were raised by companies and business advocates,
not by investors themselves.300
In general, investors do not believe themselves to be burdened by the
costs of immaterial information generated by current risk disclosure re-
quirements in the MD&A and elsewhere.301  These results indicate that
the costs of disclosure overload to investors should not impact the SEC’s
consideration of future rulemaking.  As the comments themselves make
clear, corporations’ real overload concerns are the compliance burdens
companies face when any new rules are introduced, and the related poten-
tial for securities fraud litigation.  These are important concerns, but they
are offset to some extent by the current litigation safe-harbors for forward-
looking information that apply to the most challenging forms of risk
disclosure.
Hypothesis 2—that investors are more concerned than issuers about
under-disclosure of ESG information—is also confirmed.  As Table 3
shows, among the 11 variables associated with this hypothesis, 9 show that
investors are more concerned about over-disclosure, and 6 of these differ-
ences are significant at the 1% level.  This is consistent with the evidence
of strong investor agreement on ESG materiality, and with investor com-
ments expressing dissatisfaction with Regulation S-K’s deference to issuer
judgments of ESG materiality and with the deficiencies of voluntary
reporting.
Indeed, as indicated in Section III.B above, investor responses stress
that reliance on voluntary sustainability reporting is in fact a source of
disclosure overload given the volume of immaterial information in these
300. See supra Section III.B (reporting results on disclosure overload for vari-
ous questions); see, e.g., Comment of Matthew D. Brusch, supra note 147 (expres-
sing concern about disclosure accretion); see also Comment of Exxon Mobil, supra
note 1 (same); Comment of Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 140 (noting that
over-disclosure burdens issuers, while investors can ignore immaterial informa-
tion).  Some public financial services firms concur. See, e.g., Comment of John
Matthews, supra note 125 (reporting that disclosure overload is due to expanding
disclosure rules and SEC guidance, analyst demand, Regulation FD, and litigation
risk).
301. These findings confirm earlier surveys of institutional investor views. See,
e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS: WHAT INVESTORS, COMPANY EXEC-
UTIVES AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS ARE SAYING 2 (Nov. 2014) https://www
.eyjapan.jp/library/issue/us/gaap-weekly-update/pdf/GAAP-2014-11-25-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HM64-ACQ3] (reporting from investor roundtables that “in-
vestors . . . are less concerned about reducing the volume of disclosures than they
are in obtaining more meaningful information”).
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sources.302  At the same time, as the descriptive data in Section III.B make
clear, ESG under-reporting in public filings imposes on investors the ad-
ded costs of accessing and analyzing this incompatible and unstandardized
information, which mandatory disclosure is intended to alleviate.  The sta-
tistically significant differences and strong difference in tone among inves-
tor and issuer views on ESG materiality support investors’ claims that ESG
information is under-reported—if companies insist that ESG information
is not material, they are unlikely to disclose it to investors and ESG risk will
not be efficiently incorporated into market prices.  These results highlight
the need for the SEC to consider the costs to investors of ESG overload
outside the public filings and of ESG under-reporting within the current
framework.
Hypothesis 3 is also generally confirmed.  Among the 16 variables as-
sociated with this hypothesis, 13 show that investors are in fact more con-
cerned than issuers about under-disclosure of material risk information
generally; 10 of these differences are significant at the 1% level and two at
a 10% level.  As discussed above with respect to the MD&A and Item 503,
respondents also differ in their level of satisfaction with the current report-
ing framework.  Investor comments indicate they want more precise assess-
ments of risk and more detail on risk management.303
Interestingly, the question of what is under-disclosed is an area of
strong agreement among the SEC, investors, and the business community:
all three groups agree that risk disclosures are extensive, but are often
generic and boilerplate.  There is therefore a shared interest in making
current risk disclosures more firm-specific and more meaningful.  Because
of the more limited comments on risk disclosures in Regulation S-K (Items
101, 303, 503 & 305) than on ESG disclosure reform, these conclusions
should be confirmed in the course of future reform proposals.
Hypothesis 4—that investors are more supportive of prescriptive or
line-item disclosures than issuer respondents—is also confirmed.  Among
the 10 indicators associated with support for prescriptive disclosure, 9 sup-
port Hypothesis 4; 4 of these differences are significant at the 1% level, 2
at the 5% level and 1 at the 10% level.  This supports the findings dis-
cussed in Section III.B that investors largely support prescriptive or mixed
disclosure approaches, while issuers largely oppose new line-item rules
and urge the SEC to rely on issuer materiality judgments.  There is sub-
stantial agreement among all respondents about the value of principles-
based disclosure even though investors would prefer more limited defer-
ence to issuer materiality judgments.
These results show that both issuers and investors understand the dif-
ficulties of risk disclosure, and that ESG issues are directly connected to
the broader risk disclosure framework of Regulation S-K.  They also con-
302. Supra notes 265–272 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Comment of CalPERS, supra note 119; Appendix, infra, at Table
15 (indicating greater investor support for MD&A KPI disclosures).
62
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/2
2020] DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD? 129
firm that investors and the business community define the over-disclosure
problem differently.  The observed divides on the questions of prescriptive
disclosure and ESG materiality may also drive how strongly these groups
support or oppose proposals to clarify or standardize ESG disclosure
through regulatory intervention.  These conclusions are tested more rigor-
ously below.
2. Part II: Understanding Support for (and Opposition to) ESG Disclosure
Reform
The results here confirm the observations of prior studies of the Con-
cept Release comments, which have found strong support for ESG disclo-
sure among investors, who are the primary consumers of disclosure, as
well as equally strong opposition from those representing public compa-
nies, the producers of disclosure.304  However, it is important to isolate, if
possible, the reasons why respondents’ views on ESG disclosure vary.  The
analysis above suggests that support for ESG disclosure reform is positively
related to (w) identity as investors and other consumers of disclosure; (x)
support for prescriptive disclosure; (y) acceptance of ESG materiality; and
(z) dissatisfaction with the current reporting framework (Hypothesis 5).
Because the Fisher exact test cannot measure the independent effects of
these factors, this study used two sets of logistic regression models to test
these relationships. Table 22 of the Appendix presents the results.
The first set of models (Model 1) in Table 22 of the Appendix tests
this hypothesis using respondent support for ESG reform (proESG = yes)
as the dependent variable, and the second set of models (Model 2) uses
respondent opposition to ESG reform (proESG = no) as the dependent
variable.  The independent variables include several variables related to
the respondent’s status as an issuer or investor, or an institutional or indi-
vidual respondent, as well as a variable representing support for or opposi-
tion to prescriptive disclosure.  Respondents’ satisfaction with the status
quo is represented in both models by their response to Question 218 on
the adequacy of corporate sustainability reporting for investment pur-
poses.  Several independent variables representing respondents’ views on
ESG materiality are included in the models: (i) expressed support for or
opposition to ESG materiality in Question 216 are included in alteration
in the models due to multicollinearity concerns; (ii) identification of ESG
issues as material to certain sectors, which is expected to have a positive
effect on support for ESG reform; and (ii) agreement with the statement
in Question 217 that the inclusion of ESG information in public filings will
obscure material information, a response which should negatively affect
their support for ESG reform.  Acknowledging the sectoral nature of ESG
materiality is a relatively weaker statement on materiality; holding the view
that ESG obscures material information is a strong rejection of ESG
materiality.
304. See generally sources cited at supra note 26.
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Both sets of models confirm Hypothesis 5 and the results are robust
across the models.  Respondents’ support for prescriptive disclosure is the
factor that has the strongest positive effect on support for ESG reform in
Model 1 and this effect is significant at the 1% level across all Model 1
tests.  As expected, Model 2 confirms that support for prescriptive disclo-
sure has an equally significant negative correlation with opposition to ESG
reform.
Whether respondents accept the materiality of at least some ESG fac-
tors is also highly predictive of their support for ESG reform; as expected,
it is negatively correlated with opposition to ESG reform in the second set
of models.  These results are robust across models and are significant at
the 1%–5% levels, depending on the model.305  Also as expected, those
who identify ESG as material on a sector-specific basis are less likely to
oppose ESG disclosure reform, holding all other factors constant, but this
effect is not significant in the second set of models.  The directionality of
this relationship is more ambiguous in the first set of models where the
dependent variable is support for ESG; the effects in Model 1 tests are also
not significant.  This is likely due to the fact that some comments opposed
ESG reform because of the complexity they foresee given their understand-
ing that ESG materiality is sector-specific.  Holding the view that ESG in-
formation will obscure material information has, as expected, a strong
negative effect on support for ESG disclosure in the first set of models and
an equally strong positive effect on opposition to ESG disclosure in the
second set of models.  These results are significant at the 1% level.
Greater consensus on ESG materiality would therefore be expected to
strengthen support for ESG reform.
One of the most surprising results of this analysis is that respondent
identity is not predictive of either support for or opposition to ESG re-
form, as shown in Table 22,306 suggesting that the other factors, such as
one’s views on ESG materiality and the value of prescriptive rules are the
more important.  The effects of a respondent’s status as an investor, issuer,
or “other” respondent are not significant in any of the models.  In addi-
tion, whether a respondent is an organization or an individual has ambigu-
ous effects.  Institutional status is negatively associated with support for
ESG in Models 1b-d and the results are highly significant.  However, it is
positively but not significantly related to opposition to ESG reform in
Model 2a.  This is likely due to the higher participation rate of institu-
tional actors who explicitly indicate their support of ESG but few of whom
305. Opposition to ESG materiality was not significant in any of the models,
possibly because only 9 respondents expressed this view affirmatively, as compared
to over 240 positive responses.
306. To address multicollinearity issues, these variables were tested separately
in different models. See infra Appendix, at Table 22, Models 1b to 1d and Models
2c and 2d.  In the first set of models (Model 1), the dependent variable is support
for ESG, while in the second set of models (Model 2), it is opposition to ESG.
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explicitly indicated opposition to ESG.  The effect of individual status is
also not significant in any of the models.
Finally, respondents’ level of dissatisfaction with voluntary disclosure
has a strong and significant independent effect on their support for or
opposition to ESG reform.  As the regression results for Model 1 in Table
22 show, dissatisfaction with voluntary ESG disclosure is strongly and posi-
tively correlated with support for ESG reform and is significant at the 1%
level Similar results obtain in Model 2, though with opposition to ESG as
the independent variable; the results therefore show that satisfaction (i.e.,
low dissatisfaction) with voluntary reporting is highly predictive of opposi-
tion to ESG reform.  These results are significant at the 1%–5% level, de-
pending on the model.  These results support the earlier descriptive
findings that issuers believe no reforms are necessary when investors are
awash in ESG information outside public filings, while investors urge the
need for ESG disclosure reform to fill the gaps because they find this in-
formation not suitable for investment analysis.
On the broader question of whether ESG reform is necessary or
would be counter-productive, these empirical tests show that the apparent
divide between investors and issuers identified throughout the descriptive
analysis is in fact driven more by underlying views on the appropriate ap-
proach to risk disclosure and by somewhat categorical positions on ESG
materiality.  These results confirm that those who oppose any expansion of
prescriptive rules are equally likely to oppose prescriptive ESG rules be-
cause they are prescriptive and because new regulation may increase com-
pliance costs, regardless of investors’ demand for that information.  Those
who strongly reject ESG materiality will of course strongly resist efforts to
incorporate it into public filings or to engage the SEC in ESG disclosure
reform.  Those who support the status quo—voluntary disclosure and
broad discretion to companies’ materiality judgments—not surprisingly
see little need for ESG reform.  But, as Section III.B above also shows,
those who hold these views are not investors.
CONCLUSION
As the SEC considers how to streamline the existing reporting frame-
work and whether ESG risks warrant new disclosure reforms, the Concept
Release data offer a unique opportunity to clarify where the battle lines lie,
to find areas of common ground, to hone in on the places where report-
ing requirements leave gaps, and to see where over-disclosure is a prob-
lem.  Doing so reveals that for investors, worries about disclosure overload
are largely irrelevant, and that the disclosure overload claims raised by
many public companies and business advocates who responded to the
Concept Release are largely a false front for predictable concerns about
the regulatory burdens of mandatory disclosure.  This analysis also shows
that for investors, the far bigger concern is the under-reporting of material
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ESG risks under the current disclosure framework and the inadequacy of
both voluntary disclosure and current SEC guidance.
The SEC’s core mission to protect investors, facilitate fair, orderly,
and efficient market efficiency, and promote capital formation means that
these claims must be taken seriously.  This is particularly imperative in the
case of climate-related risk, which has been identified as a potential con-
tributor to systemic risk307 and which the SEC has already identified as
necessary to companies’ materiality determinations.308  The vast majority
of the respondents in this study agree.  Congress’s mandate under the
FAST Act already directs the SEC to ensure that this material information
reaches investors while also considering how best to reduce the “costs and
burdens” on reporting companies.309  Therefore, the critical question for
the SEC and also for Congress should not be whether to respond to the
information gaps investors have identified, which are real and costly.  Nor
should the SEC shy away from ESG reform because of opposition from
those who would oppose any disclosure expansion.
The question instead is how to standardize ESG risk disclosure as part
of broader risk disclosure reform.  The hardest part of this effort will be
for the SEC to establish a workable framework that helps overcome man-
agement bias against ESG materiality and encourages greater agreement
within sectors regarding which ESG risks are material, particularly with
respect to longer-term and emerging risks.  Many useful proposals were
raised in the Concept Release,310 and a full treatment of how ESG disclo-
sure reform should proceed is beyond the scope of this paper.  However,
this study has identified some areas of agreement among respondents that
give Congress, the SEC, and the public useful starting points for undertak-
ing risk disclosure reform.  The results here also suggest that beyond con-
sidering the compliance costs to public companies, it is time for Congress
and the SEC to take into account the costs to investors and the capital
markets of under-disclosing material ESG information.
307. See TCFD, supra note 99, at iii, 1–22 (discussing the potential systemic
effects of inadequate climate responses on the global financial system); see also
supra note 18 and sources cited therein.
308. See generally 2010 Climate Guidance, supra note 54.
309. FAST Act, supra note 40, at 72,002; Concept Release, supra note 1, at
23,921.
310. See generally supra Section III.B.7 and sources cited therein.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Scope of Analysis.
Regulation S-K
Item No.
Concept 
Release Section
Question
No. Description 
Inclusion
in Analysis
Related SEC
Rulemaking
GENERAL 
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
III.A Basis of 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
1–5 Sunsetting of new provisions Included  
GENERAL 
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
III.B Nature of 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
6–13 
Principles-based 
and prescriptive
disclosure 
Included  
GENERAL 
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
III.B Nature of 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
14–20 Audience for disclosure Included  
GENERAL 
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
III.B Nature of 
Disclosure 
Requirements 
21–23 Compliance & disclosure costs Included  
ITEM 101(a)(1)
IV.A.1
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
24–30 
General 
development of 
the business 
Included 
101(b)
disclosure of 
segment 
financial
performance 
deleted (2018
Final Rules).  
ITEM 101(c)  
IV.A.2
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
31–41 
Narrative 
description of 
the business 
Included  
ITEM
101(c)(1)(iv)
IV.A.3.
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
42–46 
Technology & 
Intellectual 
property rights 
Excluded  
ITEMS
101(c)(1)(ix)
IV.A.4.b
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
47-48
Government 
contracts and 
regulation 
Excluded  
ITEMS
101(c)(1)(xii)
IV.A.4.c
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
49–51 
Compliance 
with
environmental 
laws 
Included  
ITEMS 101(c) 
IV.A.4.d
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
52–53 Government regulation Included  
ITEMS
101(c)(1)(xiii)
IV.A.5
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
54–59 
Number of 
employees; 
employment 
practices 
Included 
Disclosure of 
foreign
operating risks
deleted (2018
Final Rules).
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Regulation S-K
Item No.
Concept 
Release Section
Question
No. Description 
Inclusion
in Analysis
Related SEC
Rulemaking
ITEM 102 
IV.A.6
Core Company 
Business 
Information 
60–66 Description of property Excluded 
Amended to 
require
disclosure of 
location only 
for physical 
property that is
material (2019 
Final Rules).  
ITEM 103  
Not
included 
in
Concept 
Release 
Legal 
proceedings 
Included 
in analysis
of Item 
101(c) 
2018 Final 
Rules decline to 
amend. 2019 
Proposed Rules 
would raise 
materiality
threshold.
ITEM 301 
IV.B.1
Selected 
Financial Data 
67–78
Significant
trends in
financial
conditions,
operational 
results 
Excluded 
2020 Proposed 
Rules would 
eliminate Item 
301 and no 
longer require
5 years of 
certain
financial data.
ITEM 302 
IV.B.2
Supplementary 
Financial
Information 
79–87
Selected 
quarterly 
financial data 
Excluded 
2020 Proposed 
Rules would 
eliminate Item 
302 and no 
longer require
2 years of 
certain
quarterly data.
ITEM 303 
IV.B.3
MD&A Item 
303 
88–106 Content & focus of MD&A Included 
2020 Proposed 
Rules would 
add new Item 
303(a) on the 
purpose of 
MD&A.
ITEM 303(a)-
(b) 
IV.B.3.a
MD&A Item 
303 
88–98 Quality & focus of MD&A Included 
Amended to 
allow exclusion
of discussion of 
earliest of the 3 
years of the 
financials if
discussed in
prior year 
MD&A (2019 
Final Rules).   
ITEM 303(a)(1);
ITEM
303(a)(2)(ii);
ITEM
303(a)(3)(ii)
IV.B.3.b
MD&A Item 
303 
99–102 Forward-looking statements Included  
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Regulation S-K
Item No. 
Concept 
Release Section
Question
No. Description 
Inclusion
in Analysis
Related SEC
Rulemaking
ITEM 303 
IV.B.3.c
MD&A Item 
303 
103–106 
Key indicators
of financial
condition & 
operating
performance 
Included 
2020 Proposed 
Rules would 
amend certain
disclosures 
regarding 
capital
resources and 
results of 
operations. 
ITEM 303(a)(3)
IV.B.4
MD&A Item 
303 
107–112 Results of operations Included*
ITEM
303(a)(1)–(2)
IV.B.5
MD&A Item 
303 
113–124 
Liquidity & 
capital
resources 
Included*
ITEM 303(a)(4)
IV.B.6
MD&A Item 
303 
125–130 
Off-balance 
sheet 
arrangements 
Included*
2020 Proposed 
Rules would 
eliminate this
rule,
encouraging
disclosure 
integrated 
within the 
MD&A.
ITEM 303(a)(5)
IV.B.7
MD&A Item 
303 
131–136 Contractual obligations Included*
2020 Proposed 
Rules would 
eliminate 
tabular
disclosure of 
contractual 
obligations. 
ITEM 303 
IV.B.8
MD&A Item 
303 
137–144 
Critical
accounting
estimates 
Included*  
ITEM 503(c) 
IV.C.1
Risk & Risk
Management 
145–156 Risk factors Included 
Risk factor 
disclosure 
moved to new 
Item 105; risk
factor examples 
eliminated 
(2019 Final
Rules); adds 
reference to 
risk associated
with
“geographic
areas”  (2018
Final Rules);
selection to be 
based on 
materiality
(2019 Proposed 
Rules). 
ITEM 305 
IV.C.2
Risk & Risk
Management 
157–168
Quantitative & 
qualitative
disclosures 
Included  
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Regulation S-K
Item No.
Concept 
Release Section
Question
No. Description 
Inclusion
in Analysis
Related SEC
Rulemaking
ITEM 305(b) 
IV.C.3
Risk & Risk
Management 
169–179 
Disclosure of 
approach to risk 
management & 
risk
management 
process 
Included  
GENERAL 
APPROACH TO 
RISK
DISCLOSURE
IV.C.4
Risk & Risk
Management  
180–182 Consolidatingrisk disclosure Included  
ITEM 201(b); 
ITEM 202; ITEM 
701; ITEM 703 
IV.D
Securities of 
the Registrant 
183–204 
Disclosures 
related to equity
holders; capital
stock; sales of 
unregistered
securities; use of 
proceeds from 
registered 
securities; share 
repurchases 
Excluded  
INDUSTRY
GUIDES
IV.E
Industry
Guides 
205–215 
Utility of 
industry guides; 
codification of 
guide content 
Included  
SUSTAINABILITY IV.FSustainability 216–223 
Disclosure of 
Information
relating to 
public policy & 
sustainability
matters 
Included  
ITEM 601;
SUBSIDIARIES &
LEGAL 
IDENTIFIERS
IV.G
Exhibits 224–256 
Material 
contracts;
preferability
letter 
Excluded 
Amended to 
allow omission
of certain
schedules/
attachments to 
exhibits,
confidential
information;
revising
material
contract
disclosure 
(2019 Final
Rules). 
ITEM 601;
SUBSIDIARIES &
LEGAL 
IDENTIFIERS
IV.G
Exhibits cont. 257–263 
Subsidiaries & 
legal entity
identifiers 
(LEIs) 
Included 
Declined to 
require LEIs 
(2019 Final
Rules).
SCALED 
REQUIREMENTS
IV.H
Scaled 
Requirements 
264–285
Scaled 
disclosure; 
frequency of 
interim
reporting
Included 
in analysis
of IV.F
70
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/2
2020] DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD? 137
Regulation S-K
Item No.
Concept 
Release Section
Question
No. Description 
Inclusion
in Analysis
Related SEC
Rulemaking
GENERAL 
DISCLOSURE
FORMAT,
PRESENTATION 
& DELIVERY
V.A–G
Presentation 286–340 
Cross-
referencing;
incorporation
by reference; 
hyperlinks;
websites;
layered/
structured 
disclosure 
Included 
in analysis
of IV.F
Expanded use 
of hyperlinks
and internal
cross-references 
(2019 Final
Rules).
* Narrative discussion included; not included in quantitative analysis.
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Table 2: Identity of Respondents.
Sector/Category Classification Total Sector/Category Classification Total
Investor: Asset 
owner/manager Investor 172 Academic Other 10 
Individual  100 (58.1%) Accounting Other 17 
Investment
adviser
 27 
(15.7%) Legal Issuer 18
Religious fund  18(10.5%)
Financial
services N/A* 69 
Foundation 10(5.8%)
Investment
managers
42
(60.9%)
Public pension
fund
7
(4.1%) Other
27
(39.1%)
Mutual fund  5(2.9%) Environmental N/A* 12 
Union fund  3(1.7%) Other Other 5 
Other 2(1.2%) Government Other 17 
Standard setter Other 12 Stategovernment
8
(47.1%)
Stock exchange Other 2 Federallegislative
4
(23.5%)
Issuer Issuer 11 Federalexecutive
4
(23.5%)
Trade
association Issuer 22 
Other
government
1
(5.9%)
NGO  72    
Business
advocacy Issuer
15
(20.8%)
   
Investor
advocacy Investor
41
(56.9%)
   
Neutral/other Other 16(22.2%)
   
* Note: Because these categories are not mutually exclusive, they sum to more 
than the 282 total discrete comments included in this study.  For example, asset 
managers are included in financial services, and so appear in both totals. They 
are categorized only as “investors” in this study for ease of reference.  Other 
financial services institutions were categorized as an “issuer” if the comment 
identified the organization as a listed company or business advocate.
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Table 3: Significant Differences Among Respondent Groups on Risk-Related &
ESG Disclosure (Hypotheses 1–4).
Hypothesis/
Variable  
Definition 
Variable 
Investor-Issuer  
Responses1
Fisher’s 
Exact 
Test2 
Regulation 
S-K
Reference 
Concept  
Release
Question(s) 
H1: Concern about over-disclosure 
-Expected positive
correlation- 
Supports 
automatic
sunsetting of any 
new disclosure 
rule  
1_5support_ sunset
(Tbl. 7) 
Investor (n=6): 33.33%
Issuer (n=5): 80.0%  N/A 1–3 
Supports 
reducing Item 101 
environmental 
disclosure 
envtl_reduce  
(Tbl 9) 
Investor (n=2): 50.0% 
Issuer: (n=8): 100.0% * Item 101 49 
Believes Item 303 
elicits immaterial
disclosure 
IVB89immat_ 303 
(Tbl 12) 
Investor (n=1): 100.0%
Issuer (n=1): 100.0%  Item 303 89
Supports adding
materiality
thresholds to Item 
303 (MD&A) 
IVB89mat_ thresh
(Tbl 12) 
Investor (n=4): 0.0% 
Issuer (n=2): 100.0% 
Item 303 
(MD&A) 89
Is concerned 
about length of 
risk factor 
disclosures  
148length_ issue503c
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=17): 35.3%
Issuer (n=16): 75.0% *
Item
503(c) 148
Supports new safe 
harbors for Item 
503 risk factors 
150generic_ safeh503c
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=3): 66.63%
Issuer (n=8): 100.0% 
Item
503(c) 150 
Believes ESG
disclosure reform 
will obscure 
material
information 
F217_ESGobscure 
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=46): 37.0%
Issuer (n=23): 95.7.0% *** N/A 217 
Supports lower 
ESG requirements 
for smaller issuers 
222ESGscale 
(Tbl 21) 
Investor (n=21): 23.8%
Issuer (n=2): 100.0% * N/A 222 
Supports 
exempting certain
issuers from any 
new ESG
requirements 
222ESGexempt 
(Tbl 21) 
Investor (n=19): 21.0%
Issuer (n=2): 50.0%  N/A 222 
1 Percentages shown are of the total number of responses from that respondent
group.
2 A “N/A” means the Fisher’s exact test of independence is not meaningful.
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Hypothesis/
Variable  
Definition 
Variable Investor-Issuer  Responses 
Fisher’s 
Exact 
Test 
Regulation 
S-K
Reference 
Concept  
Release
Question(s) 
-Expected
negative
correlation- 
     
Supports 
increased Item 
101
environmental 
disclosure 
envtl_increase  
(Tbl 9) 
Investor (n=10): 80.0%
Issuer (n=4): 0.0%  ** Item 101 49 
Mentions cost 
savings associated
with ESG
disclosure reform 
F221_savecost 
(Tbl 20) 
Investor (n=26): 100.0%
Issuer (n=0): 0.0% N/A N/A 221 
H2: Concern about ESG under-disclosure 
-Expected positive
correlation- 
Supports ESG
disclosure reform 
in some form 
pro_ESG Investor (n=219): 94.5%Issuer (n=28): 14.3% *** N/A 
Any
response 
Identifies ESG as 
relevant to Item 
101a 
IVA_101a_ESG
(Tbl 8)
Investor (n=219): 1.4%
Issuer (n=28): 0.0% 
Item
101(a) 24–30 
Identifies ESG as 
relevant to 101c 
IVA_101c_ESG
(Tbl 8)
Investor (n=219): 1.8%
Issuer (n=28): 10.7% 
Item
101(c) 
31–41, 49–
51 
Believes Item 
101(c)(i)(xii)
elicits material
envtl. disclosure 
envtl_material
(Tbl 9) 
Investor (n=9): 100.0%
Issuer (n=0): 0.0% 
Item
101(c) (i) 
(xii)
49–51 
Supports 
expanding
employee-related 
disclosure 
QIVA_54_59 
(Tbl 10) 
Investor (n=33): 97.0%
Issuer (n=8): 25.0% *** 
Item
101(c) (i) 
(xiii) 
54–59 
Identifies ESG
topics as relevant 
to Item 303 
(MD&A) 
IVB_ESG_MDA 
(Tbl 11) 
Investor (n=219): 9.6%
Issuer (n=28): 17.9% 
Item 303 
(MD&A) 88–144 
Believes ESG
information may 
be or is material
F216_ ESGmateriality
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=205): 98.5%
Issuer (n=28): 63.1% *** N/A 216 
Identifies ESG
information as 
related to systemic
risk 
ESG_systemic
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=32): 100% 
Issuer (n=0): 0.0% N/A N/A 216 
Believes voluntary 
ESG disclosure is
ineffective
F218vol_OK 
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=97): 99.0%
Issuer (n=13): 0.0% *** N/A 218
Believes SEC
climate guidance
is ineffective
223_climateok 
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=80): 96.2%
Issuer (n=12): 0.0% *** Various 223 
-Expected
negative
correlation- 
   
Believes ESG
disclosure reform 
will obscure 
material
information 
F217_ESGobscure 
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=46): 37.0%
Issuer (n=23): 95.7.0% *** N/A 217 
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Hypothesis/
Variable  
Definition 
Variable Investor-Issuer  Responses 
Fisher’s 
Exact 
Test 
Regulation 
S-K
Reference 
Concept  
Release
Question(s) 
H3: Concern about under-disclosure of risk-related information 
-Expected positive
correlation- 
Supports 
expanding
employee-related 
(i.e., social) 
disclosure 
QIVA_54_59 
(Tbl 10) 
Investor (n=33): 97.0%
Issuer (n=8): 25.0% *** 
Item
101(c) (i) 
(xiii) 
54–59 
Supports 
requiring
disclosure of how 
risk is addressed 
145risk_mitig_ 503c 
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=13): 69.2%
Issuer (n=12): 0.0% *** 
Item
503(c) 145 
Supports 
requiring
disclosure of risk
probability 
146risk_prob503c 
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=15): 73.3%
Issuer (n=18): 0.0% *** 
Item
503(c) 146 
Supports 
requiring ranking
of risk magnitude
or importance 
147risk_order503c 
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=12): 58.3%
Issuer (n=12): 8.3% *** 
Item
503(c) 147 
Supports new safe 
harbors for Item 
503 risk factors 
150generic_safeh503c
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=3): 66.63%
Issuer (n=8): 100.0% 
Item
503(c) 150 
Supports 
requiring ranking
of top 10 risk 
factors 
152risk_top10503c 
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=9): 22.2% 
Issuer (n=17): 0.0% *
Item
503(c) 152 
Supports 
requiring a risk 
factor summary 
152risk_sum503c 
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=5): 60.0% 
Issuer (n=5): 0.0% 
Item
503(c) 152 
Supports 
requiring a 
description of risk 
management
processes 
169riskmgmtdescribe
(Tbl 17) 
Investor (n=5): 100.0%
Issuer (n=5): 40.0% ** 
Item
503(c) 169 
Supports 
requiring an 
assessment of the 
company’s risk 
management
process 
170riskassess 
(Tbl 17) 
Investor (n=2): 50.0% 
Issuer (n=3): 0.0% *
Item
503(c) 170 
Supports 
requiring
disclosure of 
changes to/
waivers of risk
management
processes 
172riskmgmtchange 
(Tbl 17) 
Investor (n=1): 0.0% 
Issuer (n=3): 0.0% 
Item
503(c) 172 
Supports 
requiring
disclosure of risk
management or 
mitigation 
176disclmitigate 
(Tbl 17) 
Investor (n=2): 50.0% 
Issuer (n=6): 0.0% *** 
Item
503(c) 176 
Believes voluntary 
ESG disclosure is
ineffective 
F218vol_OK 
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=97): 99.0%
Issuer (n=13): 0.0% *** N/A 218 
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Hypothesis/
Variable  
Definition 
Variable Investor-Issuer  Responses 
Fisher’s 
Exact 
Test 
Regulation 
S-K
Reference 
Concept  
Release
Question(s) 
Believes SEC
climate guidance
is ineffective 
223_climateok 
(Tbl 19) 
Investor (n=80): 96.2%
Issuer (n=12): 0.0% *** Various 223 
-Expected
negative
correlation- 
   
Supports 
reducing Item 101 
environmental 
disclosure  
envtl_reduce  
(Tbl 9) 
Investor (n=2): 50.0% 
Issuer (n=8): 100.0% * Item 101 49 
Believes that Item 
503(c) effectively
captures
emerging risk
154emergrisk_eff503c
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=20): 15.0%
Issuer (n=11): 81.8% *** 
Item
503(c) 154 
Believes risk
mitigation 
disclosure would 
be misleading 
177nomitigatediscl 
(Tbl 17) 
Investor (n=2): 100.0%
Issuer (n=5): 6.0% 
Item
503(c) 177 
H4: Supports prescriptive or mixed disclosure in some form 
-Expected positive
correlation- 
Supports 
prescriptive rules 
generally or in
response to any 
Concept Release 
question 
6_3prescriptive Investor (n=219): 87.7%Issuer (n=28): 10.7% *** N/A 6–9 
Supports 
increased Item 
101
environmental 
disclosure 
envtl_increase  
(Tbl 9) 
Investor (n=10): 80.0%
Issuer (n=4): 0.0%  ** Item 101 49 
Supports new 
employee-related 
prescriptive
disclosures 
QIVA_54_59 
(Tbl 10) 
Investor (n=33): 97.0%
Issuer (n=8): 25.0% *** 
Item
101(c) (i) 
(xiii) 
54–59 
Supports 
requiring
quantification of 
material effects of 
known trends & 
uncertainties
IVB102_pro_uncert_
 quant (Tbl 14) 
Investor (n=3): 0.0% 
Issuer (n=4): 0.0% 
Item
303(a)(1) 102 
Supports 
requiring ranking
of risk magnitude
or importance 
147risk_order503c 
(Tbl 16) 
Investor (n=12): 58.3%
Issuer (n=12): 8.3% *** 
Item
503(c) 147 
Supports 
principles-based 
disclosure of KPIs  
IVB103_mdakpi_
princ
(Tbl 15) 
Investor (n=11): 81.8%
Issuer (n=3): 66.7%  Item 303 103 
Supports new 
prescriptive rules 
on disclosure of 
KPIs
IVB103_mdakpi_
presc 
(Tbl 15) 
Investor (n=10): 50.0%
Issuer (n=9): 0.0% ** Item 303 103 
Supports 
requiring use of 
LEIs 
257_263LEI Investor (n=12): 58.3%Issuer (n=12): 8.3% * N/A 257–263 
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Hypothesis/
Variable  
Definition 
Variable Investor-Issuer  Responses 
Fisher’s 
Exact 
Test 
Regulation 
S-K
Reference 
Concept  
Release
Question(s) 
-Expected
negative
correlation- 
     
Supports 
automatic
sunsetting of any 
new disclosure 
rule 
1_5support_sunset  
(Tbl. 7) 
Investor (n=6): 33.33%
Issuer (n=5): 80.0%  N/A 1–3 
Opposes 
quantified
materiality
thresholds in Item 
103
envtl_noquant Investor (n=9): 22.2% Issuer (n=7): 100.0% *** 
Item
101(c) (i) 
(xii);
Item 103 
49 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  An 
insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among respondent groups on this
question.  
Table 4: Responses on Risk-Related & Sustainability Topics.
Investors (%)
(n=219) 
Issuers (%)
(n=28) 
Other (%)
(n=35) 
Total (%) 
(n=282) 
Risk-related disclosure
(section C) (n=116)
94
(43.32)
6
(21.43)
16
(45.71)
116
(41.13)
ESG & sustainability
(section F) (n=277) 
216
(99.08)
28
(100)
33
(94.29)
277
(98.23)
Table 5: Support for & Opposition to Prescriptive Disclosure; Support for Mixed
Disclosure.
Investors (%) 
(n=219) 
Issuers (%) 
(n=28)
Other (%) 
(n=35) 
Total (%)  
(n=282) 
Support 192 (87.67) 3(10.71) 17 (48.57) 212 (75.18)
Oppose 12 (5.47) 21 (75) 7 (20) 40 (14.18)
Unspecified 14 (6.39) 4 (14.29) 11 (31.43) 29 (10.28)
Fisher’s Exact Test: Significant at the less than 1% level.  
Mixed Investors(%) (n=34) 
Issuers
(%) (n=4) 
Other (%)
(n=7) 
Total (%) 
(n=45) 
Support 33 (97.06) 4 (100) 7 (100) 44 (97.78)
 n=219 n=28 n=35 n=282
% of subgroup 33 (15.0) 4 (14.3) 7 (20.0) 44 (15.6) 
Fisher’s Exact Test: Insignificant.
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Table 6: Audience for Disclosure.
 
Investors (%) 
(n=37) 
Issuers (%) 
(n=20) 
Other (%)
(n=5) 
Total (%)  
(n=62) 
Sophisticated 7 (18.92) 4 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 13 (20.97) 
Status Quo (All) 25 (67.57) 13 (65.0) 5 (100.0) 43 (69.35) 
Rational 0 (0.0) 3 (15.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (4.84)
Retail 5 (13.51) 0 (0.0) 1 (20.0) 6 (9.68)
Table 7: Support for and Opposition to Rule Sunsets.
Investors (%) 
(n=6)
Issuers % 
(n=5)
Other (%) 
(n=4)
Total (%) 
(n=15)
Support 2 (33.33) 4 (80.0) 3 (75.0) 9 (60.0)
Oppose 4 (66.67) 1 (20.0) 1 (25.0) 6 (40.0)
Fisher’s Exact Test: Insignificant.
Table 8: Reference to ESG Issues Within Responses on Development of Business
(Item 101(a)), Description of the Business (Item 101(c)).
Investors
(%)
(n=219)
Issuers
(%)
(n=28)
Other
(%)
(n=35)
Total
(%)
(n=282)
Fisher’s
Exact
Test
Mentions ESG under Item 
101(a) (IVA_101a_ESG_yes)
3
(1.37)
0
(0.00)
1
(2.86)
4
(1.41)  
Mentions ESG under Item 
101(c) (IVA_101c_ESG_yes)
4
(1.83)
3
(10.71)
3
(8.57)
10
(3.55)
Note: An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among 
respondent groups on this question.
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Table 9: Environmental & Regulatory Disclosure (Item 101(c)(1)(xii)).
Investors
%
Issuers
%
Other
%
Total
%
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Expanding
environmental
disclosure
n=10 n=4 n=5 n=19 **
Support 8 (80.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (60.0) 11 (57.89)
Oppose 2 (20.0) 4 (100.0) 2 (40.0) 8 (42.11)
Reducing
environmental
disclosure
n=2 n=8 n=2 n=12 *
Support 1 (50.0) 8 (100.0) 1 (50.0) 10 (83.33)
Oppose 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (50.0) 2 (16.67)
Materiality of
environmental
compliance 
n=9 — n=5 n=14 N/A 
Agree 9 (100.0) — 5 (100.0) 14 (100.0)
Retaining Item 103
quantified materiality
threshold
n=9 n=7 n=3 n=9 ***
Support 7 (77.78) 0 (0.0) 2 (66.67) 9 (47.37)
Oppose 2 (22.22) 7 (100.0) 1 (33.33) 10 (52.63)
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level. An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant
difference among respondent groups on this question.
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Table 10: Employment-Related Disclosure (Item 101(c)(i)(xiii)).
 Investors
(%)
Issuers
(%)
Other
(%)
Total
(%)
Fisher’s
Exact
Test
More detailed
employment-related
disclosure should be 
required (QIVA_54_59) 
n=33 n=8 n=4 n=45 *** 
Agree 32 (96.97) 2 (25.0) 3 (75.0) 37 (82.22)  
Disagree 1 (3.03) 6 (75.0) 1 (25.0) 8 (17.78)  
Disclosure of the total 
number of employees is
important to investors
(IVAempl_total) n=29 n=3 n=3 n=35 *** 
Support 29 (100.0) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 32 (91.43)  
Oppose 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 2 (5.71)  
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 1 (2.86)
Further distinctions among 
total employees are 
important (IVAee_distinct) n=23 n=3 n=4 n=30 *** 
Agree 22 (95.65) 1 (33.33) 3 (75.0) 26 (86.67)  
Disagree 1 (4.35) 2 (66.67) 0 (0.0) 3 (10.00)  
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (3.33)  
Information on the use of 
outsourcing is important to 
investors
(IVAee_outsource)  n=18 n=2 n=3 n=23 *** 
Support 17 (94.44) 0 (0.0) 2 (66.67) 19 (82.61)  
Oppose 1 (5.56) 2 (100) 0 (0.0) 3 (13.04)  
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 1 (4.35)  
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 
the 10% level.
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Table 11: ESG Relevance to the MD&A; Consolidation of MD&A Guidance.
Investors
(%)
Issuers
(%)
Other
(%)
Total
(%)
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Mentions ESG in the 
MD&A
(IVB_ESG_MDA) n=219 n=28 n=35 n=282 N/A 
21 (9.59) 5 (17.86) 4 (11.43) 30 (10.64)
The SEC should 
consolidate MD&A-
related guidance
(IVB90consol_ 
guidance)
n=8 n=5 n=6 n=19 N/A (100% agreement)
Support 16 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 8 (100.0) 30 (100.0)
Oppose 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
Note: An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among 
respondent groups on this question.
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Table 12: Over-Disclosure in the MD&A; Need for Materiality Thresholds.
Investors
(%)
Issuers
(%)
Other
(%)
Total
(%)
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Some requirements of Item 
303 (MD&A) result in
immaterial disclosures
(IVB89immat_303)
n=1 n=1 n=3 n=5  
Agree 1 (100.0) 1 (100.0) 2 (66.67) 4 (80.0)
Disagree 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 1 (20.0)
Item 303 should be subject 
to a materiality threshold 
(IVB89mat_threshold)
n=4 n=2 n=2 n=8
Agree 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (100.0) 2 (25.0)
Disagree 3 (75.0) 2 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (62.5)
Unspecified 1 (25.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5)
An executive overview
should be required in the 
MD&A
(IVB91exec_overview)
n=7 n=5 n=2 n=14  
Agree 5 (71.43) 3 (60.0) 1 (50.0) 9 (64.29)
Disagree 1 (14.29) 1 (7.14) 1 (50.0) 3 (21.43)
Encourage, but not 
mandate 1 (14.29) 1 (7.14) 0 (0.0) 2 (14.28)
Layered disclosure is
recommended
(IVB94layereddiscl)
n=4 n=3 n=3 n=11 *
Agree 2 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (75.0) 5 (45.5)
Disagree 2 (50.0) 3 (100.0) 1 (25.0) 5 (45.5)
Note: * significant at the 10% level. An insignificant result indicates no 
statistically significant difference among respondent groups on this question.
Table 13: Test for Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information in the MD&A.
 
Investors
(%)
Issuers
(%)
Other
(%)
Total
(%)
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
The SEC’s two-step test 
should be retained
(IVB99_102_two_step_FLS) 
n=8 n=5 n=4 n=17  
Support 6 (75.0) 2 (0.0) 3 (75.0) 11 (64.71)
Oppose & the SEC should 
adopt the probability/
magnitude test 
1 (12.50) 2 (40.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (17.64)
Note: An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among 
respondent groups on this question.
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Table 14: Mandatory Quantification of Risk Effects in the MD&A.
 Investors
%
Issuers
%
Other
%
Total
%
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Uncertainty should be 
quantified
(IVB102_pro_uncert_quant)
n=3 n=4 n=4 n=11  
Support 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (25) 1 (9.09)
Oppose 1 (33.33) 4 (100.0) 2 (50) 7 (63.64)
Encourage, but not mandate 1 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (9.09)
Materiality qualifier 1 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (9.09)
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (9.09)
Note: An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among 
respondent groups on this question. 
Table 15: Forward-Looking Information & KPIs in the MD&A.
 Investors
%
Issuers
%
Other
%
Total
%
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Principles-based KPI 
disclosure
(IVB103mdakpi_princ)
n=11 n=3 n=5 n=19  
Support 9 (81.82) 2 (66.67) 5 (100) 16 (84.21)
Oppose 1 (9.09) 1 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 2 (10.53)
Encourage, but not 
mandate 1 (9.09) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (5.26)
Prescriptive KPI disclosure
(IVB103mdakpi_presc) n=10 n=9 n=7 n=26 **
Support 5 (50) 0 (0.0) 4 (57.14) 9 (34.62)
Oppose 4 (40) 9 (100) 3 (42.86) 16 (61.54)
Encourage, but not 
mandate 1(10) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.85)
Note: ** significant at the 5% level. An insignificant result indicates no 
statistically significant difference among respondent groups on this question.
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Table 16: Risk Factor Disclosures (Item 503(c) (Current Item 105)).
Investors 
(%) 
Issuers 
(%) 
Other 
(%) 
Total
(%) 
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Mitigation efforts should be disclosed 
(QC145risk_mitig_503c) n=13 n=12 n=8 n=33 ***  
Support 9 (69.23) 0 (0.0) 5 (62.5) 14 (42.42)
Oppose 1 (15.38) 8 (66.67) 2 (25) 12 (36.36)
Allow 1 (7.69) 4 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 5 (15.15) 
Encourage, but not mandate 1 (7.69) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5) 2 (6.06) 
Risk factor probability and effect 
should be disclosed 
(QC146risk_prob503c) 
n=15 n=18 n=6 n=39 ***
Support 11 (73.33) 0 (0.0) 2 (33.33) 13 (33.33)
Oppose 4 (26.67) 18 (100) 4 (66.67) 26 (66.67)
Risk factors should be ordered by 
importance or magnitude
(QC147risk_order503c) 
n=12 n=12 n=6 n=30 *** 
Support 7 (58.33) 1 (8.33) 4 (66.67) 12 (40.0) 
Oppose 5 (41.67) 11 (91.67) 2 (33.33) 18 (60.0) 
Risk factor disclosure length obscures 
information
(QC148length_issue503c) 
n=17 n=16 n=8 n=41 *
Support 6 (35.29) 12 (75) 5 (62.5) 23 (56.1) 
Oppose 11 (64.71) 4 (25) 3 (37.5) 18 (43.9) 
Generic risks could be omitted,
subject to safe harbor 
(QC150generic_safeh503c) 
n=3 n=8 n=3 n=14  
Support 2 (66.67) 8 (100) 2 (66.67) 12 (85.71)
Oppose 1 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 2 (14.29) 
Risk factor examples should be 
retained (QC151retain_ex503c) n=2 n=2 n=3 n=7  
Support 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 2 (66.67) 4 (57.14) 
Oppose 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 1 (33.33) 3 (42.85) 
Top 10 risk factors should be 
disclosed, ranked 
(QC152risk_top10503c) 
n=9 n=17 n=6 n=32 *
Support 2 (22.22) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (6.25) 
Oppose 7 (77.78) 17 (100) 6 (100) 30 (93.75)
Risk factor summary should be 
provided (QC152risk_sum503c) n=5 n=5 n=3 n=13  
Support 3 (60.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 4 (30.77) 
Oppose 2 (40.0) 5 (100) 2 (66.67) 9 (69.23) 
Item 503(c) effectively captures 
emerging risks 
(QC154emergrisk_eff503c) 
n=20 n=11 n=11 n=42 ***
Agree 3 (15.0) 9 (81.82) 1 (9.09) 13 (30.95)
Disagree 16 (80.0) 2 (18.18) 10 (90.91) 28 (66.67)
Other 1 (5.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.38)
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among respondent groups 
on this question.  
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Table 17: Market Risk Management (Item 305(b)).
Investors 
(%) 
Issuers 
(%) 
Other 
(%) Total 
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Item 305 is effective 
(QC158mktriskeffect) n=4 n=2 n=6 n=12  
Agree 1 (25.0) 1 (50.0) 2 (33.3) 4 (33.3) 
Disagree 3 (75.0) 1 (50.0) 4 (66.7) 8 (66.7) 
Item 305’s quantitative disclosure 
requirement should be limited to 
financial services registrants
(QC161quantsector) 
n=3 n=3 n=4 n=10 **
Support 1 (33.3) 3 (100.0) 4 (100.0) 2 (20.0) 
Oppose 2 (66.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 8 (80.0) 
Market risk management processes 
should be described 
(IVC3_169riskmgmtdescribe) 
n=5 n=5 n=6 n=16 ** 
Support 5 (100.0) 2 (40.0) 5 (83.33) 12 (75.0) 
Oppose 0 (0.0) 3 (60.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (18.75) 
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (16.67) 1 (6.25) 
Assessment of risk management 
processes should be disclosed 
(IVC3_170riskassess)
n=2 n=3 n=3 n=8 *
Support 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (100.0) 4 (50.0) 
Oppose 1 (50.0) 3 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (50.0) 
Waivers or changes to risk management 
approach should be disclosed 
(IVC3_172riskmgmtchange) 
n=1 n=3 n=3 n=7  
Support 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (66.67) 2 (28.57) 
Oppose 1 (100.0) 3 (100.0) 1 (33.33) 5 (71.42) 
Risk factor mitigation should be 
disclosed (IVC_176_disclmitigate) n=2 n=6 n=5 n=13 *** 
Support 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (100.0) 6 (46.15) 
Oppose 1 (50.0) 5 (83.33) 0 (0.0) 6 (46.15) 
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 1 (16.67) 0 (0.0) 1 (7.7) 
Requiring risk factor mitigation 
disclosure would reduce informativeness
(IVC3_177nomitigatediscl) 
n=2 n=5 n=2 n=9 
Agree 2 (100.0) 3 (60.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (55.56) 
Disagree 0 (0.0) 2 (40.0) 2 (100.0) 4 (44.44) 
Risk factor mitigation should be 
disclosed by risk factor 
(IVC3_178_support_requiring) 
n=2 n=3 n=2 n=7 
Support 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (100.0) 3 (42.86) 
Oppose 1 (50.0) 2 (66.67) 0 (0.0) 3 (42.86) 
Unspecified 0 (0.0) 1 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 1 (14.29) 
Consolidation of risk-related disclosure 
should be required (IVC3_180_182) n=7 n=7 n=7 n=21 
Support 6 (85.71) 7 (100.0) 7 (100.0) 20 (95.24)
Oppose 1 (14.29) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (4.76) 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
An insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among respondent groups 
on this question.
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Table 18: Industry Guides.
Investors
(%) 
Issuers
(%) 
Other
(%) Total 
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Industry Guides are useful, 
should be retained 
(IVE_205_215_keepIG)
n=16 n=6 n=8 n=30 N/A (100%  agreement) 
Agree 16 (100.0) 6 (100.0) 8 (100.0) 30 (100.0)
Industry Guides are useful for 
aiding ESG disclosure 
(IVE_205_215indguideESG)
n=12 n=1 n=2 n=15  
Agree 11 (91.67) 0 (0.0) 2 (100.0) 13 (86.67)
Disagree 1 (8.33) 1 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (13.33)
(Certain) Industry Guides 
should be codified
(IVE_213indguidecodify) 
n=4 n=2 n=2 n=8  
Support 1 (25.0) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 3 (37.5)
Oppose 3 (75.0) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 5 (62.5)
86
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/2
2020] DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD? 153
Table 19: Section IV.F. Views on ESG Disclosure Reform.
Investors (%)
n=216 
Issuers (%)
n=28
Other (%)
n=33 
Total 
n=277 
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
NATURE OF ESG INFORMATION
ESG factors are material, in
whole or in part 
(F216_ESGmateriality)
n=205 n=19 n=27 n=251 ***
Agree 202 (98.54) 12 (63.16) 27 (100.0) 241 (96.02) 
Disagree 2 (0.98) 7 (36.84) 0 (0.0) 9 (3.59)
Unspecified 1 (0.49) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.40)
Establishing ESG disclosure 
rules is within the SEC’s
authority (F220_mission) 
n=173 n=12 n=19 n=204 ***
Agree 170 (98.27) 4 (33.33) 18 (94.74) 192 (94.12) 
Disagree 3 (1.73) 8 (66.67) 1 (5.26) 12 (5.58)
Some ESG Factors reflect 
systemic risks (ESG_systemic) n=32 n=0 n=4 n=36 
N/A (100%  
agreement) 
Agree 32 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (100.0) 36 (100.0) 
% of Section F respondents  14.81% of 216 0.00% of 28 12.12% of 33 13.00% of 277
ESG factors are sector-
specific (F216_ESGsector) n=69 n=5 n=18 n=92 
Agree 68 (98.55) 5 (100.0) 18 (100.0) 91 (98.91) N/A (100%  agreement) 
% of Section F respondents 31.94% of 216 17.86% of 28 54.55% of 33 32.85% of 277
Disagree 1 (1.45) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
% of Section F respondents 0.46% of 216 0.00% of 28 0.00% of 33 0.00% of 277 
NEED FOR ENHANCED OR EXPANDED ESG DISCLOSURE 
Enhancing ESG disclosure 
will elicit immaterial 
information and obscure 
material information
(F217_ESGobscure) 
n=46 n=23 n=12 n=81 ***
Agree 17 (36.96) 22 (95.65) 6 (50) 45 (55.56) 
Disagree 29 (63.04) 1 (4.35) 6 (50) 36 (44.44) 
Voluntary sustainability
disclosure is sufficient to 
meet investors’ needs 
(F218vol_OK)
n=97 n=13 n=16 n=126 ***
Agree 1 (1.03) 13 (100.0) 2 (12.5) 16 (12.7)
% of Section F respondents 0.46% of 216 46.43% of 28 6.06% of 33 5.78% of 277 
Disagree 96 (98.97) 0 (0.0) 14 (87.5) 110 (87.3) 
% of Section F respondents 44.44% of 216 0.00% of 28 42.42% of 33 5.78% of 277 
ESG information provided 
on company websites is
sufficient to meet investors’
needs (F218weblink_OK) 
n=38 n=4 n=10 n=52 ***
Agree 3 (7.89) 3 (75.0) 3 (30.0) 9 (17.31)
% of Section F respondents 1.39% of 216 10.71% of 28 9.09% of 33 3.25% of 277 
Disagree 35 (92.11) 1 (25.0) 7 (70.0) 43 (82.69) 
% of Section F respondents 16.20% of 216 3.57% of 28 21.21% of 33 15.52% of 277
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Investors (%)
n=216 
Issuers (%)
n=28
Other (%)
n=33 
Total 
n=277 
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Climate-related disclosure is
adequate under current 
framework 
(F223_climateOK)
n=80 n=12 n=14 n=106 ***
Agree 3 (3.75) 12 (100.0) 5 (35.71) 20 (18.87) 
% of Section F respondents 1.39% of 216 42.86% of 28 42.42% of 33 38.27% of 277
Disagree 77 (96.25) 0 (0.0) 9 (64.29) 86 (81.13) 
% of Section F respondents 35.65% of 216 0.00% of 28 27.27% of 33 31.05% of 277
WHY VOLUNTARY ESG REPORTING IS INADEQUATE
Its lack of comparability
(F218vol_comparability) n=96 n=1 n=14 n=110 N/A 
Agree 74 (77.08) 0 (0.0) 8 (57.14) 82 (74.55) 
Disagree 15 (16.85) 0 (0.0) 4 (33.33) 19 (18.81) 
It is directed at a wide range 
of stakeholders 
(F218vol_stakeholder) 
25 (26.04) 1 (100.0) 3 (21.43) 29 (26.36) N/A 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.  An 
insignificant result indicates no statistically significant difference among respondent groups on this
question.
Table 20: Costs & Benefits of New Line-Item ESG Disclosures.
 
Investors (%)
n=216
Issuers (%)
n=28
Other (%)
n=33
Total 
n=277
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Costs of new ESG
disclosure would exceed 
current compliance
costs (F221_disclcost) 
n=23 n=18 n=8 n=49 
***
Agree 8 (34.78) 18 (100.0) 3 (37.5) 29 (58.18)
Agree, but costs would 
be reasonable 9 (39.13) 0 (0.0) 3 (37.5) 12 (24.49) 
% who agree of Section
F respondents  10.65% of 216 64.29% of 28 9.09% of 33 10.47% of 277
Disagree 6 (26.09) 0 (0.0) 2 (25) 8 (16.33) 
Investors would 
experience cost savings
if new line-item ESG
rules were introduced 
(F221_savecost) 
n=26 n=0 n=5 n=31 N/A  
% of Section F 
respondents 12.04% of 216 0.00% of 28 15.15% of 33 11.19% of 277
Integrated reporting is
important (F218_IR) n=17 n=1 n=4 n=22 
% of Section F 
respondents 7.87% of 216 3.57% of 28 12.12% of 33 7.94% of 277 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Table 21: Exemptions & Scaled ESG Requirements.
Investors 
(%) 
Issuers 
(%) 
Other 
(%) Total 
Fisher’s
Exact Test 
Any new line-item ESG rules should be 
scaled for SRCs or certain other issuers
(F222_ESGscale) 
n=21 n=2 n=11 n=34 *
Agree 5 (23.81) 2 (100.0) 2 (5.88) 9 (26.47) 
Disagree 16 (76.19) 0 (0.0) 9 (81.82) 25 (75.53)
SRCs or certain other issuers should be 
exempt from any new line-item ESG
rules (F222_ESGexempt) 
n=19 n=2 n=11 n=32 
Agree 4 (21.05) 1 (50.0) 2 (18.18) 7 (21.88)
Disagree 15 (78.95) 1 (50.0) 9 (81.82) 25 (78.13)
Any new line-item ESG rules should be 
delayed for SRCs or certain other 
issuers to allow transition
(F222_ESGdelay) 
n=18 n=2 n=11 n=31  
Agree 4 (22.22) 0 (0.0) 5 (45.45) 9 (29.03) 
Disagree 14 (77.78) 2 (100.0) 6 (54.55) 22 (70.97)
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
Table 22: Factors Contributing to Support for (Opposition to) ESG Disclosure
Reform (Hypothesis 5).
Model 1: Probability modeled is support for ESG reform (pro_ESG_yes=1).
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c 
 Parameter Odds
Ratio
Estimate
Sig. Parameter Odds
Ratio
Estimate
Sig. Parameter Odds
Ratio
Estimate
Sig.
IIIA_6_13prescriptive_yes 2.693 14.781 *** 2.682 14.617 *** 2.656 14.235 ***
F216_ESGsector_yes -0.943 0.390 0.539 1.714 0.538 1.712 
F217_ESGobscure_yes -3.696 0.025 *** -2.606 0.074 *** -2.591 0.075 ***
F218vol_OK_no 3.807 45.027 *** 3.340 28.231 *** 3.305 27.236 ***
F216_ESGmateriality_yes 2.191 8.946 *** 2.613 13.644 *** 2.599 13.449 ***
F216_ESGmateriality_no
individual_yes -0.813 0.444 
institution_yes -2.203 0.110 *** -2.212 0.109 ***
ID_investor_yes 0.057 1.059 
ID_issuer_yes 
Model Fit Statistics 
Likelihood Ratio 312.694 324.489 324.496 
Score 225.310 231.625 232.118
Wald 54.233 47.699 47.774 
Nagelkerke’s R-Square 0.893 0.911 0.911 
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5%level; * significant at the 10% level.
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Model 1 cont.: Probability modeled is support for ESG reform (pro_ESG_yes=1).
 Model 1d Model 1e 
 Parameter Odds Ratio
Estimate
Sig. Parameter Odds Ratio
Estimate
Sig.
IIIA_6_13prescriptive_yes 2.573 13.109 *** 3.531 34.163 ***
F216_ESGsector_yes 0.456 1.578  0.911 2.487
F217_ESGobscure_yes -2.202 0.111 ** -2.323 0.098 ***
F218vol_OK_no 2.864 17.537 ** 4.147 63.241 ***
F216_ESGmateriality_yes 2.723 15.221 ***    
F216_ESGmateriality_no    -13.770 0.000  
individual_yes       
institution_yes -2.002 0.135 *** -0.939 0.391 *
ID_investor_yes       
ID_issuer_yes -1.022 0.360     
Model Fit Statistics       
Likelihood Ratio 325.827   The maximum likelihood estimate
is questionable.Score 235.431   
Wald 49.206   
Nagelkerke’s R-Square 0.913   
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
Model 2: Probability modeled is opposition to ESG reform (pro_ESG_no=1). 
 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 Parameter Odds
Ratio
Estimate
Sig. Parameter Odds
Ratio
Estimate
Sig. Parameter Odds
Ratio
Estimate
Sig.
IIIA_6_13prescriptive_yes -2.940 0.053 *** -2.730 0.065 *** -2.564 0.077 ***
F216_ESGsector_yes -0.080 0.923  -0.087 0.917  -0.007 0.993  
F217_ESGobscure_yes 3.731 41.698 *** 3.762 43.041 *** 3.707 40.712 ***
F218vol_OK_no -3.242 0.039 *** -3.208 0.040 *** -2.879 0.056 **
F216_ESGmateriality_yes -2.023 0.132 *** -1.708 0.181 ** -1.594 0.203 **
F216_ESGmateriality_no          
institution_yes 0.298 1.347      
individual_yes    -0.669 0.512  -0.509 0.601  
ID_investor_yes       -0.510 0.601  
ID_issuer_yes          
ID_other_yes                   
Model Fit Statistics               
Likelihood Ratio 328.425     328.754     329.220     
Score 233.876     234.582     235.814     
Wald 46.401     46.688     47.292     
Nagelkerke’s R-Square 0.917     0.918     0.919     
Note: *** significant at the one-percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; * significant at the 10 percent 
level.
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Model 2 cont.: Probability modeled is opposition to ESG reform (pro_ESG_no=1) 
 Model 2d Model 2e 
 Parameter Odds Ratio
Estimate
Sig. Parameter Odds Ratio
Estimate
Sig.
IIIA_6_13prescriptive_yes -2.656 0.070 *** -4.069 0.017 ***
F216_ESGsector_yes -0.170 0.844     
F217_ESGobscure_yes 3.441 31.229 *** 3.002 20.131 ***
F218vol_OK_no -2.824 0.059 ** -4.592 0.010 ***
F216_ESGmateriality_yes -1.760 0.172 ***    
F216_ESGmateriality_no    14.311 556.400  
institution_yes       
individual_yes -0.725 0.484     
ID_investor_yes       
ID_issuer_yes 0.582 1.790     
ID_other_yes       
Model Fit Statistics          
Likelihood Ratio 329.220     The maximum likelihood estimate
is questionable.Score 237.237     
Wald 47.347     
Nagelkerke’s R-Square 0.919     
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
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